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Abstract
This thesis seeks to better understand the nature of, and relationships between 
knowledge, data and information. The context selected for this work was clinical 
practice in the UK National Health Service (NHS) beginning with the generation and 
use of clinical knowledge. The thesis undertakes a critical examination of the 
relationship between that knowledge and the data it produces, and the large-scale 
statistical data sets generated from it via a number of human, technological, systemic 
and mathematical processes. The statistical data sets were regarded as important 
because they were highly influential, being used as the basis for significant and far- 
reaching decisions about healthcare in the NHS. These decisions included policy­
making, financial allocations, and allocations of services and other resources. This 
situation provided fertile ground for this research because the clinical knowledge and 
data were believed to be subjective to some unknown degree. The statistical data sets, 
however, were endowed with objective and scientific value. The thesis explores and 
explains this apparent contradiction.
In addressing this issue, the thesis encompasses philosophical, sociological and 
technological concerns and develops explanatory theories grounded in data collected. 
Data was collected by a process of extensive qualitative field-based investigation 
undertaken with clinicians, and data collectors, handlers and users in their operating 
environments. Key concepts underpinning these theories involve the social 
construction of reality as a product of individual and group frames of reference; social 
construction of reality as a result of social arrangements for professional groups; social 
construction of reality as a result of the pursuance of ontological security; and lastly, 
the phenomena of structural contradiction and conflict. Of major relevance in this was 
Giddens’ work (1976, 1984) on Structuration Theory, in particular in terms of 
exploring the effects of sociologically-based frames of reference on creation and 
transfer of meaning in informational terms. This work was also influential in terms of 
the notion of structural contradiction and conflict and its informational effects.
Application of this abstract, meta-level theory to this real-world situation also led to 
one of the main contributions to theory. This engagement with reality enabled 
refinement of its underpinning model. It also demonstrated its explanatory power. This 
strengthens the validity of the theory and renders it more accessible to other 
researchers.
The thesis indicates clinicians’ use of information and subsequent recording of data 
represents a highly personalised area of professional activity. This does not 
subsequently translate easily into the data sets and statistical classification schemes 
that are in common usage in healthcare management. These findings led to conclusions 
which confirmed initial perceptions of statistical clinical datasets as having a tenuous 
connection with the clinical knowledge and events upon which they purport to be 
based. Drawing on evidence which describes knowledge as being situationally- 
dependent, the conclusions also assert that the transformation of original meaning this 
implies is largely due to social influences. Finally they claim that the apparent 
rationality of decisions made on the basis of the transformed meaning, while the result 
of calculative thought designed to justify related decisions, is misguided in that it has 
no foundation in the evidence presented. The document ends with a call for a 
fundamental reassessment of the types of knowledge processed routinely through 
systems, and of the ways in which those types are handled.
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Chapter 1, Introduction to the Research
This chapter provides an introduction to the thesis. It contains an overview of the 
research problem. This is then expanded upon in a discussion of the researcher’s 
relationship to the problem and the problem situation. This discussion also describes 
the reasons why the research was developed. The chapter goes on to describe the 
specific research questions designed to address the problem. Lastly, it discusses the 
broad approach taken to the research, and the rationale behind it.
This thesis describes a piece of research undertaken in order to better understand the 
nature of, and relationships between, certain kinds of knowledge, data and information. 
The context selected for this work was clinical practice in the UK National Health 
Service (NHS) beginning with the generation and use of clinical knowledge. The thesis 
undertakes a critical examination of the relationship between that knowledge and the 
data it produces, and the large-scale statistical data sets which are generated from it via 
a number of human, technological, systemic and mathematical processes. The 
statistical data sets were regarded as important because they are highly influential, being 
used as the basis for significant and far-reaching decisions about healthcare in the NHS. 
These decisions include policy-making, financial allocations, and allocations of services 
and other resources. This situation provided fertile ground for this research because the 
clinical knowledge and data were believed to be subjective to some unknown degree. 
The statistical data sets, however, are endowed with objective and scientific value. The 
thesis explores and explains this apparent contradiction.
In doing this, the thesis does not assert that quantification is invalid; as noted by Porter 
(1995) firstly quantification:
‘.... has an overwhelming appeal.... in Government, business and social research 
....’ (Porter, 1995: viii)
As he then goes on to note, this is not least because it is:
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‘.... a technology of distance .... it is well suited for communication that goes 
beyond the bounds of locality and community.’ ( Porter, 1995: ix)
The need for pragmatic tools in an organisation as distended as the NHS is, therefore, 
accepted. However, as Porter (1995) goes on to note:
‘.. . .a  highly disciplined discourse helps to produce knowledge independent of the 
particular people who make it.’ (Porter, 1995: ix)
This raises two issues. Firstly, acceptance of pragmatic need is not believed to preclude 
a requirement to understand the effects of those tools and associated processes, so that 
more informed use and provision of information might take place. Secondly, it is the 
exact nature of that ‘independence’ which is a key area for this research. Independence 
could be taken to mean that knowledge is easily transportable, that it is not anchored 
irretrievably in one location. This independence may also, however, underpin the 
apparent contradiction referred to above, by enabling unnoticed and unexplored change 
in the basic content and meaning of that knowledge. This issue is at the heart of this 
thesis and is explored by addressing philosophical, sociological and technological 
aspects of the problem domain.
1.1 Overview of the Research Problem
The research problem was based on the researcher’s perception of a paradox pertaining 
to clinical data in the NHS. The paradox involved the fact that the practice of medicine 
was socially accepted as being imbued with all the rigour and certainty of science. As 
noted by Higgs (1999) the history of medicine has:
‘ .... culminated in the dominance of ‘western scientific medicine.’ (Higgs, 1999: 
162)
As also noted by Higgs, this is as opposed to any of the other highly complex systems 
of medicine which have flourished in other cultures for thousands of years.
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However, as the researcher became involved with clinical knowledge and data, key 
elements of it began to emerge as being opinion-laden, uncertain and vague. In short, 
these elements seemed to be characterised by subjectivity at least as often as they were 
by objectivity. Yet both objective and subjective types of data were all regularly 
transformed into a homogeneous body of objective, statistical ‘facts’, which were the 
Government’s national clinical datasets (known as Hospital Episode Statistics or HES 
data). Moreover, these ‘facts’ were being used by the Government and various 
healthcare managers as the basis of significant and far-reaching decisions about 
healthcare in the NHS. Herein lay the paradox, and the problem. Subjective 
knowledge, it appeared, was being objectivised as a matter of routine, and with far- 
reaching consequences. As noted by Felligi (1996):
‘Given the magnitude of our problems, the leverage of the right kind of statistical 
information system has seldom been as great.’ (Felligi, 1996: 166)
This comment was made in reference to the use of statistical information to inform 
national public policy in Canada. It was known to be equally relevant to the UK, where 
the national clinical datasets were used as follows:
• ‘Policy development.
• Illustrating variations in health status and health delivery through time and across 
geographic areas.
• Providing answers to Parliamentary Questions (PQs).
• Production of comparative statistics to assist in performance management.
• Medical research -  HES contains a wealth of information of use to clinicians and 
others who are developing new treatments, investigating causal factors and 
monitoring trends.
• Helping to determine how much of the taxpayers money should be spent on 
healthcare, and how it should be distributed.’ (DH, 1997a: 1)
The problem perceived was clearly, therefore, hugely important in social terms. Given
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such a situation, and an increasing reliance on such data, such confidence was 
considered to be misplaced without serious study of the underpinning knowledge and 
the data it generated.
1.2 The Background to the Research: The Researcher and the Research Problem
To expand upon the above overview, initial perception of the research problem began 
for the researcher during her first work assignment for the NHS. This required direct 
involvement with NHS clinical work and information at all stages of its generation and 
use. The researcher’s assignment focused on the development of a statistical 
classification for clinical data. This tool, Healthcare Resource Groups (HRGs) is more 
fully described in chapters 2 and 8, although some description is useful at this stage.
Like all of the statutory NHS statistical clinical classifications, the primary purpose of 
HRGs was to provide statistical data to NHS managers. This was used as a basis for 
administrative decision-making about clinical work, both locally and nationally. A 
basic premise of its operation was that the system would only use clinical data already 
being collected in a management minimum dataset developed in the 1980s. This dataset 
was designed to give managers what were considered to be the minimum amount and 
type of data necessary for management decisions in running the NHS at all levels. The 
dataset was a mixture of basic demographic and clinical data about each patient 
encountering NHS hospitals. The demographic data was collected from the patients by 
administrative clerks. The clinical data was abstracted by coding clerks from statements 
recorded in medical casenotes by clinicians, and then processed through two clinical 
classifications, the International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health 
Problems, Tenth Revision (ICD-10) and the Office of Population Censuses and Surveys 
Classification of Surgical Operations and Procedures, Fourth Revision (OPCS-4). It 
was also subjected to various statistical processes.
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To this work of classification development the researcher brought the socially accepted 
view of the clinical world, its knowledge and data coming from it. In other words, 
clinical work was considered to be characterised by certainty and ‘scientific’ rigour. 
Data based upon it was, in principle, considered to be the same. It was, therefore, 
considered valid for the purposes of computer coding and statistics. This was despite 
the knowledge that, as noted by Krause and Clark (1993):
‘Uncertainty pervades life and can arise from many sources. It is present in most 
tasks that require intelligent behaviour, such as planning, reasoning, problem­
solving, decision-making .... and many others dealing with real world entities.’ 
(Krause and Clark, 1993: 1)
However, such was the socially-held perception of clinicians and their work that this 
was not perceived as applying there.
The researcher’s involvement with healthcare data then extended as she became 
responsible at national level for development and maintenance of all statistical clinical 
classifications for the NHS. With the overview brought by this position it became clear 
that clinicians were generally unhappy with these classifications, particularly in terms of 
the way they represented their clinical work. It also became clear that managers, while 
believing that the data coming out of the classifications could accurately reflect clinical 
work, were generally unhappy with the quality of that data. It was obvious that 
something would have to be done if the classifications were to fulfil their allotted role 
and justify the investment made in them.
A review of what appeared to have been done up to that point indicated that action taken 
had entrenched the problem rather than resolved it. The researcher’s opinion was that 
this was possibly because the views of neither group had been perceived as having any 
validity by the other. In a departure from this stalemate, one of the ways in which she 
sought, therefore, to resolve these difficulties was to seek better understanding of each 
group’s worldview. This approach was adopted in the hope of managing the conflict 
and arriving at a negotiated plan of support for the classifications. This was undertaken
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by close work, not only with managers, but also with clinicians, using a mixture of 
approaches. These were most noticeably characterised by their appropriateness to 
gaining understanding of conflicting views of the same issues, and included for 
instance, Checkland’s Soft Systems Methodology (Checkland, 1981). This process is 
fully described in the researcher’s Masters thesis (Drennan, 1991).
The results of these efforts were unexpected. Far from enabling development and use of 
classifications to move swiftly and directly forward on the basis of more shared 
understanding between the key groups, it precipitated for the researcher a sense of 
fundamental and significant unease about the basic premise of statistical clinical data 
classifications. It raised similar levels of anxiety about the validity of their data output 
and about decisions based upon that output. This unease had one main origin. The 
above-mentioned efforts to understand the realm of clinical work had necessitated fairly 
direct involvement with clinical knowledge, with its application, and with the 
generation of new knowledge and data. This changed the researcher’s initial perception 
of clinical knowledge and data as being a homogeneous body of scientific, hard, 
objective, empirical fact. Rather it emerged as a mixture, with significant amounts of it 
being characterised by uncertainty and significant degrees of subjectivity and 
heterogeneity. That in itself was not considered to be necessarily problematic, because 
medicine seemed to work. Patients were treated and many seemed to get better. 
However, as mentioned above, this information was then, to varying degrees, used by 
the administrative management of the organisation as the key statistical and, it was 
assumed, factual descriptor of the conditions, treatments and clinical services received 
by NHS patients, and of the resources these incurred. Given these uses, and the coding 
and classification processes used to handle the data, the researcher’s assumption was 
that management was routinely endowing all clinical data it received with scientific 
qualities. Inherent in the processing observed seemed to be an assumption by non- 
clinical groups (managers, statisticians, Ministers, coders) that the initial clinical 
knowledge was objective ‘truth’, and that individuals and systems involved were 
somehow neutral media in terms of the representations of reality they created. As a
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result, impacts on the meaning of the original clinical data, or the integrity of the 
resulting statistics were not considered.
These insights immediately raised the possibility for the researcher of incompatibility 
between medical casenote data and ICD-10 and, to a lesser extent, OPCS-4. They also 
indicated that the original clinical statements written in the medical casenote were being 
transformed, not transferred. This led to two key questions for the researcher. The first 
was how such ‘facts’ could arise out of what seemed to be subjective opinion. The 
second was what the specific effects and implications of the transformation were for the 
resulting information. Both of these questions then quickly assumed a wider relevance, 
as they led the researcher to question ‘objective’ knowledge and information more 
generally, and to question its handling via systems.
1.3 The Aims of the Research and the Research Questions
The research focused, therefore, on what was considered to be an unexplored, 
fundamental and important trichotomy. This involved firstly, the nature of clinical 
phenomena, secondly, the nature of the knowledge and data generated by clinical 
phenomena and, thirdly, the nature of the uses to which that data was being put.
The research aimed to gain a deeper understanding of the nature of clinical phenomena, 
as expressed in the knowledge inherent in the key processes of clinical care. It also 
aimed to gain more profound insights into the primary and secondary data produced by 
those processes and the behaviour based on that. Exploration of this focused on the 
impact of social influences. These were deemed to be an important area to explore 
because it appeared, from the above situation, that different views of one reality might 
exist. In searching for reasons for this situation the researcher was conscious of a 
number of variances in the social, organisational settings involved. These included 
different professional and occupational groups: clinicians and managers, and different 
formal and informal information systems and requirements. This resulted, therefore, in
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a focus being placed both on the nature of the knowledge, data and information in 
question, and on the settings within which they were found as knowledge and data were 
passed between groups.
This research was, therefore, based upon the premise that information is underpinned by 
knowledge and that knowledge sits within a social framework, which may have an 
effect upon it and upon the information it generates. Information in this context, was 
not, therefore, approached as a standard, homogeneous entity, static at all points in 
terms of its characteristics and its place within its context. Rather it was considered in 
terms of whether and how it was relative to and, most importantly, reflective of social 
context, whether it was a manifestation of that as well as a medium.
Because of the specific and more general problems the research could address, it aimed 
to contribute to knowledge underpinning both healthcare management, and theory and 
practice in the field of Information Systems (IS). This wider application of findings 
was based on the fact that data, information and knowledge underpin many other key 
social processes and phenomena, including the law, finance, and personal and corporate 
decisions. They can, therefore, shape the world in which we live, the reality we 
perceive and our ability to maintain and change that reality. It was hoped, for instance, 
to expand upon work which emphasises the need to understand the relationship between 
problem domains and systems analysis and development methodologies (Jayaratna, 
1994; Checkland, 1981; Avison and Fitzgerald, 1995). This kind of contribution could 
be achieved by contributing to an underpinning foundation of detailed insight into the 
contexts which shape information rather than solely into what real-world entities 
information purports to describe and the nature of their existence.
Because the research would have the benefit of studying two extremes, in terms of the 
nature of knowledge and information, a further goal was to contribute to the continuing 
philosophical debate about the subjectivity or objectivity of reality. The intention was 
not to resolve this conflict between objectivist and subjectivist philosophies, and finally
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determine whether anything actually exists independently of man’s cognition of it. Nor 
was it to determine whether any absolute truths exist. As noted by Habermas (1972):
‘If we imagine the philosophical discussion of the modem period as a judicial 
hearing, it would be deciding a single question: how is reliable knowledge .... 
possible.’ (Habermas, 1972: 3)
However, what the research did seek to do was explore how a perception, or set of 
perceptions, became socially accepted as ‘knowledge’, in so far as they were received 
into and acted upon by a community. Validity therefore, in the context of this research, 
related to the relationship between the initial meanings with which this knowledge and 
associated data was endowed by its initiators, and the subsequent meanings attached by 
others.
The specific research questions that were developed in order achieve the aims of the 
research were as follows:
• Is there an objectivity inherent in clinical data?
• Can it be so readily translated into the body of statistical fact that underpins the data 
sets for healthcare decision-making?
• What is the relationship between the social knowledge processes involved in clinical 
decision-making and the nature of data produced from those actions?
• What is the impact on decision-making in healthcare management?
1.4 Overview of Approaches Used to Address the Research Problem
In broad terms the research addressed the problem in the following stages. Firstly, it 
considered the philosophical questions raised by research which sought to understand 
the nature of knowledge and social processes relating to that knowledge. Building on 
this foundation, it engaged in the bringing together of a view, comprised of initial and
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relevant theories, from areas of conceptual work. This view was then tested through a 
process of field research, using NHS clinical data as a vehicle. Initial hypotheses were 
improved upon during this process. They were then ultimately refined in order to add to 
the existing academic knowledge base in this area. The results were also focused at 
providing advice of strategic and practical use to the Department of Health (DH) and 
other international healthcare bodies, which might inform policy making in the areas to 
which this knowledge would apply. This broad approach is reflected in the structure of 
the thesis, which can be represented diagrammatically as follows:
3. Undertaking the Research
The third major section of the thesis discusses and analyses the data collected when 
the problem was investigated in its organisational context. The analysis takes account 
of earlier findings from the literature review, and also encompasses exploration of 
findings in relation to meta-level theory, (chapters 6, 7, 8, 9 and 10)
4. Research Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations
The fourth major section applies the research findings to draw conclusions about the 
research problem and to make recommendations relating both to the problem domain, 
and of a more general nature. This section also establishes the contribution made by the 
research beyond the problem domain. Lastly, it provides conclusions drawn about the 
process of the research itself, (chapters 11, 12 and 13)
2. Planning the Research
Having set the scene for the research, the second major section of the thesis explores the 
issues involved in undertaking it. This section establishes the philosophical foundation 
for the research. It also discusses the exploration of key areas of conceptual work 
through which the research problem was addressed, culminating in discussion of early 
hypotheses. Lastly, the methodological and analytic approaches chosen are considered, 
(chapters 3, 4,and 5)
1. The Research Problem Defined
The first part of the thesis establishes the focus of the research, the research questions 
and the broad approaches used to address those questions. Explanatory detail is 
provided by discussion of the background to the problem, and of how and why it came 
to be perceived as it was. This includes consideration of the researcher’s relationship to 
the problem context, and of defining aspects of the organisational context within which 
the problem was identified, (chapters 1 and 2)
Figure 1: The Structure of the Thesis
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Chapter 2, The Organisational Context
Due to the nature of the problem, it is felt that it is important at this early stage to set the 
context for the research. Context both informs and dictates our understanding of 
practices inherent in the research domain. In order to establish that contextual setting, 
this chapter provides a description and discussion of the NHS as an organisation. The 
NHS of today is very much a product of social arrangements for the practice and 
organisation of healthcare prevailing before its inception. The history of the NHS is, 
therefore, addressed, starting with the situation before its inception in 1948, and 
including significant developments since then up to the present day. This discussion also 
provides an insight to the foundations of current roles and relationships amongst key 
actors in the research problem domain.
The discussion then continues to build a picture of the problem domain by describing the 
information systems at work there. The relationships between them are described in 
terms of the clinical data which flowed from one to the other. The systems included the 
medical casenote, which was manually created by the clinician and was the source of all 
clinical data thereafter. They also included several systems which were then used to 
process extracts of the contents of the medical casenote. These systems were computers, 
a coded, computerised nomenclature, statistical classifications, and statistical processes. 
People were addressed as part of the literature review and as part of the fieldwork. 
Discussion of them is included in the relevant chapters. A detailed organisational 
analysis is also provided as part of the discussion of the literature.
2.1 Before the NHS
Prior to its inception the medical profession was divided into three distinct groups: 
General Practitioners (GPs) and two tiers of hospital doctors, each of which had very 
different terms and conditions of employment. Each GP was, for all practical purposes, 
an independent businessperson whose practice, for the most part, was quite separate from 
the hospital service. The hospital service was split into two distinct areas: voluntary and 
municipal. The most prestigious hospital doctors usually worked in the voluntary 
hospitals, which were mostly eighteenth century charities in origin and governed by a
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board of trustees. These hospitals had no direct management. Their doctors did not, 
therefore, answer to a direct manager and to a large extent they managed themselves. 
They were in possession of enormous, independent power. This was based historically 
on the kind of expert and specialist knowledge that has made ‘professional syndicalism’ 
a feature of most, if not all, middle class professions.
The remaining hospital doctors worked at municipal hospitals. This was by far the larger 
of the two sectors. Local politicians controlled these hospitals at a macro level. At a 
local level they were controlled by a Medical Officer for Health who was, in effect, a 
doctor-manager. This person had great power, but within the constraints of direct 
management.
2.2 The Birth and Development of the NHS, 1948-1999
This was the situation into which the Government of 1948 introduced its proposals for a 
national health service. As noted by Cook (1987) its initial objectives were to:
‘ provide good medical care for all, free at the point of need ....’ (Cook, 1987: 11)
It sought to do this by marshalling what were, at that time, uncoordinated and inequitably 
distributed medical services. This aim met with considerable resistance from the medical 
profession, not least because of the perceived loss of independence to which it might 
lead. Clearly, however, the involvement and support of clinicians were critical to the 
enterprise. Such was the Government’s commitment that, in order to secure that support, 
the then Minister for Health, Aneurin Bevan, struck some key bargains. Most 
significantly he gave the medical professions concessions, the likes of which other 
professions could only dream. The effects of these concessions continue to reverberate 
through the NHS to the present day, particularly in the hospital sector. Specifically, what 
Bevan did was to review the existing municipal and voluntary models of management 
within healthcare. He then selected the voluntary sector model as part of the basis upon 
which Consultants would agree to support the NHS. He thereby extended the privileges 
previously enjoyed only by the elite of the medical profession to all those working in the 
hospital sector. Thus no hospital and, critically, no doctor had a manager. Furthermore,
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while receiving a salary from the NHS, doctors were allowed to dictate their own terms 
as to when and how they would work within it.
Thus, the expert power of clinicians persisted. No ‘outsider’ possessed the competence 
to judge practice, and no insider needed to, because practice was evidence of expertise, 
and expertise was a matter of judgement as well as skill. They continued to be nominally 
equal, fiercely independent and self-managing. Their actions, practices and general 
modus operandi, including production and provision of information, remained largely 
uncontrolled and uncontrollable by outsiders. The loyalty of the profession was, and 
remained, firmly and exclusively focused towards its patients, its members and its 
professional bodies. The latter was also the profession’s greatest and, for all practical 
purposes, only real source of both sanction and censure. The profession essentially, 
therefore, retained all of the power it previously held, in terms of autonomy, etc., and 
supplemented that with access to a pool of resources and a source of regular and 
guaranteed income.
This was largely the situation when the research was undertaken, the only potentially 
relevant development being the Internal Market.
2.3 The Internal Market and the Research Problem
The development of the Internal Market in healthcare in the 1990’s is worth 
consideration in terms of the situation which led to it. This is useful in order to fully 
appreciate the implications of the change for information within the NHS and, therefore, 
for the research problem.
When the NHS came into being hospitals were funded centrally from Government 
coffers. Allocations were made annually and were calculated on the basis of what each 
hospital received the previous year together with an allowance for inflation where 
appropriate. GPs continued to be small-scale, largely independent businessmen. Central 
management of General Practice was largely nominal and quite separate from the 
structures agreed for the hospital sector. However, funding did change, as GPs became 
contractors to the NHS, receiving a capitation fee for each patient on their list.
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This all changed again with the advent of the ‘Internal Market’. In the face of increasing 
demand for static or, in real terms, diminishing resources, every Government has 
espoused the view that the efficiency and effectiveness of the NHS must improve. 
However, the last Conservative administration also took the view that the traditional 
method of guaranteed annual funding offered insufficient incentive for this to happen. 
As a response to this the Internal Market was introduced.
This was a system which was being maintained by the Labour Government during the 
research, although the December 1997 White Paper, ‘The New NHS: Modem, 
Dependable’ (DH, 1997b) expressed an intention to modify it from 1999. The essence 
of the system was that, ultimately, hospitals would not receive any funding from central 
sources. This was being phased out so that during the research most hospitals still 
received a proportion of their funding in this way. Competitive packaging and marketing 
of healthcare services to GPs would acquire the remainder of the funding. GPs were 
provided with budgets from central funds to disburse on patient care, theoretically at 
least, anywhere within the NHS. They could also employ private practitioners where it 
could be justified. So, for example, a GP might traditionally have always sent hip 
replacement patients to the nearest local hospital. However, in the Internal Market, 
another hospital might convince the GP that their care was equally or more effective and 
cheaper. This persuasion could be achieved by use of local data, for instance, about 
shorter lengths of stay in hospital for given treatments or conditions, and low rates of 
readmission. The GP would be at liberty to send that work to the new hospital, which 
would then be appropriately reimbursed for the care delivered. Alternatively, or 
additionally, the GP might underpin any decisions of this nature by reference to 
published DH statistics.
With the Internal Market money, therefore, began to follow patients rather than being a 
guaranteed factor in the operational life of a hospital. Hospitals that failed to achieve 
funding could, therefore, be closed, and demonstrable quality of care, as described by 
clinical data, was among the deciding factors. It seemed likely, therefore, that clinical 
activity, judgements and decisions, as reported in clinical data, as well as in actual 
practice, would be liable to regular and incisive scrutiny. This in turn meant that the 
autonomy of clinicians as individuals and as groups would be vulnerable to challenge.
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In a different but equally significant way the activities of managers in the NHS was also 
affected by this changed operating environment. Managers, specifically Chief Executives 
of NHS hospitals, became responsible for the financial health of their organisations. 
This resulted in a much keener interest in the effectiveness and efficiency of clinical 
decisions than ever before. It was supposed by the researcher that this would partially 
manifest itself in a keen interest in clinical data.
The context of the problem was, therefore, one of deeply entrenched and significant 
structures and roles, but one in which change that had relevance for the research problem 
might be occurring.
2.4 NHS Systems and The Flow of Clinical Information
The remaining key elements of the context in which the research was undertaken were 
the information systems and flows. Because it is intended at this stage simply to provide 
a complete picture of the context, this section is largely confined to description and 
discussion of the systems’ external specifications and design purposes. This is followed 
by a description of the processes that linked them and the flow of clinical data through 
the NHS. This is, therefore, a first level analysis of them. Deeper explorations of 
systems types and of the specific systems at issue were undertaken later in the research, 
during the literature review and field research. They are, therefore, analysed in greater 
depth in the reports of those parts of the research.
Six clinical information systems formed the vehicle for this research. The first was the 
medical casenote. This was the key data source for the other systems. The first of these 
was the hospital Patient Administration System (PAS). The remainder were the Read 
Coded Clinical Thesaurus, Version 3 (Read 3) ICD-10, OPCS-4 and HRGs. PAS, Read 
3, and HRGs were all computerised systems. ICD-10 and OPCS-4 were either manual or 
software-based. In either event data compiled using them was always entered into a 
computer. Together with their organisational context these systems formed the backbone 
of clinical knowledge and data transfer within the NHS.
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2.4.1 The Medical Casenote
Each NHS hospital patient has a medical casenote. This is a file containing 
administrative details, for example demographic information, and a clinical sheet or 
document produced or added to solely by the clinician as a result of patent encounters. 
From the clinical perspective it appeared that the purpose of this document was as an 
action log. In other words, it was a document written by clinicians for clinicians, that 
was oriented possibly towards future action on the patient, possibly towards defence of 
past clinical action and opinion. It was used by the NHS as the main source of all 
clinical data for management purposes.
2.4.2 Patient Administration Systems (PAS)
PASs are modular information systems installed on hospital mainframe computers. 
Coders used these systems in order to complete their task. Access by coders to 
administrative and clinical coding modules was through remote terminals, linked to the 
central hospital databases. PASs were designed initially to collect patient administration 
data for local use and in order to fulfil statutory requirements for returns of data to the 
DH. With the addition of subsequent modules a variety of patient information could be 
collected and processed for a number of different users. This included clinical data of 
the type focused on by this research. All PASs offer users a number of field-based 
screens that are relevant to the particular module being accessed, the basic contents of 
which did not vary across the NHS.
2.4.3 The Read Coded Clinical Thesaurus, Version 3 (Read 3)
Read 3 is a computerised system of coded clinical terms. It was developed by and for 
clinicians to support them in the delivery of patient care. The importance of this system 
to the research was that, while it was not possible to collect primary data reflecting its 
live use, it was increasingly used within the NHS to record computerised details of 
clinical consultations, and reflected the most recent direction and views of the DH on 
clinical data. It was also increasingly used as the basis from which statutory data and, 
therefore, statistical datasets were derived. In practice, although the intention was that
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clinicians should enter their own data using this system, where it was used clinicians 
usually still completed medical casenotes as they always had, and these still went to 
coders. The coders then entered the data into the PAS by first using Read 3. They then 
achieved classification data through a mixture of manual work and automatic maps from 
Read 3 to ICD-10 and OPCS-4.
This system purports to move away from the inherent scientism of clinical 
classifications. It is, like all representational systems, a model of a view of the clinical 
domain, as it relates to both primary and secondary healthcare sectors. In terms of the 
detail of the model, it can be described as a concept-based systematised nomenclature. 
In other words, it is a system of terms which is elaborated according to pre-existing rules 
and has a concept system as its basic principle of organisation. Concepts are assumed to 
be non-linguistic abstract entities that are expressed by linguistic terms. Read 3 contains 
hundreds of thousands of clinical terms, catalogued by clinicians, and reflecting the 
words they normally use to describe their clinical work in the everyday care of patients. 
Types of data analysis to be undertaken were not specified at the design stage, beyond 
ensuring each clinical user could retrieve their own data as entered. Rules for use do not 
exist, and definitions of terms do not exist. To this extent Read 3 does not impose a 
framework.
The terms are arranged in a hierarchical file structure and each term has its own unique 
alphanumeric code. The code identifies the term and nothing else. It carries, for 
instance, no information about the place of the term in the conceptual hierarchy within 
which it sits.
The hierarchy closely mirrors the current bureaucratised approach to medicine, which 
starts with ‘disease’ or ‘treatment’ and divides the body into parts. Thus the top 
‘chapter’ in the system is ‘Read thesaurus’. Beneath this are the chapter headings, which 
are fully listed and described in Appendix 1. They include, for instance, History and 
Observations, Disorders, and Investigations. Beneath each heading are relevant terms. 
So, for instance, beneath History and Observations are terms for clinical findings, which 
the literature says may be obtained from a clinical history, examination, assessment, 
special investigation or tests.
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This structure has knock-on effects for the ‘logical’ arrangement of some concepts within 
the system. A concept such as ‘pulmonary tuberculosis’ must appear twice, in both the 
‘Respiratory Disorder’ and the ‘Infective Disorder’ hierarchies. A further feature of the 
system is that, in order to avoid a ‘term explosion’ and because of the area of the world it 
is addressing, Read 3 breaks ‘complex’ terms into what are known as ‘core terms’ and 
‘qualifiers’. Therefore, ‘Emergency Appendectomy’ would appear as a core term of 
‘Appendectomy’, with an option of selecting ‘Emergency’ from the available qualifiers. 
The grounds for deciding what is a core term and what is a qualifier seemed somewhat 
arbitrary.
Core terms are supplemented by synonyms, each also with their own unique code, but 
inextricably linked to their associated core term within the system. The criteria for 
deciding what was an acceptable core term or synonym was also somewhat arbitrary. 
Being in normal use by a number of clinicians seemed to be the most common criteria.
As mentioned above, the system holds no definitions of terms. Users are free to work 
with the terms in the contexts of their own frames of reference. The system gives no 
advice on what aspects of observed facts and medical language data should be reported 
or how it should be indexed. It just offers concepts (terms) for standardising medical 
language data in what was considered by the designers to be a passive manner, although 
this passivity is somewhat tempered by the existence within the system of established 
clinical relationships between entities. These relationships, however, broadly reflect 
clinical consensus, being based upon established texts and teachings in the field. In 
terms of definitions of clinical concepts and entities it is assumed that, at one level, users 
will apply their own definitions and meanings to the terms in the model. At another level 
it is hoped that groups will see the benefit to clinical care of being able to share clinical 
information about patients, and will be driven to agreeing and establishing definitions.
2.4.4 The International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health 
Problems, Tenth Revision (ICD-10)
The importance of this system to the research was that it was one of the two systems 
mandated by the DH within the NHS for use in production of statutory datasets. Every
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patient encountering the NHS must have defined clinical details coded according to one 
of these systems. As described above, this is either done manually using the medical 
casenote and the classification manuals or, where Read 3 was used as a front end, the 
codes in this classification were reached by means of mapping tables and some manual 
work. The differences in the levels of detail between these systems, which becomes 
more evident below, inevitably impact upon the original clinical data.
As its title suggests this is a statistical classification, i.e. an arrangement of concepts into 
classes and their subdivisions, expressing the semantic relationships between them. The 
criteria for subdivision are clear, and the division is exhaustive and exclusive. The 
characteristics used for subdivision reflect its purpose. It works, therefore, in a top- 
down, goal-oriented manner. In a statistical classification class frequencies do not differ 
too much from an equal distribution in some sort of reference population. Cote (1983) 
maintained that, in this sense, the ICD is not truly a statistical classification. Here the 
term ‘statistical classification’ should be defined as lists of statistically significant 
entities based predominantly on prevalence or considered importance.
ICD is produced and maintained by the World Health Organisation (WHO). The WHO 
(1993) defines its purpose as being:
‘.... to permit the systematic recording, analysis, interpretation and comparison of 
mortality and morbidity data collected in different countries or areas and at different 
times.’ (WHO, 1993: 2)
As noted by Porter (1995):
‘.... quantification is a technology of distance’. (Porter, 1995: ix)
Its classes are arranged so as to facilitate the statistical study of disease phenomena. It is 
used to translate diagnoses of diseases and other health problems into alphanumeric 
codes, which permit easy storage, retrieval and analysis of the data. It is the international 
standard diagnostic classification for all general epidemiological and many health 
management purposes. These include analysis of the general health situation of 
population groups. They also include monitoring of the incidence and prevalence of 
diseases and other health problems in relation to other variables, such as the
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characteristics and circumstances of the individuals affected. The WHO makes it clear 
that the ICD is neither intended nor suitable for indexing of distinct clinical entities. It is, 
however, routinely used in the NHS in this way. It also warns of some constraints on its 
use in billing or resource allocation, such as that engaged in by users of HRGs, which 
draw their data from ICD-10 and OPCS-4 data.
It was originally designed to classify causes of mortality as recorded on registration of 
death certificates. Its use and scope was only more latterly extended to include 
morbidity. The developers recognised that not every problem or reason for coming into 
contact with health services can be categorised as a disease or injury with a formal 
diagnosis. It also provides, therefore, a wide variety of signs, symptoms, abnormal 
findings, complaints and social circumstances that may take the place of a diagnosis in 
health records. Interestingly, NHS checks on the quality of ICD-10 data prohibit more 
than minimal use of these. Non-specific statements are deemed by DH statisticians to 
exist in medical casenotes only rarely.
ICD-10 can be used to classify data recorded under headings such as ‘ diagnosis’, 
‘reason for admission’, ‘condition treated’, and ‘reason for consultation,’ all of which 
appear on the variety of health records from which statistics and other health-situation 
information are derived.
The ICD-10 classification is organised into hierarchical chapters, again reflective of the 
bureaucratic approach medicine takes. These are fully listed in Appendix 2. They 
include, for instance, Diseases of the Blood and Blood-Forming Organs and Certain 
Disorders Involving the Immune Mechanism; Congenital Malformations; Deformation 
and Chromosomal Abnormalities; Injury, Poisoning and certain other consequences of 
External Causes; Diseases of the Nervous System; Diseases of the Musculo-Skeletal 
System and Connective Tissues; and Symptoms, Signs and Abnormal Clinical Findings 
Not Elsewhere Classified.
The ICD is a variable-axis classification. The following pattern of organisation can be 
identified within its structure:
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Epidemic diseases 
Constitutional or general diseases 
Local diseases arranged by site 
Developmental diseases 
Injuries
The first two and the last two of the groups listed above comprise ‘special’ categories, 
which bring together conditions that would be inconveniently arranged for 
epidemiological purposes if they were scattered. The remaining group includes the ICD 
chapters for each of the main body systems. The WHO (1993) warn that:
‘.... the distinction between the ‘special groups’ chapters and the ‘body systems’ 
chapters has practical implications for understanding the structure of the 
classification, for coding to it and for interpreting statistics based on it.’ (WHO, 
1993:13)
They advise that generally, and where there is any doubt, conditions should be primarily 
classified to one of the special groups chapters.
Though the WHO admits the arbitrary nature of some of the characteristics of the ICD, 
they maintain that it has stood the test of time and is found to be a more useful structure 
for general epidemiological purposes than any of the others tested.
The basic ICD is a single coded list of three character categories, each of which can be 
divided up into ten four character sub-categories. Alphanumeric codes are used. 
Possible code numbers range from AOO.O to Z99.9. The letter ‘U’ is not used, being 
reserved for research purposes.
The classification has a limited number of explicit definitions relating to certain terms: 
e.g. ‘live birth’. As is customary for a classification, it also has extensive rules 
governing what can be assigned to any class. These are deemed essential in order to 
produce ‘comparative’ information as they guarantee unique assignments of individuals’ 
instances or concepts to one class. Class frequencies could not be interpreted statistically 
if this were not the case. The classification contains over 40,000 coded labels.
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2.4.5 The Office of Population, Censuses and Surveys Classification of Surgical 
Operations and Procedures, Fourth Revision (OPCS-4)
This is the other mandated system for producing statutory data about NHS patients. This 
is a classification used for statistical purposes, although investigations to date do not 
indicate that statistics were the primary motive behind its design.
Its basic structure again follows the bureaucratic approach to medicine, with 23 
anatomically-based chapters, most of which relate to procedures on the whole or part of a 
body system, e.g. Nervous System; Endocrine system and Breast; Eye; Ear; Respiratory 
Tract; etc. They follow the same principles as ICD-10 and are not, therefore, listed in an 
Appendix to this thesis.
Alphanumeric codes are used in a hierarchical structure. The authors maintain that:
\ . . .  strict anatomical allocation of operations has infused a readily understandable 
logic into the classification.’ (HMSO, 1990: viii)
This is interestingly described as necessary:
‘.... given the increased blurring of specialty boundaries.’ (HMSO, 1990: viii)
The classification contains over 10,000 coded labels.
Within each section procedures were generally sequenced in a way which was thought to 
reflect their comparative significance in resource use terms. This was done by arranging 
the procedures within each organ section in descending order of complexity, as 
understood in 1990. Notably this was before the emergence of ‘keyhole’ surgery as a 
main technique in surgery.
Like ICD-10, it contains some limited definitions, e.g. what constitutes a surgical 
procedure. It also contains limited instructions to coders regarding what should be 
assigned to the classes.
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2.4.6 The Healthcare Resource (Statistical) Grouper (HRGs)
As with Read 3, it was not possible to collect primary data about the live use of this 
system. Once again, it is included for completeness.
At the time of the research this system was mandated for use in developing financial 
contracts for the sale and purchase of healthcare in some specialties within the NHS.
This statistical classification was designed for analysis of resource use in healthcare. It 
contains over 500 classes or groups. The system automatically draws its data from data 
classified using ICD-10 and OPCS-4 via a series of mapping tables. It implicitly follows 
the organising principles of ICD-10 and OPCS-4, although groups are labelled according 
to their HRG content as would be expected. Groups are not individually listed here due 
to their number. They are designed to contain disorders and treatments that have 
similarities, in that clinically they can be meaningfully grouped together and are also 
expected to consume similar amounts of healthcare resources. Thus they include, for 
example, groups titled Non-Surgical Treatment of Fibroids, Menstrual Disorders or 
Endometriosis; Spinal Cord Injury with Fusion or Depression; Complex Elderly with a 
Vascular System Primary Diagnosis; and Neonates with Multiple Major Diagnoses. 
Each group has an alphanumeric code.
2.4.7 NHS Clinical Data Flows
The following logical model is designed to show how the systems work together:
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Clinician <„.........> Patient
vMedical record <................. > clinicians
(either manual or computerised via Read)
< c -— __ _
coding clerks
yCoding clerk
vPAS
Read dataset   > clinicians
    > coding clerks
Maps and manual coding
y
^ ICD-10 and OPCS-4 datasets--------- > Hospital managers  > clinicians
i Vj D e p a rtm e n t-------------- >  Ministers
i of researchers
j Health clinicians
I hospitals
j DH depts.
y
HRG grouper 
yHRG dataset
Figure 2, Macro Information System Flows
In the above model the flow of data through the systems progresses down the left- 
hand side. The right-hand side of the model describes those to whom the data is 
available.
Following the left side, clinicians engage in consultations with patients and produce 
from that a document, described here as the medical casenote. This is either solely in 
manual format or also in computerised format in Read 3. This captures those details
> finance directors 
....^clinicians
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clinicians deem relevant to patient care. The form and content of the medical casenotes 
can be idiosyncratic and incomplete. They can be composed of any of the following: 
clinical statements and observations, speculations, symbols, drawings, printouts, and 
numbers. As well as describing treatments, these often refer to illnesses, symptoms and 
conditions. They do not always contain, therefore, definitive diagnoses.
This data is then passed, either electronically or using the medical casenote, to coding 
clerks so that the clinical details of the consultation can be coded. The coding clerks do 
this by first accessing the patient’s administrative record, which is held on the PAS. This 
enables them to check, for instance, that they are coding the right patient. They then 
access the clinical coding module and enter the details of the patient’s condition(s) and 
treatment(s) if relevant. Certain data items from this collection are then manually 
abstracted from the medical casenote. They are then codified. Two alternatives are 
available for this initial coding process. They could be coded initially using Read 3. These 
codes would then be translated into their classification equivalents, using a mixture of 
manual coding and mapping tables. The mapping tables are software-based and contain 
the relationships between each thesaurus code and its classification equivalent(s). 
Alternatively, clinical data could be coded directly into ICD-10 and OPCS-4. This process 
would produce the ICD-10 and OPCS-4 statutory datasets used by hospitals and required 
by the DH and made available to its customers. Where Read was used it would also 
produce a Read database for use by the hospital.
ICD-10 and OPCS-4 coding is then sometimes followed by coding into the higher level 
classification, HRGs, using fully automated mapping schemes. This reclassifies the 
original coding in a different way for the purposes of analysing resource use in healthcare. 
It also produces an HRG dataset for use by the hospital.
In the problem domain, coding and classification was happening, therefore, more than 
once, and using various people and mechanisms, both manual and computerised, each with 
different design purposes. The data was then subjected to statistical analysis in hospital 
information departments and DH statistical departments. These efforts ultimately 
produced reports in basic numerical formats, which were variously presented and widely 
used as definitive facts about the real-world clinical phenomena described. Entire
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publications were found to be devoted to them (DH, 1998a, 1998b). Subsequently, far- 
reaching decisions, as described in chapter 1, were made on the basis of them.
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Chapter 3 Addressing the Problem: Philosophical Considerations
3.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the philosophical issues which were addressed when starting to 
explore the research problem. Specifically, it describes how the researcher defined the 
problem situation in terms of key factors at work. It then explores the philosophical 
stance adopted by the researcher and seeks to make an argument for an open- 
mindedness amounting to a multi-view approach, particularly during the early stages. It 
also explores how that influenced definition of perceptions of the problem situation and 
the research problem itself. As noted by Popper (1957) the best we can do is write in a 
way which is consistent with a particular point of view, and that point of view ought to 
be clearly stated. The chapter also provides the rationale for the areas of theoretical 
work explored, which will be seen to span the philosophical divide of subjectivity and 
objectivity. Lastly, it provides the foundation for the approaches used in the field work 
stage of the project. As noted by Kirsch (1983):
‘ Perhaps the most obvious way philosophy can contribute to the human sciences is
by questioning underlying methodological principles.’ (Kirsch, 1983:12)
3.2 Philosophy and the Researcher: Defining the Problem Situation
The research problem was perceived as encompassing both social and scientific 
elements. It was considered necessary, therefore, to examine relevant elements of social 
context and the scientific treatment of the information. These included the generation of 
clinical knowledge and the movement, manipulation and multiple uses of the data and 
information that generated. Information in this context was not perceived as innocent 
(March and Simon, 1958) or as existing in a vacuum. Rather it was seen as the 
lifeblood of the organisation and inextricably bound up with its goals, politics and 
practices. Thus the research included exploration of the organisational context of the 
research problem. This followed Kantrow’s (1984) assertion that:
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‘In order to know which design changes are really needed, it is first necessary to
understand how  various systems and structures fit and work together, what is
the logic that holds them, what special peculiarities and relationships are essential, 
what constraints are unavoidable.’ (Kantrow, 1984: 41)
Thus, it was deemed relevant to this research that, as previously described, the NHS as 
an organisation was the product of an ‘agreement’ between the Government and the 
British medical profession in 1948. The nature of that agreement was of interest in 
terms of whether and how the consequently political character of the NHS might affect 
the research problem. In addition, the main objective of the Government in 1948 had 
apparently been, and ostensibly still was, to develop an organisation wherein the best 
medical care for all, free at the point of need, would be available. The core business 
would be patient care and the primary need to be satisfied would be that of the patient. 
The NHS was undeniably, therefore, the product of a particular political ideology 
which, it could be argued, was based on a belief that the State knows what is best for its 
people, and which forever placed the NHS firmly within the realm of public 
‘ownership’ and political utility. This, in turn, characterised the demands to which 
non-clinical managers of the NHS would have to respond. These included, most 
significantly, that of public accountability, and methods of achieving and demonstrating 
that through information. Given that, account was taken of the work, for instance, of 
Barnes (1974, 1977) who considered such ideologically grounded knowledge as 
inherently including and concealing illegitimate interests. This was particularly 
interesting in terms of the NHS. As discussed by Mannheim (1970):
‘The higher the rank of an occupation, the more likely its is to have a highly 
developed occupational ideology.’ (Mannheim, 1970: 438)
Drawing on Barnes (1974,1977) this situation of robust ideological affinities might lead 
to consideration by the groups involved, whether implicit or explicit, of such questions 
as:
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‘What account of reality would lead others to act so that instead of furthering their 
own interests... .they furthered ours?’ (Barnes, 1977: 32)
Within this research, the extent to which this was so was particularly important from the 
perspective of understanding whether, when and where particular interests gained 
supremacy and what the ensuing effects were on knowledge gained and transferred.
It was also considered to be of relevance to examine the situation prior to inception of 
the NHS because medical models, power bases and relationships existing at that time 
were carried forward into the new NHS structure and persisted, in large part, to the 
period of the research. Thus, a focus was also placed on understanding whether the 
professional nature of clinical work had a bearing on the research problem. A key 
element of professional autonomy, which is discussed at greater length later in this 
thesis, is what might be termed ‘knowledge closure’ by professions, using various 
means, including language and other methods of communication. In other words, 
professionalism and its inherent autonomy both enable and are enabled by 
communication arrangements which are exclusive of non-members. This raised 
concerns about the validity of such knowledge and information when employed outside 
the direct clinical context.
Thus, clinical imperatives and public ownership, ideological derivation and political 
utility were considered to be worthwhile areas of study because of their potential 
influence on knowledge processing and use. The underpinning question revolved 
around the relativistic perception that, as noted by Urmson and Ree (1995):
‘What is true in one situation may not be true in another that the concepts used
in one situation may be unintelligible in another....’ (Urmson and Ree, 1995: 275)
An important tenet of this approach for this research, as Urmson and Ree go on to 
discuss, was that it does not assume that different things are believed or said or done in 
different circumstances, but that it is possible that differences which emerge are a 
consequence of local circumstances. Thus this approach was considered to have
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potential in explaining a situation where apparently subjective opinions emerged, after 
passage through a series of social circumstances and events, as ‘objective facts’.
Moving down a level into the processes of the organisation, the information in question 
passed through a number of handling centres, involving people, hardware, software and 
manual systems. Each of these would, therefore, also receive attention.
The above description of the key factors at work in the problem domain represents the 
researcher’s perception of some part of ‘reality’, namely the people, technology, 
structures, tasks and processes associated with the generation and use of specific sets of 
NHS clinical knowledge, data and information. This is a wide scope, and reflects two 
factors. Firstly, it reflects the researcher’s previous exposure to all parts of the process 
involved in the research problem, which indicated the need for such a focus. Secondly, 
it reflects the researcher’s belief that the context of the problem was organisational and 
that an organisation is not a machine, but what Checkland (1981:14) describes as a 
‘human activity system’. In other words, the context involves a dynamic, complex and 
purposeful system of social relationships, including people, technology, structures, tasks 
and processes (taken from Jayaratna’s (1994: 59) modification of Leavitt’s (1972) 
model). This was not to discard notions of scientific mechanism, but rather to widen 
the method of enquiry sufficiently to ensure that both those concepts and humanistic, 
interpretive notions could be accommodated. A focus on all of the elements was 
deemed necessary to generating explanatory hypotheses.
The word ‘deemed’ is important, because the early stages of the research were intended 
to produce hypotheses which would later be tested and developed. The desire here was 
to ensure that, while not extending to random explorations, the scope did not exclude 
potentially important areas at an early stage.
The views and approaches described thus far are not the only possible views and 
approaches. As noted by Jayaratna (1994):
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‘....problem solvers, by being human, tend to select some elements of the situation 
as being relevant and useful for study...’ (Jayaratna, 1994: 64)
As he goes on to note, sometimes this selection is unconscious and based on 
unexamined assumptions, and sometimes it is based on explicit models and 
methodologies that are employed, although the author would argue that both 
assumptions and methodologies can be mutually influential. What is clear, however, is 
that individuals approach and understand situations via a cognitive framework or 
‘mental construct’ (Jayaratna, 1994: 64). This can vary from individual to individual 
and have influential effects on what is perceived and how.
Among the characteristics active in influencing a researcher’s choices, Jayaratna (1994) 
goes on to identify such factors as the researcher’s perceptual process, which filters 
information from the real world and determines significance. He identifies values or 
beliefs assimilated from various societal sources, like peer groups and parents, and 
guiding choices between alternatives by helping individuals to pass judgement on 
situations, etc. He also includes ethics or expected standards and types of behaviour; 
motives, or needs individuals seek to satisfy; prejudices, or persistent opinions; 
experiences; reasoning ability and knowledge and skills. He further includes role 
characteristics, i.e. those that are assumed as part of holding responsibility for particular 
tasks. Lastly, he includes structuring processes or ways of structuring our thinking, 
whether or not we have access to methodologies, models and frameworks. Frameworks 
are described in this context as static structures which show the connections between a 
set of models. Jayaratna argues that the elements of this mental construct act together in 
a dynamic way in the process of enabling individuals to make sense of and negotiate 
reality.
The elements deemed at this stage to lie within the initial boundary of the problem 
situation inevitably, therefore, reflected the characteristics of the researcher. However, 
it is argued that awareness of these influences resulted in a more comprehensive and 
useful boundary than would otherwise have been the case.
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3.2.1 Worldviews and Their Validity
Fundamental to the mental construct described above are our beliefs about the nature of 
reality itself and our consequent beliefs on investigating it. The concepts of 
‘subjectivity’ and ‘objectivity’, and of scientific and interpretive approaches to reality 
are significant here. Development and justification of an approach to exploring this 
problem clearly involved a need to explicitly clarify, first of all, what these positions 
meant to the researcher. The following tables, which draw on unpublished work by 
D’Arcy (1989) sought to do this and to create a foundation for the rationale behind the 
initial and subsequent approach used in this research. This approach is developed 
further later in the thesis, when research methods in connection with fieldwork are 
described and the role of the researcher in this regard is fully explored.
The framework distinguishes philosophically between the scientific and interpretive 
paradigms by means of laying out what are considered to be the key parametric 
characteristics of a paradigm. The term paradigm is used here to represent a 
commonality of perspective which binds the work of a group of theorists together in 
such a way that they can usefully be regarded as approaching social theory within the 
bounds of the same problematic. Each paradigm, therefore, has an underlying unity in 
terms of its basic, and often taken for granted, assumptions. In a very fundamental way 
these separate theorists located in one paradigm from those in another.
Within the framework each parameter is described, firstly from the perspective of the 
scientific paradigm, and then from that of the interpretivist paradigm. The 
paradigmatical parameters of each are then described from the standpoint of the other. 
Each parameter is shown to represent a measure which, when applied to the scientific 
paradigm gives a particular response and when applied to something else, in this case 
the interpretive paradigm, gives another, thereby highlighting the key assumptions and 
differences inherent in both stances. The purpose here is not to focus effort on the still 
unresolved debate about any given type of reality. Rather it is to demonstrate that each
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has strengths and weaknesses in relation to a particular worldview, and ultimately to 
show those strengths and weaknesses in relation to understanding particular types of 
phenomena. The first table describes the parameters of the scientific paradigm as seen 
from the perspective of the scientist:
PARAMETER SCIENTIFIC PARADIGM
ontological commitment external, common, knowable reality
method of enquiry formal, logical, a priori analytic, a posteriori 
synthetic
nature of evidence open to examination, proof and refute
nature of knowledge shared, useful, applicable
purpose of knowledge prescriptive, predictive
terminology (language) precise, syntactically correct
relationship of user maintained independence and objectivity from 
area of enquiry
development continuum 
(by following that paradigm)
gradual transitions, discontinuities due only to 
imperfect knowledge
Table 1, The Scientific Paradigm
Applying these principles to the realm of clinical reality, the key assumption is that of a 
reality which is external to man and knowable by him. All other parameters may be 
seen to be logical according to this foundation. That reality is considered, therefore, to 
be knowable by man by use of the kind of investigative approaches this stance 
embraces. The question then arose of whether this could be held, at this stage, to be true 
in terms of the clinical realm. Government approaches to that realm, i.e. statistics, 
codification, classification, etc., indicated it could be.
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However, this approach has two other major characteristics. Firstly, it rejects notions of 
experiential realities which are unique to individuals. Thus, the role of the clinician as 
investigator into that reality would be perceived as being independent of it. This would 
mean that clinicians must be a neutral medium in terms of the representations of reality 
which they made. The researcher’s professional experiences indicated this was not the 
case, although management actions indicated it was. Also, if the ‘user’ referred to 
above was completely independent of the object of enquiry, how would this paradigm 
explain its notion that discontinuities are due to imperfect knowledge? Knowledge 
resides within the individual and there is, therefore, an undeniable human influence at 
work.
Turning now to the interpretivist approach, the following table describes the above 
paradigmatical parameters applied to the interpretivist position:
PARAMETER INTERPRETIVE PARADIGM
ontological commitment essence of realities
method of enquiry intentional perception
nature of evidence derivable, non-replicable
nature of knowledge interpretively descriptive of reality
purpose of knowledge enhanced understanding of realities
terminology flexible, adaptive (because it is impossible to 
predict the kind of realities we will encounter)
relationship of user dependent on encountered phenomena
development continuum 
following that paradigm)
relies on alternatives and inherent discontinuities (by 
(if there were none the need for this paradigm 
would disappear)
Table 2, The Interpretive Paradigm
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The basis of this philosophical stance is that reality is relative to the individual’s 
perception of it. It cannot, therefore, be conceptualized as commonly knowable entities 
with regular relationships between them. This is a very different perspective, reflected 
in the work for instance of Barnes (1974) who asserts that all knowledge claims exist in 
the form we know them:
c. ... as a response to particular interests in prediction and control, which are in turn
related to social interests.’ (Barnes, 1974: 30)
For the research problem it would imply that the clinician was influential and that 
known clinical reality was not a concrete phenomena. If that was the case nothing could 
ever be known with certainty, and if that was the case the question was raised as to how 
medical effectiveness, e.g. in treating heart disease, could ever be explained.
Each of these positions assumes an exclusive connection with the ‘absolute truth’. To 
elaborate further upon this it is useful to consider the views of each paradigm on the 
other, as shown in the following two tables. The first table repeats the assertions of the 
scientific paradigm with regard to the characteristics of its own parametric values, but 
also lays this alongside the scientific view of the interpretivist stance on the same 
parameters:
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PARAMETER
ontological commitment
SCIENTIFIC
PARADIGM
external, common, 
knowable reality
INTERPRETIVE
PARADIGM
mystical, ambiguous 
reality
method of enquiry formal, logical, a priori 
analytic, a posteriori 
synthetic
random, unstable
nature of evidence open to examination, 
proof and refute
fragmentary, beyond 
proof
nature of knowledge shared, useful, applicable not supportable, 
opinion only
purpose of knowledge prescriptive, predictive confusing, arbitrary
terminology (language) precise, syntactically 
correct
undisciplined
relationship of user maintained independence 
and objectivity from 
area of enquiry
subjectively
dominated
development continuum 
(by following that paradigm)
gradual transitions, 
discontinuities due only 
to imperfect knowledge
chaotic, misdirected
Table 3, The Scientific View of Interpretivism
Thus science perceives interpretive accounts of reality to be fragmentary and beyond 
proof. It perceives interpretive method to be random and unstable, and the object of 
enquiry to be contaminated by researcher or user involvement.
The following table describes those same parameters as seen through the eyes of the 
interpretivist:
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PARAMETER SCIENTIFIC
PARADIGM
INTERPRETIVE
PARADIGM
ontological commitment distorted by the 
imposition of a singularity
essence of realities
method of enquiry predetermined, inflexible intentional perception
nature of evidence predetermined selective 
(if it does not fit with 
pre-definitions of evidence 
you do not select it
derivable, non- 
replicable
nature of knowledge limited, contextually 
barren (discovery of 
nuclear power considers 
no moral aspect
interpretively 
descriptive of 
reality
purpose of knowledge self-justification enhanced 
understanding of 
realities
terminology (language) rigid, restrictive 
(in support of rigid 
processes)
flexible, adaptive 
(because it is 
impossible to predict 
the kind of realities 
we will encounter)
relationship of user mistakenly detached mutually inter­
dependent with 
encountered 
phenomena
development continuum 
following that paradigm)
entrenched, vested 
interests, discontinuities 
unwelcome/resisted 
(Copernicus/Newton etc. 
-it means you have to 
relearn all your science)
relies on alternatives (by
and inherent
discontinuities
(if there were none
the need for this
paradigm would
disappear)
Table 4, The Interpretive View of Scientism
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As this table shows, the interpretivist believes scientific evidence to be selective, the 
nature of scientific knowledge to be limited and the object of enquiry to suffer from the 
researcher’s detachment.
3.2.2 Worldviews: Conclusions and how they Relate to the Researcher’s 
Perceptions of Reality
Given the complex and very varied nature of the world in which we live it was 
considered by the researcher unlikely that either position and its ensuing approach was 
totally right or totally wrong. Rather it was perceived that a balanced view would 
probably admit both viewpoints have strengths and validities as much as they have 
weaknesses.
It was also considered that this was particularly the case in this research, and at this 
stage of the research, which focused on both human and designed systems in 
understanding knowledge transformation. This stage also, as mentioned above, sought 
to develop a view which might be refined and developed by later testing against real life 
experiences and observations. As Checkland (1981) observes, designed systems:
once they are manifest, ‘could only be as they are,’ but human activity 
systems can be manifest only as perceptions by human actors who are free to 
attribute meaning to what they perceive.’ (Checkland, 1981: 14)
Science was, therefore, considered necessary and vital, but it was recognised that there 
are many things it could not address, nor was it designed to. It was designed to be, and 
is, successful in relation to a particular worldview and, it is argued here, to the parts of 
reality that worldview reveals and holds significant. As Checkland (1981) also 
observes:
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‘.... science also has many limitations .... Outside science but within the area of 
problems we might hope it could help us tackle, we find the method of natural 
science apparently impotent. Complexity, in general and social phenomena, in 
particular both pose difficult problems for science; neither has it been able to tackle 
what we perceive as ‘real world’ problems (as opposed to the scientist-defined 
problems of the laboratory).’ (Checkland, 1981: 13)
In addition, as observed by Porter (1995) whether or not it is the case that science can 
yield ‘true’ knowledge about real life phenomena:
‘.. . . i t  must nonetheless do so through social processes. There is no other way.’ 
(Porter, 1995: 11)
For instance, a consideration might be a belief that although all reality may not be 
external to the individual, ‘matter’ exists independently of our cognition of it. If and 
how it is labelled, whether or not it becomes part of the reality we can, or choose to, 
perceive in our ‘social’ reality, as opposed to what might be termed ‘extra-social’ 
reality, might be seen to be a product of social processes. Thus, whether the existence 
of the phenomena labelled ‘bones’ is known to a society does not preclude existence of 
such arrangements of matter. It does not preclude scientific exploration of its structure, 
and of what that structure can reveal about other such structures and their relationships 
to different structures. Labelling as ‘bones’ not only reflects an inclusion of such matter 
within the reality of particular worlds, it also carries understanding of how that 
phenomena fits into that social construct. Within this research no a priori assumptions 
were made with regard to how different ‘societies’ viewed and understood the same 
phenomena. It might have been the case that social labels were subject to differing uses 
by different social groupings, and to different degrees of social uncertainty within that. 
Schatzki (1983) claims that:
‘In fact, the factors that determine meaning are the factors that determine 
understanding. So the meanings of phenomena and one’s understanding of them 
are complementary; by being socialised one comes to understand the roles items 
play in our activities and correlatively, an item plays no role that is not understood 
by someone.’ (Schatzki, 1983: 135)
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As discussed earlier, this seemed to be the case where clinical work was concerned. A 
number of clinical observations appeared to be grounded in uncertainty and labelling 
was often tentative. However, such data seemed to be viewed by statisticians as hard, 
objective fact, its labels as sound and precisely descriptive of their real-life phenomena.
Rorty (1979, 1982) offers further insights and additional justification for the approach 
described here. He argues that such spectral opposites as subjectivity and objectivity 
may not be sufficient in exploring and representing reality, and that ‘justified’ 
knowledge arises from the pragmatic consensus of people in a specific community. 
Thus epistemic authority lies in their ‘unforced’ agreement (Rorty, 1982: 173). Porter 
(1995) also offers insights with his observation that, in current philosophical usage, 
subjectivity speaks of those phenomena; beliefs, etc., which exist only in the mind of 
the individual. Objectivity is almost synonymous with realism. However, as Porter 
goes on to discuss, this notion of objectivity is somewhat ‘absolute’, and when 
considering the objectivity of, for instance, science or scientific approaches to reality, its 
most influential characteristic might be defined as its social ability to reach a consensus. 
Thus, as Porter observes, we have what Megill (1992) refers to as ‘disciplinary 
objectivity’. Interestingly, Porter goes on to observe:
‘.... this sort of objectivity is not self-subsistent. Its acceptability to those outside a
discipline depends on certain presumptions which are rarely articulated .....’
(Porter, 1995: 4)
The presumptions referred to are the underlying commitments which both characterise 
disciplines philosophically and locate them within specific paradigms. This reflects an 
acceptance of paradigm-located knowledge, which neither accepts nor refutes either of 
the above, and may add to each. It could be held in tandem with the beliefs of the 
scientific community or, if social influences on ‘knowledge’ are accepted, with the 
beliefs of the radical interpretivist. Drawing on the work of Sayer (1984):
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‘.... the world can only be understood in terms of the available conceptual 
resources, but the latter do not determine the structure of the world itself. And 
despite our entrapment within our conceptual schemes, it is still possible to 
distinguish between more and less practically-adequate beliefs about the material 
world. Observation is neither theory-neutral nor theory-laden. Truth is neither 
absolute nor purely conventional and relative, but a matter of practical adequacy.’ 
(Sayer, 1984: 78)
This last point is important. As further noted by Sayer (1984):
‘Not just any conventions will do: they must be usable in practice.’ (Sayer, 1984: 
65)
This is taken further by Johnson (1995) who observes that:
‘This prevents ‘science’ becoming a purely intersubjective representation of, and 
consensus about, reality .... The pragmatic criterion operates as people adjust and 
reject schemas when the practical expectations they support are violated.’
(Johnson, 1995: 8)
This scenario, as further noted by Johnson (1995):
‘ .... implies that we have feedback from an independent ‘reality’ which constrains 
and enables practice that would otherwise be inconceivable.’ (Johnson, 1995: 9)
In either event, in this context truth is a changeable artifact and knowledge reflects that 
which is held to be true by a given community at a given time (Barnes, 1974). This 
view also finds some support in the history of science, for, as also noted by Barnes 
(1972) although it is:
‘.... the fully accepted beliefs of our current science that are used as touchstones of
truth .......  The history of science presents something of a problem, for it is
inescapably apparent that illustrious scientists of the past held views widely at 
variance with present ones. The situation can be saved by replacing the notion of 
truth with what ‘rationally follows from the available evidence.” (Barnes, 1972: 5)
This was taken as a fundamental premise of this research. Thus, one objective was to
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follow that consensual ‘truth’, in terms of whether and how it was transformed, rather 
than primarily to attempt to prove or disprove the existence of an external reality.
On this basis this research did not seek to defend or refute any position on the issue of 
philosophical reality. Rather, it was conducted using what might be described as a 
‘multiview’ or transdisciplinary approach. In other words, the researcher engaged in an 
iteratively enriching process of understanding, bringing to bear on the research problem 
the philosophical assumptions of the subjectivist and objectivist philosophical extremes. 
This approach attacked, therefore:
‘.... the ‘single-mindedness’ of philosophers who advance theory after theory on 
the dubious premise that one theory can be made to accommodate all the 
complexity of life (and embraces) the contradictions and idiosyncrasies of life (as) 
its strengths, not weaknesses that need to be reconciled and explained away.’ 
(Rorty: 1999, A5)
This approach also found support in a review of the work on Actor Network Theory 
(ANT) (Callon, 1986, 1997; Law et al, 1989; Latour 1989, 1991, 1997, 1998). As noted 
by Callon (1997) this work does not amount to a theory:
‘A main shortcoming is its being everything but a theory.’ (Callon, 1997: 2)
However, it was helpful in the process of framing a philosophical approach to the 
research because, as noted by Latour (1997) it has attempted to bypass the question of 
social construction and the realist/relativist debate, which it views as never having been 
a pertinent question. It suggests that both scientism and relativism stem from 
misunderstandings about the nature and practice of science and reality, and argues away 
from sociological and methodological reductionism, towards a more integrated 
approach to explanation. Thus, ANT:
‘.... collapses conventional boundaries between science, technology and society 
into a seamless web of stronger or weaker associations .... Factmaking becomes a 
collective business in which resistance must be overcome or realigned.’ (Brown, 
1992: 79)
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The explanatory aspects of this work are returned to later in this thesis. However, in 
terms of the approach taken to the work at this stage, ANT found both the scientific and 
interpretive, or social, schools of thought to be inadequate. As noted by Brown (1992) 
each group is seen as having too restricted a view of reality. Instead, it explores the 
notion that ontologies are configured by the network of relations within which the 
individual is involved, and seeks to generate explanatory accounts by understanding 
them.
3.3 Summary
This research did not set itself so lofty a target as resolving the philosophical question of 
whether an external reality exists. Philosophy had failed thus far to prove the social 
world as being external to the individual, i.e. as imposing itself on the individual from 
without, as ontologically prior to the existence of any individual, as being as hard and 
real as the natural world, and made up of hard, tangible and relatively immutable 
structures. Nor had it proved it to be the product of individual consciousness, i.e. made 
up of no more than names, concepts and labels used to structure ‘reality’. Radical 
protagonists of each stance continued to refute the value of the other. This research had 
the benefit of being able to explore knowledge apparently reflective of both 
philosophical extremes, and began with the view that each was designed to be 
successful in relation to a particular ‘worldview’, and that subjects of enquiry could 
benefit from application of the potential insights inherent in different perspectives. In 
other words, this research started with the position that a balanced view might admit 
both as being valid in certain circumstances, and that this approach, which was 
reflexively transdisciplinary (Holland, 1999) might yield more penetrating insights. 
Within the research the insights provided by each view, and relevant intervening views, 
were therefore employed as appropriate. Thus the research explored the philosophy of 
the scientific paradigm, but this did not indicate an innate bias towards the scientific 
lense. As was discussed earlier, the author did not consider herself to have a direct line 
to philosophical truth in terms of having resolved the subjectivist/objectivist debate.
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Rather she considered a secondary aim of this research to be development of a 
contribution to that on-going debate, by means of the observations and insights she 
expected to generate, particularly as it would address reflections of both sides. Thus 
the contextual and theoretical focus represented an attempt to explore and explain the 
problem by bringing to bear upon it salient features of each approach. It sought a better 
understanding of types of knowledge and issues arising from that. It sought to 
understand how reliable the knowledge is for given purposes, rather than focusing on 
the more nebulous concept of context-free reliability or ‘truth’. An important aspect of 
the work was, however, to identify and explore anything taken to be ‘truth’ about the 
world.
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Chapter 4, The Research Problem Addressed through the Literature
4.1 Introduction
This chapter describes how the research problem was explored through the literature by 
investigating key areas of conceptual work, which build on and relate to the discussion 
in chapter 3. The main areas of theory explored were Artificial Intelligence, 
Knowledge Representation, the Sociology of Knowledge, and Philosophy (as discussed 
in chapter 3). A number of other important areas of conceptual work within or 
associated with each of these fields were also explored.
This discussion is presented in four sections. In defining the research boundary and 
questions, and the approaches to be taken, the concepts of ‘data’, ‘information’ and 
‘knowledge’ were central and ran through all stages of the research. For that reason, 
the report of the literature review begins with discussion of these terms and what they 
mean to the researcher (section 4.2). The second section describes and discusses the 
choices of conceptual work considered and reviewed and the rationales for those 
choices (section 4.3). In the third section (4.4) the research problem is explored by 
applying these areas of conceptual work to what were perceived to be the key factors 
either at work, or potentially at work, in the problem situation. These were the 
organisational context, hardware and software systems, including digital computers, 
coded systematised nomenclatures, statistical classifications, the discipline of statistics, 
and people. The chapter closes with a final section discussing key theories which 
emerged from the review (section 4.5).
4.2 The Question of Data, Information and Knowledge
Exploration of these concepts began with the work of Popper (1972) who advised:
‘One should never quarrel about words, and never get involved in questions of 
terminology .... What we are really interested in, our real problems .... are 
problems of theories and their truth.’ (Popper, 1972: 310)
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However, this advice was offered for situations where definitions, although in question, 
have been established. Insights were then drawn from the work of Earl (1996) 
Checkland and Holwell (1998) and Davenport (1997) who tried to develop distinctive 
descriptions of the three terms for application in the field of IS. What quickly became 
clear from these explorations was that this process of differentiation would not be 
unproblematic. As noted by Davenport (1997):
Take the old distinction between ‘data’, ‘information’ and ‘knowledge’. I resist 
making this distinction because it’s clearly imprecise. ‘Information’ is after all an 
umbrella term for all three, and also the connection between raw data and 
knowledge eventually attained.’ (Davenport, 1997: 8)
This fairly typical assertion is echoed by Checkland and Holwell (1998) who conclude:
‘.... there is at present no well-defined definition of such terms as ‘data’ and 
‘information’ upon which there is general agreement.’ (Checkland and Holwell, 
1998: 86)
Despite this they considered it worthwhile establishing some differentiating 
descriptions. Starting with ‘data’, a number of definitions were found, as detailed in 
Checkland and Holwell (1998):
‘Data represents unstructured facts.’ (Avison and Fitzgerald, 1995: 12)
‘(Data is) Raw facts that can be shaped and formed to create information.’ (Laudon 
andLaudon, 1991: 14)
‘(Data is) The raw material of organisational life; it consists of disconnected 
numbers, words, symbols and syllables relating to the events and processes of the 
business.’ (Martin and Powell, 1992: 10)
Davenport (1997) offers a similar observation:
‘I define data as ‘observations of states of the world’ - for example, there are 697 
units in the warehouse ’ (Davenport, 1997: 9)
Data can, therefore, be somewhat loosely defined as the raw material of information. 
Turning to ‘information’ Checkland and Holwell (1998) offer the following collection
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drawn from a number of authors:
‘Information is that which results when some human mental activity (observation, 
analysis) is successfully applied to data to reveal its meaning or significance.’ 
(Galland, 1992: 127)
‘(Information is) Data that has been processed so that it is meaningful to a decision 
maker to use in a particular decision.’ (Hicks, 1993: 675)
‘(Information is) Data that have been shaped or formed by humans into a 
meaningful and useful form.’ (Laudon and Laudon, 1991: 14)
‘(Data is) transformed into information when meaning is attributed to it.’ 
(Checkland and Holwell, 1989: 95)
Drucker (1998) follows a similar theme, defining information as:
‘ .... data endowed with relevance and purpose.’ (Drucker, 1998: 46)
Information can be said to exist, therefore, where people ascribe attributes of relevance, 
purpose and meaning to data. Meaning is a function of context. This makes it variable 
and is consistent with the notion that an information system is a social, not a neutral 
system. The implications of this social dimension are discussed by Davenport (1997) 
in his discussion about what information is:
‘Information is also much harder (than data) to transfer with absolute fidelity .... 
somebody is bound to disagree with your definition of it.’ (Davenport, 1997: 9)
Checkland and Holwell (1989) also discuss this, noting that, what is generally 
overlooked is:
‘.... the fact that different people may attribute different meanings to the same 
data, or indeed, different meanings at different times ....’ (Checkland and Holwell, 
1989:95)
The concept of ‘knowledge’ proved to be no less problematic to define. Checkland and 
Holwell (1998) define it as:
‘... larger, longer living structures of meaningful facts.’ (Checkland and Holwell, 
1989: 90)
47
Davenport concurs, (1997) defining knowledge as:
‘ .... information with the most value .... precisely because someone has given the 
information context, meaning, a particular interpretation, somebody has reflected 
on the information, added their own wisdom to it .... (it) implies synthesis of 
multiple sources of information over time.’ (Davenport, 1997: 9-10)
Davenport also interestingly notes that knowledge is:
‘  unruly .... predefined categories can’t capture its fuzzy, frustrating diversity.’
(Davenport, 1997: 9-10)
Knowledge may be defined, therefore, as being made up of structures of related 
information, which may be expected to have a more prolonged existence than 
information, the meaning of which is seen to be more transient. Knowledge may also 
be taken to include, or at least be characterised by, intuition, judgement, experience, 
and opinion, all of which are the reservoir within which new data is processed. The 
notion here is that knowledge is a store, which is maintained or added to by 
engagement with data and from that engagement information and data are also 
produced. Thus the notion of ‘action’ is inherent in concepts of knowledge. O’Dell 
and Grayson (1998) concur and provide a useful summary drawing together all of the 
above:
‘Knowledge is information in action. Knowledge is what people in an 
organisation know about (for instance) their customers, their products and 
processes .... whether that knowledge is tacit or explicit. Data (facts and figures, 
context and interpretation) and information (patterns in the data) are not in 
themselves knowledge.’ (O’Dell and Grayson, 1998: 5)
So, for instance, the DH accumulates data about patient usage of the NHS. It takes that 
data and analyses it to determine patterns of disease. This might show that heart 
disease has prevalence in terms of morbidity in the population. It takes this information 
and hypothesises that, without a public health campaign the burden from heart disease 
on the NHS is likely to grow. Armed with this knowledge it takes action and launches a 
campaign designed to encourage healthy lifestyles among the population. If we 
continue to apply this to the NHS, management information is inferred from clinical 
data. Operational and policy decisions are made on those inferences, for instance,
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about efficiency of service (can we close one of two intensive care facilities, etc.). 
These inferences draw, to some extent, on existing knowledge of the NHS.
This differentiation, while hardly constituting a rigorous definition, was considered 
helpful therefore, because a focus on meaning and the creation and recreation of 
meaning was central to this research and to the exploratory approach used. Data was 
clearly seen to be moving in the problem domain. The question was whether meaning 
was also traversing cultural boundaries, or whether, in fact, meaning was being created 
anew in each social setting.
4.3 The Implications of Philosophical Considerations for the Conceptual Areas of 
Work Reviewed
A view of the problem was developed by bringing together three bodies of conceptual 
work, which were all quite distinct from each other. They were also highly relevant to 
the central concerns of the research, which were people, knowledge and systems and 
the paradigms and cultures within which they operated. As described above, the three 
main bodies of conceptual work were Artificial Intelligence (AI) Knowledge 
Representation and the Sociology of Knowledge, including scientific knowledge, 
particularly as it applies to numbers. This combination reflected the fact that both 
scientific and social theories of knowledge were recognised as having strengths in 
relation to the research. As each major theoretical field was studied it often led to a 
widening of the review to include associated literature, so that classes of literature with 
a common philosophical perspective emerged. While the main theoretical drivers of 
the work remained at the higher levels described, these associated literatures provided 
essential additional insights, so that a more rounded understanding was achieved.
The first two areas of work, AI and Knowledge Representation were reviewed by 
exploration of the work of a number of key authors, including Fetzer (1996) Krause and 
Clarke (1993), Shanker (1987) and Dreyfus (1972, 1985, 1986). Both of these areas are 
exemplars of the scientific paradigm. Knowledge Representation is a branch of AI, and 
encompasses representation of real life phenomena through data, and specifically
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through taxonomic classification. This was at the heart of the explicit transformation 
processes affecting the knowledge explored in this thesis. AI is the science of 
designing computer systems that perform tasks that would normally require human 
intelligence. As discussed by Bloomfield (1987) and Barnes (1974,1977) the influence 
of the paradigm that legitimises this world-view is significant. Drawing on the work of 
Fleck (1987) in considering AI a ‘world-view’ shared among a specific thought 
collective, Bloomfield (1987) asserts that AI, like other products of science, is part of 
the scientific culture of its conveyors. All digital computers, which are another key 
focus of this thesis, fall within this paradigm. This was considered to be of particular 
relevance because a number of the systems being studied in the problem domain were 
involved with the transformation of clinical knowledge, and the underlying principles 
of AI could be argued to underpin all ‘scientific’ approaches to reality. These were 
taken as including computer systems and systems of codification and classification such 
as those used on clinical information within the NHS. Thus, current thinking on the 
practical implications of this position could be reviewed, particularly as the work of 
both protagonists and antagonists in this field was considered.
Inclusion of AI in the review was also considered appropriate because it represents the 
most extreme of the application of objectivist assumptions, as applied to computer 
science (Dreyfus, 1972, 1985, 1986). In other words, AI was considered to be the 
fullest expression of the philosophical commitments that characterise computerised 
information systems generally. The literature review placed a particular focus on the 
application of this discipline to human decision-making, which is another key feature of 
this thesis, and the machine-based models of ‘intelligence’ which codifying and 
classifying of knowledge are designed to enable. This had a number of important 
aspects for the research. Firstly, it was hoped that its position at the extreme would 
make its assumptions clearly discernible. Secondly, the main problem that has 
consistently resisted the efforts of AI researchers is that of representing and replicating 
everyday context. This irrefutably demonstrates that context is an inherent part of 
knowledge. Also, it seems there are aspects of the real world which are not amenable 
to structured, formalised description. A question for the research, in studying the 
lessons of AI, was which category clinical phenomena fitted into.
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Exploration of the protagonists’ views in these areas was explored through the work of 
a number of influential authors. These included Sowa (1994) who focused particularly 
on the logical, philosophical and computational foundations of knowledge 
representation in artificial intelligence systems. As noted by Sowa, systems built 
around the concept of knowledge representation:
‘... take advantage of the hidden treasures in the knowledge but they depend on 
people who can reflect on the knowledge, become better conscious of it, and 
translate it to a computable form.’ (Sowa: 4,1994)
Thus, while Sowa recognises people have a role, it is clear that knowledge, in the 
scheme of this discipline, is deemed to be ultimately computable.
Exploration of this view was continued by drawing insights from the work of Musen 
(1989) who focuses on model-based knowledge acquisition tools and Fiegenbaum and 
McCorduck (1985) who claimed revolutionary developments in AI that would shortly 
make it a reality.
A counterbalance to this worldview was explored through the work of a number of 
authors, particularly Dreyfus (1972, 1985, 1986) and Weizenbaum (1985). They 
present challenges to AI at the most fundamental levels in their arguments against its 
philosophical assumptions, and the reasoning and systems that flow from them.
That this research focuses on NHS computer systems could arguably raise a challenge 
to the inclusion of AI in this review. AI is the parent of expert systems, and systems in 
the problem domain of the NHS are known to be much less sophisticated. However, 
inherent in the research problem at issue here was the possibility that, while NHS 
systems may in some ways be unsophisticated, some of the phenomena with which they 
deal, e.g. clinical knowledge and information, are not. A review of a field that overtly 
seeks to address the complex real life phenomena of knowledge was, therefore, 
considered to be potentially useful.
Also reviewed within this broad area was the literature on Computer Science (French,
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1996, Goldschlager and Lister 1988, Shave and Bhaskar, 1982) and within that 
Modelling Theory (Vemuri, 1978, Smith, 1985). These followed naturally from 
exploration of AI and Knowledge Representation, and they were useful in providing 
further insights into the effects on NHS computer systems of underpinning 
philosophical assumptions.
A further area of conceptual work in this class was Information Theory. Here the 
review drew most heavily on the seminal work of Shannon et al (1962). This describes 
how this mathematical theory of information was originally developed to solve 
problems in communications engineering. It asserts, as described by Dreyfus (1972) 
that it is the job of programmes to represent a transition from statements which are 
meaningful (contain information in the ordinary sense) to the strings of meaningless 
discrete bits (information in the theoretical, technical sense) with which a computer 
operates. This theory carefully excludes as irrelevant to the engineering problem the 
meaning of what is being transmitted. What it is important to recognise is that, as noted 
by Weaver (in Shannon et al: 1962) in this theory the word ‘information’ is used in a 
special sense that is not to be confused with its everyday usage. In particular it must 
not be confused with meaning. For instance, within this work, two messages, one of 
which is loaded with meaning, the other of which is pure nonsense, can be exactly 
equivalent in this informational sense. This theory seeks to enable reproduction at one 
point, either exactly or approximately, of a message selected at another point. 
Meaning, therefore, has no relevance in this schema.
Notably, so powerful were the concepts of this theory that attempts have continually 
been made to modify them for use in other contexts. Hence the argument put forward 
by Dreyfus (1972) that as a theory of meaning this is not plausible, particularly if one 
considers the view of Gestalt psychologists, who claim that perception is always a 
global process. This does not, however, alter this basic premise on which computer 
programming operates. Dreyfus (1972) again provides a useful insight when this is 
related to the research problem:
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‘.... when illegitimately (author’s italics) transformed into a theory of meaning, one 
sees being built in the computer-influenced assumption that experience is 
analysable into isolable, atomic, alternative choices.’ (Dreyfus, 1972: 77)
This confirms the notion that success in basic, number crunching digital computers has 
resulted in extension of their basic principles and application into more problematic 
areas. For this research these were taken to include highly context-dependent, 
subjective clinical phenomena.
Shannon’s work was further contextualised by reference particularly to that of Ackoff 
(1953) Ackoff and Emery (1972) and Davenport (1997) who also argue for a less 
‘rational’ approach to information behaviour:
‘Most research on how individuals process information suggests that we’re far 
from fully rational.... in our acquisition and use of it.’ (Davenport, 1997: 100)
The third class of literature reviewed was firmly rooted in the subjectivist paradigm. It 
consisted of the Sociology of Knowledge, and, more specifically, the Sociology of 
Scientific Knowledge. The first two classes of conceptual work were ultimately, and 
somewhat paradoxically perhaps, deemed to nest logically within this third area. The 
paradox is, however, somewhat lessened by earlier observations regarding science 
employing socially-defined measures
The need to explore the influence of people on the research problem has to some extent 
been discussed above. Exploration of the Sociology of Knowledge was considered 
essential in this regard, this area of conceptual work being concerned with analysis of 
the social construction of reality and of meaning. It also focuses on the large-scale 
relationships between knowledge, social interests and social structure, and the problems 
generated thereby. It is concerned with the concept that phenomena present themselves 
in various ways according to different social settings. This was considered particularly 
relevant for two main reasons. Firstly, it would enable necessary insights into the 
subjectivist approach to reality. Secondly, it is concerned with challenging the notion 
of ‘objectivity’ that underpins scientific work, within which medicine was included. As 
discussed earlier, there existed a significant difference between the original clinical
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knowledge and the meaning of the clinical information that the clinician recorded, and 
the nature and meaning of subsequent aggregate information allegedly based upon that. 
Also noted was the fact that healthcare data was the product, and in some senses the 
nexus, of significant and different cultural traditions and professional interests. The 
information in question journeyed through, and was transformed by, several groups or 
handling centres. Each had substantial differences, which at a minimum encompassed 
profession or occupation, organisational position and relationship to the organisation, 
and information systems. The research undertook, therefore, to explore the 
relationship, if any, between the changes in the information and the social processes 
and contexts through which it passed, taking as a starting point Barnes’ (1977) 
observation that:
‘Often (invalid) descriptions are the products of social interests which make it 
advantageous to misrepresent reality, or social restrictions upon investigation of 
reality, which make accurate perception of it impossible.’ (Barnes, 1977: 1)
This area of work potentially, therefore, offered explanatory theory relating to the 
paradox perceived in clinical work and data and associated statistical data sets.
This part of the review began with exploration of the work of Kuhn (1970). This was 
valuable because it provided insights into the internal processes of science. It also 
revealed the extent to which sociological analysis can be driven by misconceptions 
about scientific activity. The review then drew heavily on the work of Rosenberg
(1966) who explores the relationship between scientific ideas and social structure. It 
also drew on Barnes (1972, 1974, 1977) Bloor (1984) and Brown (1992) who indicate 
the possibility that scientific ‘objectivity’, rather than being based on a direct line to 
‘the truth’, is socially constructed. Barnes (1974) argues for the need to:
‘.... reveal the possibilities of different kinds of sociological theory, to reflect 
different preconceptions of the general relationship between science and the wider 
society, and to balance ‘social structural’ with ‘cultural’ analysis.’ (Barnes, 1974: 
15)
Further areas of work reviewed in this context were that of Rorty (1979, 1982, 1999) 
who provides insights into the concepts of ‘truth’ and objectivity, Collins et al (1993)
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and Foucault (1972, 1973, 1980) who analyses rationality and the human sciences and 
their relationship to ‘truth’.
More specific works of interest in exploring clinical knowledge included that of Dolby 
(1971) who focuses on the role of sociological factors in the knowledge-producing 
activity of science. Findings in this area were enhanced by review of the work of 
Needham (1956) who explores the effects of cultural differences on ‘science’, and 
Geertz (1973). Also reviewed was work by Durkheim (1973) who focuses on the 
effects of social interaction explored through the lens of science. Durkheim’s work 
(1963) on ‘primitive classification’ was also drawn upon.
Further useful work in this area was that by Hall (1992, 1993) who explores the way 
meanings are created by symbols and human interpretation, and the relationship of that 
process to culture, Habermas (1968) who explores the relationship between knowledge 
and human interests, and Goffman (1959, 1967, 1972) who analyses the apparent 
orderliness, stability and predictability of social interactions. This was achieved by 
closely exploring what individuals do and why, when they are in each other’s company, 
and also how this is understood by participants. Weber, (1978) was also drawn upon, 
particularly in terms of his framework for analysis of authority or ‘legitimate 
domination’ (in the case of this research, by both clinical and non-clinical groups).
Other relevant work reviewed in this class included that of Bernstein (1971) who 
explores the sociology of language, and in particular social closure and maintenance of 
professional position through language. This notion was perceived as potentially 
helpful in exploring the effects of cultural differences between the groups being 
studied. These insights were further enhanced by exploration of Johnson’s work (1972) 
on professions and power.
As described in chapter 1, clinicians work within a culturally diverse environment. 
Insights were, therefore, further enhanced by review of work in the field of the 
Sociology of Scientific Knowledge, particularly as it applied to the use of numbers and 
quantification (Porter, 1995, Kilpatrick, 1973, Tiles, 1989). Included in this part of the
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review was the apparently scientific field of statistics. The researcher came to this 
work with a thorough and relatively uncritical grounding in the theory and practice of 
statistics. Having already noted an apparent discrepancy in the relationship between 
clinical data in the clinical environment and national statistical data sets, the review 
sought texts that critiqued the notion of statistics as a ‘scientific’ endeavour. The work 
of Porter (1995) and Latour (1989) both of whom explore at length the inherently social 
nature of the art of statistics, was particularly influential.
The development of many disparate strands of social thought was usefully pulled 
together for the researcher towards an explanatory theory of social action by Parsons 
(1949). This process of exploring further explanatory theory was then progressed most 
particularly by exploration of the work of Giddens, (1976, 1984) whose work:
‘.... always gravitated towards the intersecting strengths of theoretical positions.’ 
(Cohen, 1998: 279)
It encompasses, therefore, exploration of the key theories and theorists in the field of 
sociology, including Marx, Weber and Durkheim. As Cohen goes on to note:
‘.... he pulls ideas out of distant orbits back to intellectual common ground.’ 
(Cohen, 1998: 279)
In so doing Giddens provides theoretical insight, in particular with Structuration Theory 
(Giddens, 1976, 1984), which takes account of a more complex sociological situation 
than his predecessors.
The review also drew heavily on the areas of Medical Sociology and Medical 
Informatics. While it is arguably an emerging discipline, Medical Informatics literature 
was central to the review in that it works in the overlap between IS and clinical 
practice. It provides, therefore, specific insights into the process of clinical knowledge 
generation and application. It is also a field that recognises that generic medical and 
information science alone do not provide the necessary basis for successful information 
handling in clinical practice. Because the two sciences are embedded in a complex 
ecological environment, other aspects are considered so that, as discussed by Sellos
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(1992) a new paradigm is emerging with this discipline:
‘It appears that only a particular mix of methods, such as information science, 
medicine, technology, science, economics, statistics, sociology and legal science, 
is adequate for a comprehensive interdisciplinary statement, which characterises 
the specially applied science of medical informatics.’ (Sellos, 1992: 80)
Medical Informatics was addressed particularly through the work of Kluge, (1996) and 
De Dombal (1996) both of whom explore the process of the acquisition of medical 
knowledge, not only theoretically, but also through case study work, which was deemed 
to be an invaluable added dimension. Kay et al (1996) were also drawn upon, not least 
because they also adopt this approach in investigating the generation and application of 
clinical knowledge.
In the area of Medical Sociology, the work of Scambler (1999) was particularly useful. 
In applying sociological theory to the area of medicine he explores those aspects of the 
two-way relationship between the individual and wider society that influence the 
experiences of health and illness in individuals and the response to them of others, 
including doctors. Also influential in the area of sociology as applied to medicine was 
Wittgenstein’s view of the human sciences, as discussed by Schatzki (1983) in terms of 
contemporary conceptions of the philosopher’s task. Schatzki, who argues the need for 
interpretive accounts of the social world, notes:
‘People acquire understanding by being trained into a form of life.’ (Schatzki, 
1983: 135)
This not only indicates that predominantly social factors determine understanding, but 
also that robust occupational training (and medical training could arguably be described 
as such) can have a significant influence. This approach found further support in the 
work of Bruner et al (1947) Postman et al (1948) in the field of Cognitive Psychology. 
They address value and need as organising factors in perception. This work was useful 
for its perspective that ‘believing is not seeing’. They note:
‘The perceiver’s world of reality, no matter how difficult to evaluate, must be the 
atrating point for assessing the reliability of information.’ (Bruner et al, 1947: 69)
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It is within the realm of clinical practice that the knowledge in question is initially 
fashioned.
The emerging discipline of Knowledge Management (KM) was also reviewed in this 
class. This is a concept that has achieved increasing prominence throughout the 1990s. 
Initial exploration of definitions of this concept indicated that it might yield useful 
insights:
‘KM is the process of capturing a company’s collective expertise wherever it 
resides and distributing it to wherever it can help produce the biggest payoffs.’ 
(Blake, 1998 :2)
‘To a growing number of companies, KM is more than just a buzz-word or a sales 
pitch, it is an approach to adding or creating value by more actively leveraging the 
know-how, experience and judgement residing within and, in many cases, outside 
an organisation.’ (Ruggles, 1998: 82)
However, as noted, by O’Dell and Grayson (1998) KM is not yet a science or a 
‘discipline’. While it is informed by a number of theoretical areas, most notably 
management and organisational theory (e.g. Daft and Weick, 1984, Leavitt and March, 
1988) the review confirmed it as a management concept rather than a theoretical area in 
its own right. It remained, therefore, debatable whether KM as it was then understood 
through the available literature was an area that offered theoretical insight to what were 
perceived to be complex social issues. For that reason it was not used as an engine to 
drive understanding in the research, although KM literature did raise some important 
themes. These included an awareness that KM adopts the important conceptual 
approach of addressing the issues raised by attempts to manage knowledge. However, 
it does this by a largely technological approach, which overlooks the importance of 
people and context. The extent to which the research might show this to be a disabling 
feature of KM was of interest.
A second important theme that was raised by review of this area came from the work of 
Davenport and Prusak (1998) who assert that the relative difficulty of capturing and 
transferring knowledge depends on the kind of knowledge involved. While the 
reference is to a relatively simplistic notion of explicit and tacit knowledge types,
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which overlooks any notion of the relevance of certainty of knowledge, it was clear that 
different types may require different handling. A focus on knowledge types was 
deemed useful to pursue throughout the research, and the potential for a subsequent 
contribution in this area was also maintained.
A third class of work developed from the areas discussed above. This continued with a 
central theme of the research by balancing a social with a mathematical view of 
information, and a behavioural with a mechanistic approach to problem solving. As a 
class it was relatively young but hugely influential, as it contained the area of IS work 
(as opposed to pure Information Theory) and also that of Information Management. 
This part of the review drew on a wide range of literature. Most notably this included 
the seminal work of von Bertalanffy (1968) whose work on General Systems Theory 
(GST) led to his recognition as the founder of the systems movement, and Lilienfeld 
(1978) who critiqued the emerging GST. The review in this area also drew heavily on 
the work of Checkland (1981) Checkland & Holwell (1998) and Davenport (1997) who 
have written extensively about the notion that computers are not simply technology, 
and information is not simply data, but that the two combine to form a system that is as 
human as it is technological:
‘Understanding how individuals handle information is at the core of all
information behaviour analysis.’ (Davenport, 1997: 99)
This relatively new approach was considered by the researcher to be an essential bridge 
between the hard scientism that had prevailed in systems work for so long, and the 
more ambiguous notion of ‘problems’. It was also seen as an important link between 
the notion of systems as technology in a mechanistic world, and the idea of systems as 
‘human activity systems’ (Checkland, 1981: 14, Checkland and Holwell, 1998: 13). In 
other words, it was included because it recognises people and social context as inherent 
and influential parts of systems and systems problems.
Exploration was also undertaken of the work of a number of writers, broadly or 
specifically supportive of the ‘human’ approach, but who chose to focus on particular 
issues this raises. These included Wilcocks and Mason (1987) who explored the issues
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involved in the apparently unproblematic process of computerising work, Robey et al 
(1984) and Markus (1983) who consider the notion of rituals at work in systems design. 
They also included Markus & Bjom-Anderson (1987) who consider the notion of the 
power of the systems professional, Kling (1987) who considers the relationship 
between the notion of social transformation and computerisation, and Land (1986) who 
argues for recognition, in the field of information management, of the distance between 
social perceptions of rationality and actual human behaviour.
Within this class, the work of Walsham (1993,1995) was particularly useful in both the 
field of IS and that of Organisational Theory (OT), particularly as it relates to 
information management, due to its underlying philosophy that is:
‘.... aimed at producing an understanding of the context of the information system, 
and the process whereby the information system influences and is influenced by its 
context .... A more subtle set of contexts for an information system are the various 
social structures which are present in the minds of the human participants involved 
with the system, including designers, users and any of those affected by the system 
....Their interpretation of reality, their shared and contested sense of the world, 
create complex, interacting contexts within which the information system is drawn 
on and used to create or reinforce meaning.’ (Walsham, 1993: 4-5)
4.4 Findings from the Literature Review
Many possible ways of presenting this section were considered, including by 
conceptual area and by stakeholder group. The one chosen is organised around the key 
factors known to be, or considered as potentially being, at work in the problem 
situation. This particular approach was stimulated by the work of Alexis et al (1967) 
who observe that, typically, in organisations information is relayed through several 
processing centres. At each such centre there is a tendency to revise it, consciously or 
unconsciously, before transmitting it to the next unit in the network. They note:
‘Decision units select and transform information input.’ (Alexis et al, 1967: 15)
They note also that individuals often:
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‘.... ‘see5 things in terms of their own needs and goals .... the perception of the 
original observer is .... selective in the sense that the information he transmits to 
the receiver depends (at least) on his evaluation of its relevance for decision­
making purposes.’ (Alexis et al, 1967: 315)
Nonaka (1998) concurs:
‘People don’t just receive new knowledge, they actively interpret it to fit their own 
situation and perspective. Thus what makes sense in one context can change or 
even lose its meaning when communicated to people in a different context.’ 
(Nonaka, 1998: 39)
Thus the information is ‘filtered’ or transformed at each relay point. Alexis et al
(1967) also found that:
‘It frequently is not possible to assign any degree of reliability without having
some knowledge of the kind of revision that took place in the information flow.’ 
(Alexis etal, 1967:315)
The problem domain, therefore, was considered in these terms and the literature was 
reviewed in order to ascertain the status of the current spectrum of thinking about the 
nature of technical and manual systems. The effects of their inherent natures on 
information were also studied. The nature of people, as part of both systems and 
organisational contexts, and any implications there, were also considered.
Presentation of the review of the relevant areas of conceptual work has been organised, 
therefore, firstly around analysis of the organisational context. It is then structured 
around descriptions of key characteristics of hardware and software systems. These 
include digital computers, systematised nomenclatures, statistical classification 
systems, statistics, and people. This is followed by discussion of their implications for 
the research problem.
4.4.1 The Organisational Context: Structure and the Research Problem
This part of the discussion builds on the earlier first level analysis of the organisation 
provided in chapter 2.
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One of the more visible manifestations of information use and flow is what is known as 
‘organisational structure’. Structure in this sense has been variously perceived and 
described, most notably within OT (Silverman, 1970; Dalton et al, 1970; Minzberg, 
1983; Handy, 1985; Reed, 1992) and encompasses both the formal information flows, 
for example, official reports, and the informal or unofficial channels and flows. 
‘Structure’ is, however, a conceptual phenomenon, most useful to analysis of the social 
context known as organisations. Structure is concerned with relationships and action. 
Information, its nature, use and flow could arguably be described as both the enabler 
and the manifestation of these relationships. For the purposes of this research structure 
was, therefore, taken to be the intrinsic and operational characteristics of the web of 
relationships and actions that make up an organisation and define its social location. It 
was also taken to be their sanctioning and censuring norms, which translate into how an 
organisation undertakes its business and negotiates on both an internal and external 
level.
Looking first at key groups and how they were related to each other, it could be argued, 
given the highly bureaucratised nature of nationalised industries, that the Government 
would have sought a tightly controlled, unitary machine bureaucracy. The implicit 
assumption here is that that the realm of medicine is amenable to such control, i.e. 
predictable, objective, rational, quantifiable, etc. Due, however, to the power of the 
professionals, what it achieved was an organisational type which addressed first the 
desires of clinicians for a level of autonomy and clinical freedom, constrained only by 
the governing professional body, and which fitted patient care around that. This type 
better fits what Mintzberg (1983: 191) describes as a ‘Professional Bureaucracy’ than 
the Government’s preferred model. This has profound implications for organisational 
information.
Operationally, a professional bureaucracy is one that is bureaucratic in terms of the 
approach to the core work. In the NHS, the core work of caring for patients is 
characterised, at least at a macro level, by a reductionist, scientific approach. This 
divides the body into anatomical sites, within which the clinicians’ standardised range 
of skills might more easily be applied. However, standards for this work are generated,
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not by the organisation, but by self-governing institutions residing outside the 
organisation and holding primacy in terms of professionals’ loyalty. In the case of 
clinicians the external standard-setting body is the British Medical Association (BMA). 
Hence there exists the situation where professional skills become standardised but, 
because of the sanctioned operation of human judgment, their application and the 
knowledge this yields are variable.
Professionals are rarely, however, the only members of an organisation. There is 
usually a support staff surrounding them, facilitating their work and performing as 
many of the ‘routine’ tasks as possible. For these groups the traditional notion of 
bureaucracy operates. Clinicians are well described as ‘dionysians’ within this 
environment (Handy, 1985: 195). The structure that exists does so only to support 
them. They perceive resources as existing solely to enable them to exercise their 
professional skills. This arrangement gives rise to an organisational form wherein 
parallel hierarchies operate. The support staff hierarchy is top-down, with a 
commitment to a machine bureaucracy. Here power comes from position. The 
professional hierarchy is bottom-up and democratic. Here power comes from expertise. 
In the NHS most administrative managers can be placed in the former category, 
clinicians in the latter. Power in this type of bureaucracy is, therefore, decentralised 
rather than centralised.
Kouzes and Mico (1985) offer further insights into this issue. For analytical purposes, 
they identify three ‘domains’ existing in such organisations: Policy, Management and 
Service (or Operating Core). Each domain has its own norms and loyalties, etc., and 
each is, therefore, in ‘organised anarchy’ (Kouzes and Mico, 1985: 454) or irresolvable 
conflict with the others. Applying this to the NHS, the Policy Domain is populated by 
the DH, which is part of the Government. Both are responsible to the public, upon 
whose consent their legitimacy rests. The public is both financier and customer. Public 
health initiatives and NHS policy are said to be reflective of its wishes. The 
Management and Service Domains are populated by the traditional administration of 
the NHS. It is responsible to both the Policy Domain, in terms of carrying out policies 
and strategies developed there, and to the public, for the same reasons as the Policy
63
Domain. The job of the administration is to manage the organisation by means of 
hierarchical control and linear work modes. Clinical professionals operate within the 
Service, and sometimes Management sectors. The overriding loyalty here is to the 
professional body.
Superficially, therefore, functional differentiation exists. However, the implications 
operate at deeper levels. As noted by Kouzes and Mico (1985) this insight is not a new 
one. Dalton et al (1967) note that, while the most superficial effects of differentiation 
(functional fragmentation of the organisation) are easily identifiable and often 
considered, in fact it has far more profound effects. They argue that, fundamentally, 
differentiation concerns:
‘.... the differences in cognitive and emotional orientations among managers in 
different functional departments and the differences in formal structure among 
those departments.’ (Dalton et al, 1967: 5)
Mannheim (1970) also makes relevant observations:
\ . . .  different occupational groups are thrown together .... and are forced to 
maintain themselves and their ideas in the face of the onslaught of these 
heterogeneous groups.’ (Mannheim, 1970: 121)
The analysis thus far indicated that issues of power and loyalty would seem to be 
among causal factors. Exploration of Mittroffs work (1983) indicated that 
fundamental perceptive processes were also involved. Mitroff asserts that a key 
influence determining the nature of information systems adopted by organsations is the 
cognitive framework and style of those involved with the systems. This informs and 
dictates the way individuals perceive reality and process information. This theme is 
developed in Mittroffs work based on a framework developed by Carl Jung. He 
identifies four broad types of personality; thinking, intuiting, feeling and sensing, which 
he maps onto the four most commonly seen types of organisation:
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Figure 3 Mitroffs Cognitive Style Matrix (Mitroff, 1983:58)
The vertical axis indicates the two extremes of a continuum representing one dimension 
of the ways in which individuals reach their decisions. The horizontal axis represents 
the ways in which individuals assimilate data, which according to Jung is either by 
sensation or intuition. The former are ‘analytic reductionist’. In other words, they 
break situations down into small detailed pieces and work on the basis of hard fact 
gathered about those pieces. They tend to require information systems that can provide 
detailed and comprehensive documentation. The latter are heuristic and focus on the 
overview, avoiding the constraints of detail as much as possible. They tend to prefer 
systems offering partial information and allowing them to exercise their intuition. 
Perceiving too much detail is seen as a constraint rather than a necessity. Both types 
take in different types of data from their perceived realities and also recognise different 
things as data.
Turning to the vertical axis, thinking types are perceived to base their decisions on logic 
and analytic reasoning. They depersonalise situations, relying on rules to control
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conduct. Feeling types more overtly base their decisions on how they feel about 
situations and people. They seek to personalise everything by stressing its individual 
uniqueness.
Clearly no one individual is going to fall neatly into one cell for all informational 
needs, and thus it was with clinicians, who presented an interesting paradox within this 
framework. In terms of practice they appeared to draw on the heavily documented, 
acknowledged basis for all medical practice. Thus, although they displayed a 
‘dionysian’ disregard for bureaucratic structure and control, facilitated by expert 
professional status, their medical methods of practice seemed to be deeply embedded in 
it. However, to bureaucratised information they added the judgment of the 
professional, to hard fact they added intuition.
Kay and Purves’ (1996) description of the clinician/patient encounter confirms this. 
They assert that significant parts of clinical behaviour are organic and adaptive and 
seem, therefore, to fall into the lower left quadrant. Managers would appear to fit into 
the diametrically opposing upper right quadrant.
This structural arrangement manifests itself, therefore, in information, with different 
types of knowledge-creating preferences operating. This dimension of organisation 
and information is also commented on by Nonaka (1998):
‘Deeply ingrained in the traditions of Western Management, from Frederick 
Taylor to Herbert Simon, is a view of the organisation as a machine for 
‘information processing’. According to this view, the only useful information is 
hard (read: quantifiable) data, codified procedures, universal principles. And the 
key metrics for measuring the value of new knowledge are similarly hard and 
quantifiable - increased efficiency, lower costs, improved return on investment.’ 
(Nonaka, 1998: 23)
Thus it came as no surprise that the key management information tools in use in the 
NHS were coding systems designed to provide definitive data for use in management 
decisions. It also came as no surprise that these were seen as irrelevant to clinicians. 
Hence Mannheim’s (1970) assertion that information between these two groups 
amounted to ‘talking past one another’ (Mannheim, 1970: 121). He also asserts that,
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while different occupational groups speak as if their differences relate only to each 
isolated question at issue, they overlook the fact that:
‘.... their antagonist differs from them in his whole outlook .... For each participant 
the ‘object’ has a more or less different meaning because it grows out of the whole 
of their respective frames of reference .... Hence talking past one another is an 
inevitable phenomenon.’ (Mannheim, 1970:121)
4.4.1.a The Organisational Context: An Initial Summary
Thus the organisational context within which the clinical data emerged was found to be 
one in which structural discontinuities existed at the most fundamental levels. It was 
considered likely that such a situation would always be problematic to an organization, 
purely in management terms. However, in an organisation such as the NHS, where data 
from one group was routinely used by another for key decisions, it was also likely that 
it would have significant effects on that data and, therefore, on the decisions which 
flowed from it. In order to explore these issues further, a focus was then placed on the 
systems that carried that data.
4.4.2 Hardware and Software Systems
Computers played a key role in transporting the clinical knowledge and data in 
question. In exploring any effects they may have had, digital computers were analysed 
in terms of their basic philosophical underpinnings, and then their component parts. 
These were taken to include the problem model they implicitly host, the solution model 
they explicitly host, and the components of developing that solution. They were also 
taken to include programmers, systems methodologies, programming languages, and 
the nature of the data such systems can handle. These aspects of systems were deemed 
to be of key importance to the research in that they reflect assumptions about the nature 
of reality and knowledge thereof. Exploration of them could, therefore, provide 
insights into the relationship of such systems to the data they processed and their effects 
on it.
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4.4.2.a Digital Computers; A Description
Digital computers are, essentially, number processors. In terms of their components, 
apart from their memory, the most basic part of any computer is its processor. This 
contains a clock, an instruction control unit, an arithmetic and logic unit and a set of 
registers. The registers record the operations and operands that are being operated 
under the control of the programme. This, in effect, produces for the digital computer a 
model of the world, represented as a structured set of facts or propositions that are 
either true or false.
Underpinning these facilities, there are at least three kinds of models of different 
aspects of reality that may be involved in the design, development and utilisation of 
computer products (Fetzer, 1996). Because of the nature of technology, all ultimately 
translate that reality into a set of explicit, unambiguous, structured data. Firstly, there is 
the specification, which is a model of the problem to be solved. Secondly, there is the 
programme. This is a model of the solution to the problem, or rather to the model of 
the problem. Thirdly, the programme itself is often written in a programming language, 
which itself functions as a model for a virtual or physical machine.
Looking first at their most influential underpinnings, philosophically digital computers 
reflect the commitments of the scientific paradigm. As discussed earlier, this paradigm 
asserts that the world can be exhaustively analysed in terms of determinate data or 
atomic facts. This is the foundation for work on Al: that all that is relevant to 
intelligent behaviour can be formalised in a structured description (Sowa, 1994, 
Fiegenbaum and McCorduck, 1983). This reflects a mechanistic belief that the world 
can be so represented because it is external to the individual, logically ordered, with 
identifiable and regular relationships existing between entities. In addition, this 
atomistic perception, which reduces the world from the sum to the parts, is perceived as 
valid. In other words, emergent properties (Checkland, 1981, von Bertalanffy, 1968) 
or properties that emerge at certain levels of complexity and cannot be reduced in 
explanation to lower levels (because they do not exist there) are not perceived to exist. 
Computer representation, therefore, requires only adequate identification and
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understanding of the various entities and relationships between them. That being the 
case, one might expect data about such a world to be, as described by Dreyfus et al 
(1986):
‘ ... discrete, explicit, determinate...’(Dreyfus etal, 1986: 188)
This is precisely the kind of data required by digital computers:
‘.... otherwise it will not be the sort of information which can be given to a 
computer so as to be processed by a rule.’ (Dreyfus et al, 1986: 118)
This is echoed by Weizenbaum (1985) in reviewing the work of von Neumann (1958) 
who asserts that, if he were to be presented with a precise description of what the 
computer was required to do, someone could program the computer to behave in the 
required manner.
This specification fits well with the original design purpose of digital computers, which 
was scientific. Experience has shown, not surprisingly therefore, that they are very 
good at that job. Their capacity in that respect far outstrips that of the human mind to 
process numbers efficiently. And in that sense the work of computers is neutral. They 
mechanically perform a technical task. There seems, therefore, to be no significant 
issue in their mechanical processing of, for instance, clinical data codes. The early 
success of computers in this field led in part to their application to other tasks. From 
pure calculation they began to be applied to manipulating data in terms of numbers that 
represented real life entities. More recently this application has extended to areas of 
human expertise, like decision support by scenario modelling. Human expertise, 
therefore, was now perceived to fall within the realm of digital computer models.
4.4.2.b Digital Computers, A Discussion
Beginning with the purposes to which digital computers are applied, as mentioned 
above, the success of scientific method in certain problem domains indicated no
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significant issue in the mechanical processing by digital computers of numbers per se. 
Nor was there perceived to be any issue where the things those numbers represent are 
occurrences of ‘hard’ phenomena, e.g. Davenport’s (1997) 697 units in a warehouse 
discussed earlier, or numbers of total hip replacements in the NHS in one year. In other 
words, phenomena about which there is wide social consensus and which are not 
susceptible to context-dependent change within that broad society were considered to 
be less problematic here. However, the numbers in this study were taken to represent 
at least some phenomena that were particularly context-laden and open, therefore, to 
interpretation and variance. Thus, it was not the same as there being no issue in 
computer processing of ‘pure’ data, because information was taken to be to be data 
plus meaning (Checkland and Holwell, 1998, Davenport, 1997, Galland, 1992, Laudon 
and Laudon, 1991, Drucker, 1998). The issue seemed to be, therefore, not with the 
computer’s ability to process numbers, but rather with the ability of those numbers to 
adequately represent the meaning of the underlying data. It was considered possible, 
therefore, that where meaning was well understood, accepted and stable, computer 
representation could be consistent with it. However, where meaning was less secure, 
possibly because it was more context-dependent, at least two effects were possible. 
Firstly, tentative meaning could have been becoming fixed and, given discussions 
above about computer models, not necessarily in the terms of the original perceiver. 
Secondly, because of the stability, objectivity, and scientific nature that attaches to 
objective data in a computer, those same characteristics could have been being globally 
attached to all clinical data within NHS computers, possibly even where some of it was 
of the less ‘secure’ type discussed above. A type of reification might, therefore, have 
been taking place, and this undoubtedly was the kind of ‘transformation’ on which this 
research was focused. It was necessary, therefore, to examine the nature of the 
knowledge underpinning computer data.
Further insight into this was found once again in Dreyfus’ work (1972, 1985, 1986) on 
Al and particularly on the kinds of data required by digital computers, which as 
mentioned earlier:
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c.... must be discrete, explicit, determinate, otherwise it will not be the sort of 
information which can be given to a computer so as to be processed by a rule 
(Dreyfus et al, 1986:118)
This is supported in work he goes on to discuss by Newell and Simon (1961) who were 
leaders in the field of Al. They observe that, while they believe that programmed 
computers could, in principle, solve problems, recognise patterns, understand stories 
and indeed do anything that an intelligent person could do, this was on the proviso that 
the symbols in the computer were used to represent context-independent, objective 
features of the real world. It was also on the proviso that the relationships between 
those objective features of the real world obeyed strict rules, so that they could be 
validly represented in computer programmes. This is, as discussed previously, a basic 
tenet of scientific philosophy and, as also previously discussed, it is basically unproven 
that it is possible, comprehensively to do this. As argued by Weizenbaum (1987) in 
discussing the myths of Al, there is more proof, given the persistent failures of Al to 
produce a truly intelligent machine, that it is not possible. However, that specific issue 
apart, for clinical data processing systems, this would mean that features could not be 
dependent upon interpretation, like, for instance, a temperature being too high. For 
such systems temperature would always have to be specified in degrees. This raised a 
question over application of computers in the context of clinical observations, 
particularly where such specificity was not possible, e.g. ‘severe pain’. Returning to 
the remarks of Dreyfus et al (1986) about the required characteristics of computerised 
data, he further asserts:
‘.... there are several reasons to suppose .... that no such data exist.’ (Dreyfus et 
al, 1986:118)
As Weizenbaum (1987) also notes:
‘If .... words like ‘judgement’, ‘reasoning’ and ‘understanding’ are to be 
comprehended in their usual meanings, then the prospects for success .... are very 
dim.’ (Weizenbaum, 1987: 86)
Dreyfus and Weizenbaum both explicitly focus the discussions referred to at 
‘intelligent’ machines. However, it was considered arguable that their relevance was
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more extensive. ‘Intelligent’ machines, in that they seek to replicate human thought 
processes, must be knowledge-based. All digital computers are, to greater or lesser 
extents, ‘knowledge-based.’ If no such data exist, the validity of the data that populates 
our digital computers must also be questioned.
In attempting to understand how this situation of ontologically mixed data could arise, 
review of work in the fields of Computer Science and IS was useful. This indicated 
that programmers do not necessarily understand the nature of knowledge itself. That is 
a philosophical subject, taken to be the concern of a different expert domain, that of 
philosophy. Information Theory offered additional insights to this.
Looking in detail at the models underpinning digital computer software, and starting 
with the specification and programme models, a number of potentially relevant issues 
emerged. Firstly, such models depend upon the use of abstraction and idealisation, at 
least in the sense that they represent some, but not all, of the properties of what is 
modelled (Jayaratna, 1994, Wood Harper and Fitzgerald, 1982). They are inevitably 
partial reflections of reality. Secondly, the problem model and, consequently, the 
solution model are the product of a human agent, i.e. a modeller. They can simply 
confirm the ‘reality’ of the modeller, i.e. models mediate, within the conceptual 
framework of the modeller, the relationship between computer systems and the world. 
Basic cognitive frameworks are not something that can be dispensed with, even if 
expertise in another domain is acquired. These frameworks influence choice of 
methodologies and each of these is characterised by particular selections of systems 
types, data or people orientations. They are also characterised by bias towards or away 
from computerisation. Particular philosophical commitments underpin this. These 
commitments influence all of the key principles underlying any methodology and, in 
taking a particular view of ‘reality’, influence the view available to and reproducible by 
users.
Having selected an approach or approaches to systems development, a further 
influential factor rests in their application. However, as noted by Fetzer (1996) systems
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developers are very often not expert in problem domains. Experts are usually most 
competent in their own domains. As noted by Dreyfus et al (1986):
‘.... every step of the conventional mathematical modeling process requires that the 
expert informants, whose expertise is supposed to be captured in the model, 
provide the sort of decomposed, decontextualised information that concerns 
beginners but not true experts. Hence, to participate in the construction of a model 
an expert must regress to seeing the world like an advanced beginner, or in some 
cases a novice. If ‘user’ experts fail to appreciate the extent and importance of 
their unrationalised ‘know-how’, they may not realise how seriously their own 
understanding is being degraded, they may even be flattered into thinking that the 
model constructed on the basis of their answers captures and amplifies their 
expertise. If so, and they act on the basis of the model, business and social 
decision-making will suffer.’ (Dreyfus et al, 1986: 177)
Indeed, it could be argued that the strength of the paradigm hosting computers and 
computer data is such that their contents are often taken to be ‘true’.
These observations draw on the work of Dreyfus et al (1986) studying the learning 
process in humans to ascertain how far digital computers can safely go towards 
apparent ‘intelligence’. This built on earlier work (Dreyfus, 1985) in which he argues 
that, for a relatively new discipline, Al reflects affinity to a surprisingly ancient 
philosophical stance. This started with Plato’s separation of the intellect or rational 
soul from the body with its skills, emotions and appetites. It was continued by Aristotle 
when he separated the theoretical from the practical and defined man as a rational 
animal, on the assumption that one could separate man’s rationality from his animal 
needs and desires. Dreyfus argues that this assumption is unproven. He also argues 
that it remains at best highly implausible if one thinks, for instance, of the development 
of our sensory-motory skills as we learn to recognise and cope with objects, or the role 
of needs and desires in structuring all social situations. He goes on to assert that the 
idea that we can simply ignore both this ‘know-how’ and contextual phenomena while 
formalising our intellectual understanding as a complex system of facts and rules is 
highly questionable.
In the later work discussed above (Dreyfus et al, 1986) five stages are identified: 
novice, advanced beginner, competence, proficiency and expert. The novice is usually
73
working on context-free information, i.e. not referring back to experience but learning 
by rote. The expert knows what to do on the basis of mature and practiced 
understanding, with skill that is so much a part of them they are almost unaware of it. 
Dreyfus argues that this shows a progression from the analytic behaviour of a detached 
subject, consciously decomposing his environment into recognisable elements and 
following abstract rules, to involved skill behaviour based on holistic pairing of new 
situations, thus going from exercising no judgment to exercising judgment. In terms of 
systems development, what this work indicates is an assumption that the user ‘domain 
expert’ is someone who possesses and, more importantly, can articulate ‘know-that’ 
knowledge and also ‘know-how’ with respect to how those beliefs became accepted 
within that domain.
Work by both Dreyfus (1986) and Giddens (1976, 1984) refutes this. When discussing 
the consciousness of the acting subject they assert that much of human knowledge is, in 
fact, held by some to exist on a tacit basis. Work in the field of KM by Scarborough et 
al (1999) and Nonaka (1994) further supports the existence and importance of tacit 
knowledge, asserting that it forms part of the background of shared assumptions on 
which culture is founded and as such cannot be articulated. This led the researcher to 
the conclusion that, if this was the case, and if systems experts lacked proficiency in the 
problem domains of others, it was questionable whether such knowledge could ever be 
comprehensively captured.
Further support for this conclusion was found in work by Gardner (1998) again in the 
field of KM. He asserts that one of the problems he perceives is that KM assumes that 
all knowledge is codifiable, which it clearly is not. Thus, it might be argued that the 
selectivity inherent in philosophically derived representations of reality can be 
compounded by the inherent inability of individuals, no matter what their philosophical 
preferences, to know and articulate all that is relevant. Far from being scientific this 
makes programmes, programming and programming languages social constructs, in the 
same way as the earlier models, and in the same way as the underpinning philosophy 
that they reflect. Thus, apparently, this was an example of science using social 
methods to negotiate reality.
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This found further support in Leith’s work (1987) on programming languages, in which 
he observes that these are considered traditionally as being dependent purely upon 
technical matters, such as speed of compilation, or execution. However, he also argues 
that the design of programming languages is not determined purely by technical 
matters, but also by social features. Both Leith and Smith (1985) argue that 
programming languages, like systems research, design and development methods, often 
represent our “involved” or particular views of how the world actually is, e.g. the belief 
that it is logically ordered.
Thus far this discussion has focused on the effect of models in shaping the reality 
reflected in computer systems (Pettigrew, 1972, Markus, 1983). Another description of 
this is ‘bias’. Exploration of modelling from that perspective revealed interesting 
additional insights provided by Friedman and Nissenbaum (1996) who offer an 
alternative, but related schema in this context. Their paper uses the term ‘bias’ in the 
sense of a system that systematically and unfairly discriminates. The example of bias 
quoted is that of an airline reservation system that searches for available flights. The 
inherent bias here was in the algorithm controlling the search and display functions. 
This gave preference to flights where all segments were on a single carrier, thus ranking 
lower any where more than one airline was used for a journey. This was considered to 
be relevant because user interfaces also reflect underlying models of problems and 
solutions and, as discussed above, models can be highly influential. From an analysis 
of cases, three categories of bias in computer systems were developed. These were 
preexisting, technical and emergent. Preexisting bias was considered to have its roots 
in social institutions, practices and attitudes. This bias was seen as entering the system 
either through the explicit or conscious efforts of individuals or institutions, or 
unconsciously in spite of best intentions. This implicitly alludes to the issues 
surrounding systems developers and users as developers. It also perhaps widens the 
discussion to involve both the relationship of individuals to organisations, and the place 
of information in that relationship. For instance, the paper notes that the interface 
design on the above-mentioned airline reservation system means that information is 
displayed in screens of two to five flight options. The advantage of having flights
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shown on the first screen is enormous, as 90% of bookings are made from the first 
display.
Because all digital computers have a user interface it was considered possible that this 
may have relevance to some healthcare systems. It was certainly relevant to some 
hospital PASs. ICD-10 and OPCS-4 were either resident on PASs or on systems 
interfaced with them. As a result of the lack of a global purchasing policy, a number of 
different models of this software system were in use across the NHS. These variations 
affected a number of factors, including the order of presentation of screen and fields, 
and the type and level of behind-the-scenes data manipulation undertaken by resident 
programmes before transmission to the central database. This was not always 
transparent to users. So, for instance, many PASs held a resident validation programme 
for clinical data. Although a national validation file was available, research showed 
that local files were often written. This was in addition to any validatory file installed 
by the supplier, which may or may not have been in accordance with the national file. 
The kinds of impact these files could have included ordering of the data entered, 
allowing certain kinds of data and disallowing others, and allowing or disallowing 
certain combinations of data.
In addition the technology can engage and extenuate bias making it difficult to spot or 
remedy. This was again the case with some PASs. There was a requirement when 
using clinical classifications for specific data to be entered in specific fields. For 
instance, according to the rules of ICD-10, a first field containing the classification 
code for an accident, e.g. ‘fractured skull’, must always be followed by the relevant 
code for the cause of the accident where known, e.g. ‘motorcycle collision’. In the 
previous revision of the ICD, ICD-9, these latter codes were identifiable by their unique 
prefix of the letter ‘E’. Some PASs automatically removed this ‘E’ and replaced it at 
the end of the code. Analysis programmes designed to investigate causes of road traffic 
accidents would routinely miss such data in their calculations, if they selected relevant 
data by searching for all codes with a leading ‘E’.
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Friedman and Nissenbaum (1996) describe technical bias as coming from technical 
constraints or solutions, including computer tools, i.e. bias that comes from a limitation 
of the computer technology, including hardware, software and peripherals. It was also 
seen as coming from attempts to formalise human constructs, e.g. when attempts are 
made to quantify the qualitative or discretise the continuous or formalise the non- 
formal. The possible relevance of this notion to clinical data processing systems again 
became apparent.
Lastly, Friedmann and Nissenbaum (1996) describe what they call ‘emergent bias’. 
This arises in a context of use, typically some time after the design is completed, and 
can be a result of changing requirements, environments, or poor design. User interfaces 
are a particular problem here because, by design, they seek to reflect the capacities, 
character and habits of prospective users. This once again reflects on the conceptual 
preferences of modellers, but also again widens the discussion to the context of use 
having an effect on information.
Computers, as argued by Winner (1985) are, therefore, political. They are:
‘.... a convenient means of establishing patterns of power and authority in a given 
setting.’(Winner, 1985: 36)
Bijker and Law (1992) concur and provide a useful summary of the above 
discussion:
‘....a11 technologies are shaped by and mirror the complex trade-offs that make up 
our societies; technologies that work well are no different in this respect from 
those that fail. The idea of a ‘pure’ technology is nonsense. Technologies always 
embody compromise. Politics, economics, theories of strength of materials, 
notions of what is beautiful or worthwhile, professional preferences, prejudices 
and skills, design tools, available raw materials, theories about behaviour of the 
natural environment - all of these are thrown into the melting pot whenever an 
artifact is designed or built.’ (Bijker and Law, 1992: 3)
All of this inevitably has philosophical ramifications. Dreyfus et al (1986) argue that if 
the persistent difficulties that have plagued all areas of Al are reinterpreted as failures, 
these failures must be reinterpreted as empirical evidence against the epistemological
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and ontological assumptions themselves. As discussed earlier, these assumptions 
underpin the application of computers to clinical knowledge.
Shanker (1987) also dissents from the Al philosophy, but not to the extent of 
questioning ‘sub-AT systems. In his contribution to the debate on Al, he describes his 
belief that Al is founded on a Mechanistic thesis. He perceives an implicit scientism in 
Al that he considers to be a misguided attempt to pursue empirical solutions to purely 
philosophical problems. These criticisms reinforce the basic philosophical approach of 
this research. This is not to say that the scientific paradigm has no validity in 
exploring real-life phenomena. As discussed by Dreyfus et al (1986) the difficulties in 
Al, rather than reflecting technological limitations may reflect the limits, and not a 
general invalidity, of the technological or scientific paradigm. This is particularly so 
when one considers, as mentioned above, the original design purpose of digital 
computers was scientific calculation, for which they may have been absolutely valid. 
The extension of their success in that field, and their availability and utility, has been 
pervasive, and many computers now handle more sophisticated transactions that are 
very different in nature. The limits to which such technology can reliably be taken in 
valid representation of any level of human knowledge do not appear explicitly to have 
been measured. They look as if they are doing the job. However, as argued by 
Davenport (1997):
‘The same attributes that make computer-based information easy to load into the 
computer, and easy to manage once it is there, make it less valuable to humans .... 
what we get from computers is usually dated information with little or no context 
or clues to meaning, devoid of sequence or causality ....’ (Davenport, 1997: 26)
Weizenbaum (1985) concurs:
‘For example, when a computer executes an instruction to add 2 to 5, it computes 
7. But one cannot infer from ‘7’ that it was the result of an addition, let alone that
two numbers were involved. That information is lost in the performance of
computation.’ (Weizenbaum, 1985: 94)
In examining these effects in a case study environment, this research was able to shed 
more light on this significant issue.
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Omission of much contextual data was believed by the researcher to have another 
important aspect. The literature reviewed suggested that the ‘meaning’ that underpins 
information is contextually situated and derived. Faced with contextless data users are 
free to, and indeed must for sense-making purposes, ascribe context from their own 
frames of reference. The consequence of this is the development of user-defined 
meaning, which may differ significantly from the original. According to Davenport
(1997) the problem for organisations, of multiple meanings for the same key units of 
information, is not a new one:
‘When a group of people try to create categories or lists of information to be used 
by others, there have always been problems in the maintenance of meaning.’ 
(Davenport, 1997: 96)
Davenport goes on to give a clinical example of direct relevance to the research:
‘Since the nineteenth century, international medical bodies have attempted to 
classify types of disease (one such classification is the International Classification 
of Disease), while individual physicians and country-based medical associations 
decide these categories don’t work for their purposes and so modify them or create 
new ones.’ (Davenport, 1997: 96)
Davenport is right. Both America and Australia have added new categories to this 
basic classification in order to make it usable by them. Davenport’s work is oriented 
towards industry and not the public sector. In his view multiple meanings can be a 
good thing, in terms of representing innovation in a business. However, what his work 
does not address is the fundamental relationship between any of these categories and 
medical knowledge, nor does it take account of the implications of unnoticed change in 
meaning.
An additional problem, alluded to above and noted by Wood (1981) concerns the 
problem that:
‘.... the power and convenience of automated information collection and 
distribution has had the effect of driving out information that does not lend itself to 
quantification.’ (Wood, 1981: 17)
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The practical implications he observes include the fact, for instance, that the CIA:
‘.... whilst coping well with crop acreage and tons of steel produced, had a fairly 
thin record in judging political and social stability, so improved access to ‘hard’ 
data may produce over-confidence in the level of understanding about the real 
basis on which an economy functions.’ (Wood, 1981: 17)
The CIA’s interpretation of the data, in the social context within which they operated, 
produced a ‘reality’ and one that was promulgated widely. Given the above discussion, 
it was considered possible that parallels may exist with the DH.
All of this indicated that what is included, and how it is included, in the software of a 
digital computer is characterised by at least two dimensions. The first involves the kind 
of scientific assumptions that are consistent with the medium of reality representation: 
the computer (but not necessarily with the reality computers seek to represent). The 
second involves the social methods by which they are arrived at. Computer software, 
therefore, is not a neutral issue in considering perceived transformation of knowledge 
and data, where at least some of that knowledge and data is thought not to be objective.
4.4.2.C Digital Computers, An Initial Summary
It was considered possible that a type of transforming reification might have been 
taking place, making it necessary to examine the nature of the knowledge underpinning 
computer data. It was also possible that the model had been allowed to become reality. 
Consequently, rather than using the output of models to support improved 
understanding of reality, notions of reality were adjusted to fit what the model 
described.
Key questions to be addressed, then, included whether there was a definable point at 
which certain types of ‘knowledge’ were not amenable to the empirical lense. They 
also included whether this was only ‘qualitative’ knowledge and, if so, what defined 
qualitative knowledge. Was the point only reached in the realms of Al, or were Al
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practitioners merely recognising knowledge types of which earlier systems designers 
were not aware, due to the lack of sufficiently testing applications? Also, could 
knowledge be divided in this way, or was it the case that knowledge was an integration 
in which ‘fact’ was only fact because of the contextual landscape within which it was 
perceived and received? If so, and computers excise original context, were users 
ascribing context on the basis of their own frames of reference? Was the model 
becoming, or defining, reality as a result of this process? Again, what may have been 
happening was the quantification of qualitative data, the transformation of one kind of 
data to another, without regard for the impact on the content and meaning of that 
information, and the wide promulgation of a ‘reality’ which was removed from the real 
basis on which the NHS was operating.
4.4.3 Statistical Classifications and Coded Systematised Nomenclatures
This section begins with a review of statistical classifications, with a view to gaining 
relevant insights to the NHS classifications, ICD-10 and OPCS-4. It then moves on to 
systematised nomenclatures, in relation to Read 3. Some earlier references to systems 
are again briefly included here where it is felt they enhance this discussion.
4.4.3.a Statistical Classifications, A Description
As described earlier, a statistical classification is an arrangement of concepts into 
classes and their subdivisions, expressing the semantic relationships between them. 
Such systems work in a top-down, goal-oriented manner and are primarily population- 
oriented. Within them criteria for subdivision are clear, and the division is exclusive. 
The criteria used for subdivision of classes reflect the classification’s purpose. What 
can be said about instances of interest is predefined, with a desired granularity, 
dependent on that purpose. They are designed so that, when populated with data, class 
frequencies do not differ too much from an equal distribution in some sort of reference 
population. They are also designed to inform decision-making about given domain 
areas by enabling:
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‘.... the systematic recording, analysis, interpretation and comparison of (real 
world) data.’ (WHO, 1993:2)
It can be argued that the first three of these activities supports the fourth. Valid 
comparison relies on consistency and stability across all observers. Great emphasis is, 
therefore, given to the standardisation of procedures for data collection. If 
measurements are reliable in this sense, it is argued, they are stable across all observers. 
They provide, therefore, a sound, theoretically neutral base upon which to build and 
make decisions. Thus, standardisation mechanisms seek to ensure reduction, to a 
minimum, of inter and intra human variability, and of ambiguity in the use of 
language. This is because language is recognised as ambiguous and several meta­
instructions are deemed necessary to fix meaning more precisely. Such classifications 
have, therefore, myriad rules about what can be described using such an instrument and 
how it must be described. For instance, classes within a classification are designated 
by rubrics, giving the user an idea of what should be included in the class. Thus in ICD- 
10 and OPCS-4 rubrics can be taken as instructions to a user to interpret what is written 
in the medical casenote and to judge whether a clinical statement should be assigned to 
a given class.
Statistical classifications purport to be exhaustive, i.e. they claim to be complete 
models of their structured domains. However, they give only a limited kind of 
completeness and, although described as ‘exhaustive’, they are not, in fact, complete 
models of their domain. They reflect only partial knowledge of certain aspects, hence 
the existence within them of concepts such as ‘not’ or ‘not known’. This characteristic 
partial completeness is based on two things. Firstly, earlier discussions about the 
capability of models to express reality are relevant here (Jayaratna, 1994, Leith, 1987, 
Friedman and Nissenbaum, 1996). Secondly, they are primarily population-oriented. 
The classes generally intentionally subsume levels of detail considered unhelpful to the 
classification’s purpose. This is because either they represent phenomena of little 
interest or they would result in frequencies in classes being too few for reliable 
statistical extrapolation.
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4.4.3.b Statistical Classifications, A Discussion
Statistical classifications reflect the commitments of the positivist, scientific tradition. 
Such systems are an attempt to formalise large and complex areas of the natural world, 
on the assumption that real world phenomena are amenable to such treatment. This 
realist perspective holds reality to exist in the empirical world, and to be discoverable 
by examination of that world. It also assumes a shared reality. In terms of their 
philosophical underpinnings, classifications reflect the prioritisation of phenomena that 
are directly observable. Any appeal to intangibles runs the risk of being dismissed as 
metaphysical speculation. This perspective argues, therefore, that scientific theories 
must be founded upon, or tested by appeal to, descriptions that simply correspond to the 
state of the world, involving no theoretical assumptions and, therefore, being beyond 
doubt. Ayer (1936) argues that only empirically verifiable knowledge makes any sense 
at all. The foundation of scientific theory could be sense data, as in traditional 
empiricism, or it may be in the realm of the ‘publicly observable’, for example, blood 
cell counts, which are easily agreed upon by all observers. For the research this 
immediately raised the question of how valid classifications might be in less explicit 
contexts, e.g. that of some clinical data, like for instance ‘abdominal pain’. As noted by 
Kilpatrick (1973):
‘ it is this subjective aspect of healthcare that leads many to maintain that the
computer will never replace the physician in diagnosis.’ (Kilpatrick, 1973:1-2)
However, this does not stop a sense of ‘completeness’ or certainty being attached to 
knowledge generated about a domain in this way. As noted by Davenport and Prusak
(1998):
‘Codification gives permanence to knowledge ...’(Davenport and Prusak, 1998:
87)
This is an important insight, but it does not consider whose knowledge is made 
permanent. Review of classifications in action revealed that, despite the number of 
standardising mechanisms, classifications could also change meaning. This was 
particularly so where they were applied as secondary instruments, as was found to be
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the case in the NHS. As with computers, this might again be perceived as a 
philosophical commitment that, rather than reflecting reality, makes it fit what it 
expects by ‘smoothing’ and ‘shoehoming’ data into the desired formats.
Turning now to their context of use in this research, this has been shown to be 
informationally disparate domains. Thus, the collector and user did not share the same 
knowledge of the domain of interest or of the classifications. In other words, users of 
the classified data did not hold the necessary contextual knowledge that the 
classification excised. Here, classifications were applied by non-clinical operatives to 
an already existing clinical perspective on some aspects of clinical reality. Selection of 
data elements had, in this context, already been made by the clinician, and for purposes 
other than those of the classification. Information loss is a part of classifying, even 
where reality itself, in all its completeness, is the data source. Where the data source is 
already selective, information loss can be greater. This raised doubts about the degree 
of fit between the original clinical observations and the output of the classifications that 
were applied to them. It also raised doubts about the classifications as media of data 
collection. This issue was explored by reference to work by Tiles (1989). This work 
relates primarily to how, or in what circumstances, it is legitimate to extrapolate from 
observed data:
‘Since the process of data collection, the making, recording and processing of 
observations is, in any scientific discipline, governed by standardised procedures, 
those procedures themselves contribute to the form and content of the 
observations. But they embody socially established and enforced standards, they 
are not dictated directly by nature, but by people’s beliefs about the best way to go 
about getting information of a given sort, given the technological and other 
resources available to them, and given their very general beliefs about the nature of 
the field concerning which they want further information. This means that the 
methods of making observations are not themselves beyond the reach of critical 
appraisal.’ (Tiles, 1989: 36)
This issue does not stop simply at information loss or transformation of meaning. 
Having been developed and put in place these classification categories can be 
impressively robust. They become official and, subsequently, increasingly ‘real’. In 
the NHS, legions of statisticians were collecting and processing numbers on the 
assumption that the categories in the classifications were valid, and this use, in itself,
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validated them. Their robustness was further bolstered by the fact that users, 
particularly in an organisation as distended and fragmented as the NHS, had very little 
ability or reason to work the numbers backwards to their origins. This helped these 
categories to become ‘black boxes’, vulnerable to challenge by only a limited number 
of insiders, if any. Thus, as Porter (1995) observes:
Public statistics are able to describe social reality partly because they help to
define it.’ (Porter, 1995: 43)
This is despite the fact that, as also discussed by Porter (1995) the underlying statistical 
categories can be highly dependent upon particular circumstances, and are hence weak. 
Supporting evidence for this was found in the research domain. Anecdotal evidence 
suggested that all of the classifications studied were unbalanced in terms of the level of 
detail allowed by categories for a given specialty’s work. For instance, Cardiovascular 
and Orthopaedic surgeons engaged in vigorous lobbying when OPCS-4 was in 
development. This resulted in more detailed descriptive labels and classes than was 
found in other specialties. Logically, in terms of the purpose of the classification, 
fewer, less detailed categories would have sufficed or even been more useful.
Even so, as Porter notes, the process of reification is robust. He explains this by 
describing the emergence of the notion of ‘cadres’ in France. In 1930 this was an 
unknown concept and, consequently, nothing was described in that way. The term was 
then applied to engineers and managers under the Vichy Government, following which 
it became a category in official statistics. The category required tight definition so 
members could be counted accurately, and soon attracted a range of numerical 
characteristics. Now it is common to hear and read about what ‘cadres’ think about 
current issues, how they dress, etc. Thus, as Porter (1995) notes:
‘.... increasingly the statistical categories become the basis for individual and
collective definition.’ (Porter, 1995: 43)
In that sense statistical classification categories and the statistics based on them attain 
‘reality’. They become part of the known landscape and, in that way, begin to inform 
notions of what constitutes reality. This observation was coupled with the
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characteristics attaching to computer data generally. The resulting picture was one of 
data socially located firmly in the realm of objective, definitive fact about reality.
What was considered important here was that the clinical reality at issue had already 
been defined at the stage when the clinician engaged with it. As a result of the 
classification process some of that information was likely to have been lost or changed 
or both. The resulting statistical data, however, was what achieved factual status in 
broad society. As mentioned above, this view coalesces with insights stimulated by 
Giddens’ work (1976, 1984) on Structuration Theory. Classifications set the 
parameters of what can be known and how it can be known and, in a sense ‘spotlight’, 
and even ‘create’, certain phenomena to the exclusion of others. This was usefully 
explored further by considering the effects of these issues on users of such data. For 
NHS statisticians and managers this data had validity, validity here being used in its 
most rudimentary sense, which draws upon its Latin root, meaning power. Where 
categories represented clinical work they became the basis for socially accepted 
notions thereof, and for actions taken on the basis of those notions. Indirect evidence of 
this was found in the promulgation by these groups (DH, HES, managers, Ministers) 
of the representation of the NHS defined in coded and classified clinical data.
4.4.3.C Statistical Classifications, An Initial Summary
Statistical classifications are reductionist instruments underpinned by the positivist 
scientific tradition. This considers complex areas of reality to be describable in 
structured, atomic data. How well this assumption worked in the field of clinical data 
was explored in the field research stage. However, the literature review already 
indicated a lack of fit between some clinical observations and the real world 
assumptions evident in classifications. Some indication that a conflict might exist was 
found in the way in which statistical classifications enforce rigorously standardised data 
collection procedures, in order to ensure reduction, to a minimum, of inter and intra 
human variability, and ambiguity in the use of language. No allowance is made for the 
possibility that this is inappropriate to certain kinds of real world phenomena, or at least 
inappropriate to the level of understanding of those phenomena that was held. Indeed
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the assumption was that standardisation ‘neutralises’ and provides, therefore, a sound 
base for decision-making, as though variance is a contaminant rather than an inherent 
and essential ingredient of real life.
In addition, statistical classifications are designed to select only that type and level of 
detail that is deemed relevant to their design purpose. They lead, therefore, to further 
information loss. Also, the number and nature of categories in these systems are, at 
best, pragmatic. This reflects the need of statistics for sufficient data in each class from 
which to generalise. It also sometimes reflects vested interests. This does not stop a 
sense of ‘completeness’, ‘realness’ and objectivity being attached to knowledge 
generated about a domain in this way. In this way public statistics could be seen to 
describe social reality partly because they helped to define it. In addition, once created, 
classification realities have a way of not only defining social reality, but also of 
influencing human action within that frame of reference. Thus, in the context of the 
research, they were possibly perpetuating a cycle of misrepresentation and misguided 
action.
4.4.4 Coded Systematised Nomenclatures, A Description
As this section is relatively brief and refers in large part to the above discussion on 
statistical classifications, it is not concluded by a summary of the key discussion points.
Coded systematised nomenclatures were of interest to the research because one of the 
systems operating within the problem domain was Read 3. Although not yet in 
widespread use in the NHS, it was in use, albeit on a very small scale, in the hospitals 
visited as part of the field research, and it looked likely that usage would grow. The 
Government’s Information Management and Technology strategy (DH, 1997b) 
indicates the need for NHS hospitals to use a clinical vocabulary in clinical systems, 
and recommends Read 3 as the preferred one.
The purpose of such systems is basically to support the efficient and easy collection, 
storage, retrieval and manipulation of data in order better to address some relevant task
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or tasks. In the case of Read 3 the task is delivery of care by clinicians in patient 
consultations.
Coded concept systems, like computer systems and statistical classifications, and all 
such representational systems, are aimed at knowledge organisation by representing the 
natural world in data elements and pre-defined relationships. The philosophical 
underpinnings of all of these systems are, therefore, consistent. Formalised concept 
systems, like Read 3, purport to lean towards an ‘open world’ assumption. All 
knowledge about individuals is considered as partial. Partial knowledge can be 
extended with the next piece of knowledge.
In terms of their explicit characteristics, a coded systematised nomenclature is a 
collection of linguistic terms assumed to represent non-linguistic, abstract concepts, to 
which codes have been attached. Read 3 contains hundreds of thousands of coded 
clinical terms, catalogued by clinicians, and reflecting the words they normally use to 
describe their clinical work in everyday care of patients. Rules for system use do not 
exist, beyond the technical demands of any host software. Explicit definitions of terms 
also do not exist. Thus in Read 3 users are free to work with the nomenclature terms in 
the contexts of their own frames of reference. In other words, they are free to assign a 
term to an observation as they see fit. As with spoken language, meaning is, therefore, 
initially defined in the primary context by the clinical observer.
To an extent, therefore, systematised nomenclatures impose less of an explicit 
framework for use than statistical classifications. ( Interestingly, these characteristics 
have been a key factor in the rejection by the DH of Read 3 data as a substitute for 
classified data. Even more interestingly, no such problems are perceived with ICD-10 
and OPCS-4 data. The inherent similarities of the systems are not recognised.) 
Freedom and naturalness are, however, constrained by the desire to adhere to a 
particular structure, by resources and by the particular view of the world this
represents, which has been extensively discussed earlier. In addition, like 
classifications and, arguably, digital computers, nomenclatures are standardising 
mechanisms, even where users are allowed involvement in their on-going development
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and growth, as is the case with Read 3. Experience has shown that some users get used 
to the terms in a nomenclature and begin using them in preference to personal variants, 
thus standardising their language. The broad contents of the system also influence what 
individuals think about when deciding what to explore and record.
4.4.4.a Coded Systematised Nomenclatures, A Discussion
These systems differ from statistical classifications in a number of respects. They do 
not impose statistical categories or any associated explicit rules about data collection, or 
even language, providing it is relevant to the domain of interest. It would seem, 
therefore, that the potential for changing meaning is vastly reduced where these 
systems are applied within their legitimate context. Two issues remain however. 
Firstly, there is partiality. Coded systematised nomenclatures are formalised concept 
systems and, as such, are aimed at knowledge organisation and at representing the 
natural world in data elements. They are, therefore, a gravitation towards the extreme 
of AI and maintain all of the philosophical assumptions, capabilities and limits 
associated with that paradigm in relation to real life phenomena. They seek better to 
represent the richness of the real world although, like classifications, they make no 
attempt or claim to fully capture it. The same denial tends not to attach to data collected 
through such systems when used outside its original context. Secondly, lack of 
definitions and usage rules must carry an implication for meaning. Such freedom can 
mean a high level of context dependency where stability of meaning is concerned. In 
this context, therefore, meaning cannot be assumed to be stable, on both an inter and 
intra user basis. This was considered to be particularly relevant in the context of the 
research problem. Read 3 was used by clinicians to capture what they considered to be 
clinical details relevant to patient care in ‘natural’ clinical language. However, the full 
richness and diversity of clinical language had not been captured, and Read 3 was, 
therefore, acting as a standardising mechanism. It was also a standardising mechanism 
in that its content was based on an explicit model of clinical work, and the need to 
handle this in a computerised environment. Standardisation progressed when this data 
was then semi-automatically processed through statistical classifications. Thus, the
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heterogeneous was standardised and attracted all of the qualities ascribed to ‘scientific’ 
data.
4.4.5 Statistics
Three of the systems in the problem domain: ICD-10, OPCS-4 and HRGs, were 
specifically designed to produce statistically useful information for the NHS. The 
subject area of statistics warranted, therefore, consideration in its own right. As 
discussed earlier, statisticalisation has the effect that public data from such systems 
achieves a powerful status in society, in which it can shape perceptions of that society 
and actions in relation to it. This area was also reviewed in order to gain insight into 
the perspective of statisticians on the type of data they required for their work, and 
assumptions they held about the data. This was important from the perspective of 
comparing those characteristics against the characteristics that emerged from clinical 
information when examined at the clinical interface.
4.4.5.a The Discipline of Statistics, A Description
Statistics is, as noted by Johnson (1988):
‘.... more than just numbers - it is what is done to or with numbers.’ (Johnson, 
1988:4)
He goes on to define statistics as:
‘... .the universal language of science .... (it involves) information, numbers to 
summarise that information, and their interpretation.’ (Johnson, 1988: 4)
Johnson also describes the events, and their sequence, necessary for the application of 
statistics:
‘(1) the situation investigated is carefully and fully defined,(2) a sample of data is 
collected from the appropriate population following an established and appropriate 
procedure, (3) the sample data are converted into usable information .... and (4) the
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theories of statistical inference are applied to the sample in order to draw 
conclusions about the sampled population.’ (Johnson, 1988:1)
For the statistician the value of the reduction of information depends on how 
representative the resultant statistics are of the population of interest. The accuracy of 
the extrapolation from the sample to the total depends on the representativeness of the " 
individuals examined. Typically, this involves ensuring that data, for instance, about 
the national prevalence of a disease, is not drawn from one geographical area. The 
issue of how representative the data is of the clinical ‘reality’ captured by the clinician 
is not challenged.
The statistics at (3) are descriptive statistics, those at (4) are inferential. In the context 
of this research, Government statistical tables may be termed descriptive. The use that 
is made of these figures in terms, for instance, of predictions about healthcare, is 
inferential.
As described in the section on statistical classifications, the kinds of data statistical 
systems require are collections of objective fact to support production of predictive 
averages. As noted by Kilpatrick (1973):
In statistics we are interested not in the single fact but in collections of
objective facts...’ (Kilpatrick, 1973: 3-6)
4.4.5.b Statistics, A Discussion
Several important points are inherent in the above description. Firstly, according to 
Kilpatrick (1973) the discipline of statistics has an innately pragmatic, rather than a 
purely objective basis:
‘....the statistical method has been introduced precisely because the power of the 
human mind to grasp a number of particulars is limited.’ (Kilpatrick, 1973: 6)
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Secondly, statistics relate to the population and not to the individual. This data can then 
be used for planning and control purposes. Staying with the issue of averages, it is a 
tenet of statistics that:
‘The most important characteristic of healthcare information is variation, patients 
differ, illnesses manifest themselves in different ways, costs increase .... this 
variation itself is apparently governed by certain laws .... All healthcare 
information varies with respect to some norm or average. If we can deduce from a 
set of data, where each reading represents an individual patient, what the ‘average’ 
experience of these patients is and also describe the observed variation about this 
average then we shall be in a better position to interpret future data of this nature 
than we would without this overall view .... We can use these bodies of 
information to predict the characteristics of single future items....’(Kilpatrick, 
1973:3)
Also, as discussed by Porter (1995):
‘The regularities of crime and suicide in early investigations of ‘moral statistics’ 
could evidently not be attributed to the individual’. (Porter, 1995: 37)
In terms of the research problem this was considered to be important. Clinical data at 
the clinical interface was, and clearly had to be, oriented towards individual patients. 
That is not what statistical systems are about. They can be populated with individuals’ 
data, but only in order that a focus can be placed on the entire population. Importantly, 
however, that focus on the population can lead to conclusions that ultimately affect the 
individual. As argued by Dreyfus et al (1986):
‘Every case is unique, so statistics about likelihoods of outcomes of various
possible treatments based on all previous cases are of little value the
frequency with which a particular procedure yielded a particular outcome observed 
in all previous sufferers from a disease or injury differs from the statistics for 
victims of the patient’s age, sex, general health, mental outlook and so on, and 
there is no scientific way of knowing what reference group should be taken as 
relevant. In reality, a patient is viewed by the experienced doctor as a unique case 
and treated on the basis of intuitively perceived similarity with situations 
previously encountered. That kind of wisdom, unfortunately cannot be shared 
(Dreyfus et al, 1986: 200)
It is interesting to note, particularly given the assertions of Kay and Purves (1996) 
Kluge (1996) De Dombal (1996) and Dreyfus et al (1986) that in essence each
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clinician/patient encounter is inherently heterogeneous, when the view from the 
statistician is that:
‘Healthcare is .... based on the fact that to a certain degree people and their 
diseases are alike, in spite of individual differences.’ (Kilpatrick, 1973: 9)
Thirdly, a numerical item of information is called a statistic. This rather obvious fact 
is important for two reasons. Firstly, anything that cannot be quantified cannot validly 
become a statistic. This may be taken to mean one of two things. Either ‘qualitative’ 
data does not exist, or ‘qualitative’ data exists but is not deemed by statisticians to be 
viable for statistical purposes. As asserted by Kilpatrick (1973):
‘....the two least accurate forms of information on which to estimate a population
value .... are the single fact and the subjective impression  Impressions are
(also) suspect in that they usually conform to the general attitude of the person 
holding them and involve subjective judgments or criteria not generally 
acceptable.’ (Kilpatrick, 1973: 8)
The ‘single fact’ problem is overcome by mass data collection. Closer inspection of 
this assertion, however, raises questions about the statisticians’ view of what is 
quantifiable, particularly when bearing in mind the paradigmatic location of statistics. 
Thus, while it might be argued that attaching a number or code to qualitative data is not 
the same thing as starting with quantitative data, no assumption was made within this 
research about what constitutes quantitative data for an individual with this 
philosophical stance, particularly when this stance is directed at the realm of medicine, 
which is also widely considered to rest within the scientific paradigm. Nor was any 
assumption made about the inherent validity of the possibly inappropriate mix of 
methods and data.
In addition, it is worth noting that subjective opinion has what can arguably be 
described as a more ephemeral, transient and uncertain nature than what is taken to be 
objective information. Numbers have a fixed meaning. Attaching definitive labels to 
opinion data immediately fixes the transient meaning at a point in time. As noted 
earlier, codification lends permanency. Fixed meaning is a fundamental characteristic 
of objective data. However, it should be noted that in the research this fixity was
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imposed rather than real. This was not, however, always evident and it may have been 
the case with healthcare data that there was an assumption that anything that had been 
assigned a number actually representing a definitive label was objective, and that if 
only there were bigger and better numbering schemes, management decision-making 
and ability to control events would improve.
Turning now to the relationship of such a tool to clinical work, insights were gained 
from Felligi (1996) and most particularly from Kilpatrick’s (1973) discussion about 
statistical principles. In this he focuses directly on healthcare. He does not apply this 
to a critique of live systems, but he describes the information needed by statistical 
healthcare systems. This is, he asserts:
‘.... objective, unemotional facts which can be checked by other people (auditors, 
physicians) and which can be communicated (much like the data needed by 
computers). For example, to say a person is cyanotic implies a personal judgment 
on what constitutes cyanosis (lack of oxygen) but the statement that the blood is 
elevated can be made more precise by quoting the systolic and diastolic blood 
pressures, the method of recording these and the norm or control values used ....’ 
(Kilpatrick, 1973: 1)
Notably he goes on to extol the virtues of subjective information:
\ . . .  it is this subjective aspect of healthcare that leads many to maintain that the 
computer will never replace the physician in diagnosis.’ (Kilpatrick, 1973: 1-2)
This was considered highly relevant to previous discussions about clinical knowledge 
and the content of the clinical casenote, which was the source of information for the 
classifications in the problem domain.
4.4.5.C Statistics, An Initial Summary
The discipline of statistics comes from the scientific paradigm and is the science of 
collecting, classifying, presenting and interpreting data. It has been shown to be a 
pragmatic attempt to overcome the inadequacies of the human brain to deal with certain 
levels and types of complexity. Its products have been shown often to be socially
94
received as fact. Where statistics are applied to real world phenomena the limitations 
as well as the strengths of its underlying philosophical characteristics emerged, 
therefore, as worthy of examination. These characteristics might, for instance, be 
argued to fix meaning where stability is not proven, and thereby change it. This 
assertion was based on evidence from the literature, which included observations that 
single facts and subjective impressions are not deemed valid for statistical purposes, 
and yet every clinical case is unique, making existing statistical extrapolations 
defective. The consequences for the research domain of the belief system surrounding 
statistics was further explored in later stages.
4.4.6 People
The issue of people in the context of the organisation has been discussed, to an extent, 
in chapters 1 and 2. However, this section draws particularly on those areas of 
conceptual work which offer insights into people as professionals. As earlier 
discussions have shown, professions can exert significant influence over the 
relationship of their members to organisations and can, therefore, be argued to influence 
behaviour. It was thought likely that this influence on behaviour extended to 
informational issues. Findings here were used to explore the profession of medicine.
In addition, potentially significant factors with regard to non-professional groups: 
managers and Ministers, are discussed here. Discussion of statisticians, in terms of their 
worldview, is implicit in the above discussion and is not, therefore, repeated in a 
separate section here. Other significant aspects of this group are discussed as part of 
the fieldwork report. Also reported there are key characteristics of the one remaining 
group deemed to be active within the problem domain: clinical coders. This group was 
not addressed here as it is not represented in the available literature.
Unlike previous sections in this chapter, this entire section is presented as a discussion, 
followed by an initial summary of key points.
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4.4.6.a People as Professionals
Key amongst the influential characteristics of professions are the social arrangements 
which surround them. These are such that outsider ability to know or challenge the 
‘realities’ constructed by professionals is minimal. Examples of this include emphasis 
within the professions upon the ‘unfettered’ one to one relationship of professional and 
client. This is initiated by the ‘inexpert’ consumer but terminated by the professional. 
This is the only setting within which it is deemed expert diagnosis of the client’s 
problems can take place and be successfully carried through. This relationship is given 
pre-eminence by professionals who need to have their expertise taken for granted. 
Another example is the degree and type of expertise needed in order to qualify in the 
professions. As discussed in chapter 2, this means no outsider possesses the 
competence to judge practice and no insider needs to, because practice is evidence of 
expertise and also a matter of judgement as well as skill. This was important in the 
context of this research, not least because peer validation of expertise meant that 
standardisation of practice for the purposes of achieving external credibility was 
unnecessary. Also, where the key entities at issue resist precise quantification, or as 
some would see it, objectification, trust fills the gap.
That the advice was expert in nature was not lightly treated. As noted by Johnson 
(1972):
‘.... knowledge provides a powerful control over nature and society.’ (Johnson,
1972:33)
As Barnes (1977) notes, it also follows that only practitioners fully understand the 
implications of their own practices, so it follows they will be allowed the dominant role 
in controlling their application. It must be assumed that this means direct application, 
for in the case of healthcare, for instance, its data and apparent knowledge about it is 
applied by non-experts in the field. This is an interesting paradox, because the 
combination of expertise, which to an extent makes professional knowledge a ‘black 
box’ to lay people, and social power, not only buttresses what might be described as 
‘ontological protectionism’, but also facilitates manipulation of the nature of
96
professional knowledge for purposes of public presentation. This ‘sword’ is, however, 
double-edged. It also supports either intentional or unwitting manipulation and 
misrepresentation by groups outside the profession.
The control enjoyed by professions is also typically and powerfully fortified by 
language (Bernstein, 1971, Johnson, 1972). Johnson (1972) discusses this in the 
specific context of medicine, referring to it as:
‘.... a highly developed community language or jargon .... Few lay people can 
intuitively understand legal or medical language.’ ( Johnson, 1972: 56)
This enables clinicians to transfer knowledge amongst them:
‘A major factor in the success of any knowledge transfer project is the common 
language of the participants. Sharing almost identical training and experience, 
working in precisely the same specialised area, the surgeons and other
professionals .... could readily understand one another’s words and actions.’
(Davenport and Prusak, 1998: 98)
However, this phenomenon has another dimension. As discussed by Bernstein (1971) 
such language is also a way of achieving ‘social closure’ or exclusion. As Johnson 
(1972) goes on to note:
‘This phenomena performs the double function of maintaining internal 
homogeneity and increasing autonomy from outsiders, both competing specialists 
and laymen, by aiding the process of ‘mystification’ of outsiders and thereby 
maintaining the control of the profession over what it considers to be its universe 
of discourse.’ (Johnson, 1972: 56)
This desire by professions to maintain themselves, their freedom and their status by 
throwing a ‘net’ around their language has implications for how this behaviour affects 
knowledge and information. This in turn has implications for the realities perceived 
and any consequent reinforcement of that status.
A final key factor in public perception of the clinical profession, and the status this 
accords it, can be found in the ‘scientific’ approach it adopts to its work. As noted by 
Higgs (1999) until the sixteenth century medicine was based largely on patients’ reports
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of their symptoms. Knowledge of anatomy was mainly drawn from Galen’s ‘On the 
Conduct of Anatomy’. This second century (AD) text was based on the anatomy, of 
monkeys, not humans. However, as noted by Merton (1942) the Reformation of the 
sixteenth century allowed for the anatomical dissection of corpses. This enabled 
comparative studies of anatomy, which allowed for the ‘normal’ to be distinguished 
from the ‘abnormal’ through observation. This in turn enabled a move from bedside 
medicine towards hospital-based medicine. This was originally characterised by 
patients being allowed access to care if they would offer themselves for study, thereby 
providing essential material for scientific investigation of disease. Patients’ reports 
thus became less important than the physical signs their bodies manifested, and both 
came to be seen merely as indications of underlying pathological factors. Thus the body 
was elevated in importance by clinicians as a more ‘objective’ method of investigation 
than what had gone before. This approach was then supplemented by a range of 
observation instruments, including X Ray, laboratory medicine, and stethoscopes. All 
of these apparently further diminished the subjective element of medicine and bolstered 
perception of its objective, scientific nature.
4.4.6.b People as Professionals, the Clinical Perspective
Looking now specifically at the clinical profession, the origin of the knowledge in 
question could be argued to start with the birth of the clinician as an individual member 
of society. For the purposes of this research, with its focus on clinical information, an 
emphasis was, however, placed primarily on the individual as clinician. More general 
sociological aspects of knowledge creation were drawn on as appropriate.
Like all professionals, clinicians are trained to perceive within the epistemological and 
ontological commitments of their respective paradigm of knowledge. As discussed 
earlier, the paradigm from which individuals operate describes the rules and content 
that lend authority to a particular discipline. These rules are the epistemology and 
ontology of a particular field. They form that body of tradition and knowledge that 
legitimises a particular kind of intellectual pursuit and, importantly, guides which 
knowledge will be sought and how it will be presented. The paradigm thus defines a
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particular way of viewing, negotiating and describing the world. As discussed by 
Kuhn (1963) and in chapter 3 of this thesis, a paradigm is universally recognised 
scientific achievements that, for a time, provide model problems and solutions to a 
community of practitioners. It has an underlying unity in terms of its basic, and often 
‘taken for granted’ assumptions. These separate a group of theorists operating in one 
paradigm in a very fundamental way from theorists located in another. These 
assumptions emphasise the commonality of perspective that binds the work of a group 
of theorists together in such a way that they can usefully be regarded as approaching a 
social theory within the bounds of the same problematic. Mannheim (1970) also 
comments on this issue:
‘Behind every definite question and answer is implicitly or explicitly to be found a 
model of how fruitful thinking can be carried on. If one were to trace in detail, in 
each individual case, the origin and the radius of diffusion of a certain thought- 
model, one would discover the peculiar affinity it has to the social position of 
given groups and their manner of interpreting the world .... generations, status 
groups, sects, occupational groups, schools etc ....’ (Mannheim, 1970:118-119)
Mannheim’s work did not consider the effects on knowledge processing in an 
organisational setting, but here once again, what is basically ‘paradigm-located’ 
knowledge is being described. This was important in the context of this research for a 
number of reasons, but mainly because very different ‘models’ or paradigms were in 
operation within the field of clinical information.
At the foundation of the clinical paradigm, as noted by Foucault (1973):
‘.... the human body defines by natural right the space of origin of distribution of 
diseases.’ (Foucault, 1973:1)
This formed the basis of organisational structures around medicine in the NHS. As 
discussed earlier, Mintzberg (1983) found that medicine was often characterised by a 
bureaucratisation of medical care. This ‘pigeonholes’ medicine in order that external 
complexity might be converted into uniform organisational categories, within which the 
clinician’s standardised range of skills might be more easily developed and applied. 
Thus, the body is divided into anatomical sites in which individual clinicians can
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specialise and perfect their skills. Coupled with its historical development, there is, 
therefore, a mechanistic approach to clinical work, providing an appearance of 
objectivity and certainty, apparently placing medicine and medical knowledge within 
the realm of science. One might expect hard, objective, reliable ‘fact’ to result, 
particularly as:
‘....the natural sciences are generally accepted as true and undistorted bodies of
knowledge, their methods as impartial, unbiased models of investigation such
has been the enthusiasm for science in western cultures that statements of its truth 
have taken on the nature of tautologies; science has been allowed to define what 
we hold to be true about the world.’ (Barnes, 1974: 5)
Brown (1992) also comments:
‘ The gradual but persistent growth in the cultural authority of Western science has 
led to the achievement of a privileged status at both epistemological and ethical 
levels.’ (Brown, 1992: 71)
Brown (1992) draws on Merton (1942) to discuss this further:
‘.... it was accepted that scientists had, by their particular methods, found ways of 
ensuring that their knowledge was uniquely determined by the state of the physical 
or social world. This in turn led to assumptions about the characteristics of the 
scientific community that must necessarily exist if such knowledge was to be 
realised in practice.’ (Brown, 1992: 71)
These findings indicated the possibility that such ‘objectivity’, rather than being based 
on a direct line to ‘the truth’, was socially constructed.
Further exploration of the literature, particularly in the areas of clinical training and 
practice also supported this and indicated that, far from being a repository of 
undisputed and indisputable facts, on closer inspection, medicine is a realm of 
uncertainty (Fox, 1979, De Dombal, 1996).
The work of Szolovits (1994) on linguistics and computer representations in the field of 
Al was also useful here. His work focuses primarily on the difficulties of reliable 
linguistic representation of clinical phenomena and work in computer systems, rather
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than the causes of linguistic heterogeneity. He does not go on to consider the 
implications of this for knowledge and information outside the clinical sphere. 
However, as a product of this work, he asserts that:
‘Uncertainty is the central critical fact about medical reasoning. Patients cannot 
describe exactly what has happened to them or how they feel, doctors and nurses 
cannot tell exactly what they observe, laboratories report results only with some 
degree of error (Szolovits, 1994: 1)
As noted by Fox (1979) and De Dombal (1996) medical teaching reflects this. It is 
based on a recognition that an irreducible amount of uncertainty is inherent in 
medicine. Fox (1979) asserts that three basic types of uncertainty may be recognised. 
The first results from incomplete or imperfect command of knowledge available about 
the discipline of medicine. The second stems from limitations in current knowledge. 
The third can derive from the first two, and rests upon the difficulty in distinguishing 
between personal ignorance or incompetence and the limitations of present knowledge. 
Literature in this area makes clear that it is assumed that medical knowledge gained 
thus far must be regarded as tentative and subject to constant further enquiry, and that 
few absolutes exist. It reveals medicine as something less than an exact science. 
Indeed, it reveals it as being as much an art as a science, a matter of judgment as well as 
skill. Notably, judgment, in the same way as art, is about subjectivity and 
interpretation, not empiricism.
The question this raised was how clinical work could be conducted on this basis. This 
was not to say such knowledge was considered unreliable for current practical 
purposes, if such knowledge was viewed as ‘justified’ in the sense described by Rorty 
(1979, 1982). Rorty puts forward the notion that whatever knowledge is, it need not 
and cannot be justified in terms of accurate reflection of the real world. It might, 
however, be justified by achieving the status of ‘disciplinary objectivity’, or the 
pragmatic consensus of individuals in a specific paradigmatic community, which gives 
certain knowledge the status of ‘fact’. Thus ‘objectivity’ loses its association with 
some immutable ‘truth’ and becomes knowledge arrived at by a process that 
consciously attempts to reduce subjectivity. In this way it increases levels of 
confidence that can be vested in it. This allowed ‘truth’ to become a changeable
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artifact, which is a notion that arguably finds some support in the significant shifts in 
knowledge which history can demonstrate. For instance, we no longer believe the 
world to be flat. It also, however, raised issues about the definition of ‘truth’ in use in 
Rorty’s argument, i.e. whether truth is what really exists, whether or not we have 
sufficiently extended and structured our understanding to recognise it, or whether truth 
is the accepted knowledge on which society acts. It also begged the question of 
whether such knowledge, when transferred into a computer system or outside the realm 
of the clinical paradigm, remained characterised by uncertainty.
Looking at such a philosophical base in practice, the literature indicated that a wide 
range of factors could then affect this basic uncertainty, extending the heterogeneity of 
clinical knowledge. Levels of acquired competence and skill affect uncertainty, as do 
levels of ‘experience’ generally. Experienced clinicians tend to elicit less information 
than their more junior colleagues, but they also tend to elicit more relevant information. 
They are also able to combine these items of information more appropriately than their 
juniors. Clinical experience generally operates as a weighting function that gives 
preference to these more effective types of connections. As discussed by Kluge (1996) 
responding to an article about the medical record:
‘.... these weighting functions are integral to the conceptual framework of the
clinician as the clinician gains experience.’ (Kluge, 1996: 88)
They are also influential in determining the reality perceived and represented.
The practical consequences of this conceptual framework are further enlarged upon by 
De Dombal (1996) particularly if uncertainty is taken to mean not holding objective 
characteristics, i.e. not being hard, immutable ‘fact’. In discussing the need to abandon 
simplistic models of clinical perception and information (which he describes as 
historically descriptive or determinist and more latterly probabilist) when designing 
computerised clinical information systems, De Dombal comments on factors affecting 
the objective value of a piece of clinical information. He presents an equation 
composed of a number of elements, which he asserts are not, so far, taken account of in 
either current determinist theory, current probabilist teaching or decision support
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systems. The equation includes the evidential value observed in previous surveys, the 
degree to which the local circumstances reflect the findings in various surveys, the 
confidence with which the clinical feature was elicited, the overall reproducibility of 
the process of elicitation of that feature, the clinical acumen of the individual eliciting 
the information, the relevance of the information to the role of the individual in the 
overall healthcare delivery system, and the timeliness of the information to the 
situation. De Dombal presents these factors as a list, indicating that, whilst he believes 
they influence the objective value of a piece of information, there is at present no 
knowledge of how they influence the value or how to combine them. What De 
Dombal is saying is that the Medical Informatics community has largely accepted, or 
believes in, simplistic representations of knowledge, ‘such as clinicians’ expressed 
opinions’ (De Dombal, 1996:1) but reality is much more complex than this. This is 
particularly so if, as he also notes, the elements in the above-mentioned equation 
reverberate through all subsequent decisions taken in the field of healthcare. These 
include allocating resources, as well as those direct clinical decisions pertaining to 
individual patients.
The literature also offered insights into the process of applying and acquiring clinical 
knowledge and information in a live setting. The review revealed a great deal of work 
aimed at creating computerised clinical information systems. There was, however, 
little that focused in any great depth on the relationship between the knowledge to be 
contained in those systems or the uses of that knowledge, particularly outside its sphere 
of origin.
Looking at clinical knowledge in more detail, the epistemological steps leading to a 
clinical diagnosis are described in Kluge’s (1996) work discussed above. They are 
quoted here as a reference against which to begin review of this process in live settings. 
Kluge notes:
‘.... the initial job of the clinician is to identify the data, dissociate them as much 
as possible from the connections that the patient has made .... and then note the 
data .... The physician then supplements these data by the data he or she gathers in 
an investigative fashion, either through direct observation or investigative 
procedures. The totality of the data thus generated constitute the basic patient
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record .... The body of knowledge that characterises the specialty (if any) of the 
clinician - which is to say the clinician’s conceptual framework - then functions 
like a filter by attaching various weights to different lines of possible connection 
among the data .... The result is a patient profile. It may leave certain possibilities 
of connections as mere possibilities. On the other hand, if only a single set of 
connections remains, the result is a diagnosis.’ (Kluge, 1996: 91)
In addition, Kluge notes that different specialties can look at the same data and come to 
different conclusions. Here Kluge gives some indication of the variability of the 
processes of perception and observation and, consequently, offers further insight into 
the heterogeneous nature of the data that may emerge. Although many of the studies 
reviewed considered this from the perspective of the certainty of clinical knowledge, 
again, none of them addressed the issue of clinicians looking at the same thing and 
labelling their observations differently. The issues of further heterogenising clinical 
data and the effects on ensuing information were not, therefore, explored.
Kluge is quoted at length here. This is because he gives a useful model of the process 
of clinical profiling and perception leading to knowledge and information generation, 
and deepens insights into the nature of that knowledge and information. This was 
considered to be important because this did not stop a programme of mass 
standardisation of this data, nor did it stop its use for purposes requiring ‘objective 
facts’ as their basis.
Moving now to the construction of a record of this knowledge, as detailed above, Kluge 
describes a patient record as ‘the totality of the data ...’ (Kluge, 1996: 91) generated by 
the clinician and patient encounter. The researcher’s experience suggested this was 
rarely the case and the medical casenote was often a working log for the clinician. In 
other words it was unique to each author and situation, and so contained varying 
degrees and types of information, as deemed necessary by each clinician for each 
patient when they were treating them. Kay and Purves (1996) in describing their work 
on the record, offer further insights:
‘.... from the start there are two markedly distinct, often diametrically opposed 
viewpoints of the same event that have to be distilled into the medical record ....
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the viewpoints may or may not be reconciled and both may not actually be 
recorded ....’ (Kay and Purves, 1996: 78)
They go on to note:
\ . . .  in general the clinician will construct the record from a mixture of 
measurement (quantitative and objective) and observation (qualitative and 
subjective). The former will involve scientific discourse, the latter ordinary 
discourse.’ (Kay and Purves, 1996: 80)
It seemed, therefore, that in the record there was a mixture of ‘objective fact’, or at least 
fact about which there was social consensus, e.g. ‘the baby’s temperature is 101.8 
degrees’, ‘the child was administered pertussis immunisation’, and subjective opinion 
or observation, subjectively labelled, e.g. ‘the child has scarlet fever’. The literature 
failed to yield evidence that the relative prevalence of either type was known.
These differences became important when consideration was given to how such 
inherently heterogeneous data was firstly homogenised and secondly, during that 
transformation process, globally endowed with the status of objective fact. As 
discussed, the instruments for collecting and representing such phenomena were 
statistical clinical classifications. These were apparently perceived by their 
protagonists as adequate for capturing clinical reality to such an extent that the 
conditions and treatments of every patient coming into contact with the NHS could be 
reflected by them. In other words, the possibility of two different versions of the same 
reality can be perceived here.
As noted by De Dombal (1996 ) and discussed by Kluge (1996) the kinds of description 
provided by Kay and Purves (1996) are:
‘.... based on the phenomenological insight that the perception of data is 
conditioned by the conceptual framework of the perceiver, that the perspective, the 
nature and structure of this framework colours what is seen.’ (Kluge, 1996: 88)
This is consistent with the kind of philosophical notions that assert that there are no 
objective facts in the world, that so-called ‘facts’ are ‘facts as perceived’, and that they 
come laden with characteristics that are contributed to by the observer’s conceptual
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framework. If this is so, the interaction between clinician and patient is not a scientific 
or interpretationally neutral fact gathering exercise, because it involves something other 
than a neutral information transfer, if such a thing exists. The entire process carries its 
own phenomenological burden:
‘The physician.... when recording data received in the physician/patient encounter 
records not pure data but data-as-information ....’(Kluge 1996: 88)
In other words the clinician enters data with meaning, or ‘information’. He enters only 
that data he perceives as relevant, relevance being a product of his conceptual 
framework. That framework appears only to extend to the direct care of the patient by 
the clinician.
This also affects how this data is presented in relation to other data and how it is 
arranged. To this must be added consideration of that fact that the record is often a 
multi-author text. Patients often see more than one doctor in a lifetime, and even in the 
course of one series of hospital contacts.
Cognitive psychology supports this phenomenological view. As discussed earlier, as a 
result of several studies, including those of psychologists Bruner et al (1947) and 
Postman et al (1948) it maintains that it is becoming increasingly clear that ‘believing is 
not seeing’. People see what they wish to see and perception is guided by inner 
cognitive sets that reflect past learning experiences, values, motives, basic personality 
needs and self-confidence about ability to act effectively in a given situation. Thus it is 
not surprising that cognitive psychology notes that words of a high value to a perceiver 
are seldom rejected in the face of meager information. These insights were of 
importance in exploring the behaviour of non-clinical users of the clinical record, in 
terms of transcription of medical records.
The issue of ‘relevance’ already, therefore, began to emerge as complex and important. 
As discussed earlier in this thesis, all knowledge claims exist in the form we know:
‘.... as a response to particular interests in prediction and control, which are in turn 
related to social interests.’ (Barnes, 1977: 30)
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For instance, the dominant interest influencing ‘relevance’ for the clinician in 
recording information in the medical record could be purely anything that enabled their 
continuing care of the patient. It could alternatively, however, be that which might be 
relevant to the clinician’s defense of clinical decisions at some later date. For instance, 
it was possible that the clinician knowingly omitted data that may be seen later to 
challenge those decisions. Anecdotal evidence suggested that this happened all the 
time. Alternatively, ‘relevance’ in this context may have been related to the medical 
record being an action log:
‘.... a document oriented towards action, and the as-yet unwritten future of the
patient story.’ (Gremy et al, 1996: 95)
Whatever the underlying perceptions of relevance that determine the content of the 
record, the researcher’s experience prior to this study indicated that use by non­
clinicians was never a consideration made by clinicians when writing it. The 
importance of this issue rested, not least, in the perception of this document by non­
clinicians about its purpose and the nature of its contents. These users included many 
who believed the medical record to be:
‘.... a scientific, technical and cold document the data written (on it having)
every quality of scientific data....’ (Gremy et al, 1996: 95)
The work of Gremy et al does not comment on whether it does have such qualities, or 
whether it is assumed to have. However, if Kluge (1996) De Dombal (1996) and Kay 
and Purves (1996) are correct, while such a document may have, or even need, the 
appearance of scientific data, whether it is possible for this to be the case must be 
challenged. The evidence above suggested not. Also, if this document did have such 
an appearance, as mentioned above, exploration of why this was so was merited. It may 
simply have been, as earlier evidence suggests, that non-clinical users were allowed, or 
required, to project their assumptions about medicine onto the document. This may 
have been happening partly because they were using that data in isolation from its 
clinical author(s). However, it was also the case that medicine emerged from this 
review as a self-regulating community that, in a united way, faced the issue of 
uncertainty. Clinicians are trained to develop an affirmative attitude towards doubting
107
and can admit they are unsure because, as described above, their training teaches them 
that a level of uncertainty is inevitable. In addition, however, they must act as ‘savants’ 
if they are to meet their clinical responsibilities. They cannot doubt as openly as they 
feel. They must commit themselves to some of the tentative judgments that they make. 
As noted by Szolovits (1994):
‘.... we must make important decisions about testing and treatments and, despite 
our uncertainties about the bases of those decisions, the decisions themselves must 
be definitive.’ (Szolovits, 1994: 1)
In addition, the work of Dreyfus et al (1986) on the progress of Al indicates that acting 
as savants leads ultimately to failures even to recognise the intuitive factors in their 
decision-making. The very nature of their skill, the fact that it constantly requires them 
to play God, seems to predispose them to think of their decisions as being rule-based. 
Doctors apparently attempt to rationalise their intuitive decisions to explain them to 
their patients and to justify them to themselves. It was, therefore, of interest to this 
research to explore whether and how the imperative of definitive decisions, and the 
resulting beliefs clinicians held about their own behaviour, had worked backwards 
along the information chain and encouraged large-scale reification of heterogeneous, 
judgmental observations into objective fact.
4.4.6.C People as Clinical Professionals, An Initial Summary
Medicine is socially perceived to lie within the realm of the empirical sciences. Its 
knowledge base assumes, therefore, all of the associated characteristics, i.e. objectivity, 
certainty, explicitness and, importantly, ‘truth’. Knowledge from this sphere defines 
for society outside medicine what we take to be true about that world.
This view is at odds with what the literature revealed. It indicated that there are some 
tried and true ‘hard facts’ about which there is little argument, but also there is a 
provisional nature to much that is assumed to be medically known. Medical teaching 
reflects this. It is based on the recognition that an irreducible amount of uncertainty is 
inherent in medicine. In addition, clinical perception, knowledge and information
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emerged as characterised, to some unknown degree, by an unavoidable 
phenomenological bias. It is highly judgmental, subjective and heterogeneous. Data 
sources coming from this realm, e.g. clinical records, emerged as documents whose 
purpose and content were possibly ill-defined, possibly misunderstood, and whose 
contents carried with them all of the heterogeneity inherent in their origins and 
purposes. These were the main source of all Governmental clinical information about 
NHS clinical encounters. However, because knowledge from this domain was taken to 
be ‘true’, truthlike characteristics were attached to the data they contained.
The power exerted by the scientific nature of this domain, and knowledge, data and 
information coming from it, were shown to be further reinforced by the professional 
status of clinicians. This included social arrangements that were such that outsider 
ability to know or challenge the ‘realities’ constructed by professionals is limited. This 
power was also shown to be buttressed by a highly developed community language, 
which maintains internal homogeneity and increases autonomy from outsiders.
All of this was considered to have two effects that were key in terms of this research. 
Firstly, all clinical data did not appear to fit well with the requirements of the statistical 
systems that were routinely using it. The relationship between the two appeared 
tenuous at best. Decisions based upon such data were, therefore, suspect. Secondly, it 
appeared that clinicians themselves played a part in perpetuating this situation. It was 
necessary, therefore, to explore the part played by individuals in creating and 
recreating the reality in which they existed and the implications therein for knowledge 
and action. If, as Kluge (1996) Bruner et al (1947) and Postman et al (1948) assert, the 
framework of the perceiver colours what is seen, the effects of structured information 
systems could not be underestimated. These systems were presenting versions of 
clinical data that were contextually impoverished and allowed, and even necessitated, 
imposition on them of users’ contexts.
Given the insights gained by exploring the clinical profession, the paradigmatical 
commitments of other key organisational player were explored next.
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4.4.7 Ministers and Managers, A Discussion
Looking first at Ministers, the Government of the day appoints Ministers from among 
its Members of Parliament. While these Ministers become servants of the Crown, their 
first loyalty is ostensibly to a particular political ideology. This ideology must be both 
actively and demonstrably supported, and successful. On that basis political images, 
ambitions and careers are developed and promoted. As demonstrated in the discussion 
of NHS statisticians in chapter 8, the role of the Civil Service is to support Government 
policy, regardless of political hue.
Also, Government is funded by public money. The result of this is that Government has 
a key responsibility to demonstrate accountability in terms of how the money is spent 
and whether or not the public is getting the best for that money. This accountability is 
usually in relation to large and complex areas of public spending like transport, 
education and, the subject of this research, healthcare. It also encompasses decisions 
that affect hundreds of people and events, and are usually made with a minimum of 
informed judgement, local knowledge or subject expertise. Porter (1995) in 
considering the historical development of statistics, offers relevant insights here:
Tn a republic, where anyone can be anything, the most ignorant may be assigned
the most difficult functions.’ (Porter, 1995: 84)
This means that Ministers are in a poor position to challenge the integrity of public 
statistics that are presented to them and yet must rely on them. Quantification is 
shown, therefore, to be not only a technology of the inexpert, but also ‘.... a technology 
of distance.’ (Porter, 1995: ix).
Their position as public servants also means that Ministers need the appearance of 
impartiality in their professional behaviour. Their own judgement must not appear to 
be active or criticisms of bias and personal interest may result. Statistics again play an 
important role here. As discussed earlier, quantification is the technology of 
objectivity.
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In turning now to look at managers, work by Handy (1985) provided what were 
considered to be the most useful insights. One of the ways in which he categorises 
management is as a ‘semi-profession’ (Handy, 1985: 381). However, on the basis of 
what he describes as ‘many years of dealing with managers and of being a manager’ 
(1985: 386) he also asserts that this semi-professional status is warranted because 
management does not yet manifest the key aspects of professions as described above. 
These include a recognised body of knowledge and enforced standards of practice. It 
is, however, a recognised occupational role in society. It is debatable whether this 
constitutes sufficient grounds for the application of the title ‘semi-professional’. What 
was important to this research, however, was that it was deemed at this stage that 
influences on the research problem caused by professional status were unlikely in the 
realm of the manager. Handy (1985) also asserts that:
‘It has never been easy to define what a manager is or what he does. It is a useful 
concept, ‘management’, the missing ‘x’ which makes resources equal output. But 
the ‘x’, the exact qualities tend to shift from equation to equation. Definitions of 
the manager, or the manager’s role, tend therefore to be so broad they are 
meaningless ....’(Handy, 1985: 361)
Exploration of the manager in the context of the research domain was, therefore, 
undertaken within the field research stage.
4.4.7.a Ministers and Managers, An Initial Summary
The primary responsibilities of Ministers are to uphold Government policy and achieve 
public accountability in a way that indicates not only financial probity but also policy 
success. Ministerial decisions are made on the basis of a number of factors, one of 
which includes public statistics produced by Government departments. There are a 
number of reasons for this. Firstly, decisions often relate to huge areas of the 
population. Secondly, practical issues mean that they are usually made with a 
minimum of informed judgement, local knowledge or subject expertise. Thirdly, the 
position of Ministers as public servants requires an appearance of impartiality in their 
professional behaviour, which decisions based on statistics can provide. Ministers 
have, therefore, a significant vested interest in perpetuating the collection and use of
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Government statistics. Ministers’ ability to challenge the integrity of data in the form 
of public statistics is limited. However, the extent to which this is problematic for them 
is possibly tempered by the scientific status that attaches to them. It may also be 
affected by the fact that use of these systems creates a micro-reality beyond which 
nothing is seen to exist and which is difficult to challenge. This raised questions for the 
research about the practical usefulness of such an exercise, in terms of healthcare, if 
that micro-reality was shown to be fictional.
4.5 The Literature Review: A Summary of Key Issues and Some Initial 
Hypotheses
This section begins with a review of the original research questions and key findings 
from the literature review. It then draws on the key points from the above discussions, 
and develops these into tentative hypotheses relating to the original aims of the 
research.
4.5.1 The Aims of the Research Revisited and Addressed
As discussed in Chapter 1, the specific research questions were as follows:
• Is there an objectivity inherent in clinical data?
• What is the relationship between the social knowledge processes involved in clinical 
decision-making and the nature of data produced from those actions?
• Can it be so readily translated into the body of statistical fact that underpins the data 
sets for healthcare decision-making?
• What is the impact on decision-making in healthcare management?
Evidence from the literature review indicated that some clinical data fits the socially 
accepted view of objectivity. This is data about which there are high levels of 
consensus and certainty, e.g. temperature readings. Human influences were recognised 
in these areas but they were seen as less active. Evidence was also found of data that 
did not fit into this view. Uncertainty emerged as a central tenet of clinical work.
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Clinical knowledge was shown not to be a homogeneous body of scientific fact, most 
significantly by medical teaching itself. Rather it emerged as a mixture of fact, 
tentative judgement and opinion, wherein individual elements could change their status. 
This was shown to be particularly so where that status was influenced significantly by 
changeable factors like professional experience, confidence and additional knowledge. 
This finding indicated that, given current processes, it could not be so readily translated 
into the body of statistical fact underpinning healthcare decision-making.
The reasons for this were explored in the second research question, which concerned 
the social knowledge processes which link clinical decisions and related data. Social 
factors were shown to be highly influential. They included the nature of the systems 
and processes used, and the nature of the two key stakeholder groups.
Looking first at the key groups, their views of clinical reality were shown to be quite at 
odds with each other. Findings showed that societal perceptions of, and arrangements 
for, science (and medicine is included there) endow its scientific works with a status of 
fact. Thus, the knowledge base of medicine was shown to be externally characterised 
as being objective, certain and factual. Also, societal perceptions of, and arrangements 
for, the professions were shown to enable the kind of autonomy that precludes outsider 
ability to know or challenge the ‘realities’ constructed by professionals. This was seen 
as both enabling and requiring clinicians to perpetuate a global scientific certainty 
about their domain. It was also shown to allow them an insulated freedom in their use 
of data and information. The needs of the wider organisation did not concern them.
Organisationally, this group operated alongside the other key stakeholder, the 
managers. Societal arrangements here were shown to revolve around the need for 
public accountability and authority, and certainty and objectivity in decision-making. 
This required managers to extract data from the clinical workface. Displaying all of the 
characteristics of their belief about clinical work, managers employed a series of 
processes in handling clinical data which delivered what they needed, i.e. objective 
facts. If one takes psychological observations, which indicate that cognition is a 
product of each individual’s frame of reference, and puts them together with
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decontextualised data, an arguable observation is that user assumptions about computer 
data, and their own paradigmatic or role motivations, imposed a scientific context and 
range of characteristics on clinical data in coded systems, thereby enabling the model to 
become the predominant reality. The models of reality upon which these systems were 
operating were shown to reflect the positivist view, and the data yield did nothing to 
challenge that.
The systems provided, therefore, a uniformity and certainty that did not previously 
exist. The nature of these structured systems was shown to subsume distinct clinical 
entities within clinically-based but aggregate labelling schemas, and also to 
decontextualise it. As discussed, information can only become information in a context 
(Checkland and Holwell, 1998). The importance of this is that quantitative methods 
are necessarily and unashamedly reductive and strip context out. Also, coding has been 
shown to add permanence to data. This made tentative opinions appear definitive. In 
other words a transformation of meaning took place. Clinical knowledge was invalidly 
transformed into a homogeneous body of statistical fact, and social knowledge about 
the reality of clinical phenomena was impaired. Key social knowledge processes were 
found to include enactment of social context by individuals and groups. This process 
was shown to underpin the choices made in terms of processes applied to clinical 
knowledge and data. Thus they were shown to be consistent with use in this context of 
computers and coded statistical classifications and processes.
In terms of the last research question, the implications of these findings for decision­
making in healthcare management, were significant. Firstly, there were implications 
for all of the areas listed in chapter 1 as ways in which this data was being used. In 
addition, there was increasing pressure to extend the use of coded, computerised 
systems in healthcare data processing. Electronic health and patient records would take 
this beyond administrative use and into the sphere of direct patient care. These 
simplified models of complex realities provided, therefore, an increasingly inadequate 
basis for understanding and supporting real behaviour.
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The next stage in this research was to test these tentative theories against the reality of 
the problem domain. First, however, consideration was given to the methods 
considered, rejected and selected for undertaking this phase of the research.
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Chapter 5, Approaches to Field Research, A Methodological Discussion
5.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a methodological discussion. It builds on 
some of the philosophical discussion and hypotheses established in chapters 3 and 4 and 
discusses the methodological issues addressed in approaching the fieldwork stage of 
data collection. It first describes the methodological approach chosen. It then provides 
an argument in favour of this choice by discussing the major alternatives of deductive 
and inductive methods, and providing a critique of each. The selected approach 
followed the inductive tradition, on the basis of earlier findings relating to the 
apparently social foundation to the research problem. The justification of that choice 
included consideration of how the selected approach avoided the difficulties perceived 
in the alternatives, which were rejected.
The chapter then describes the specific data collection methods adopted, which were 
semi-structured interviews and observation. This part of the discussion also includes 
consideration of the role of the researcher in undertaking these processes. The chapter 
continues with a description of the research design and application of the methodology, 
which includes discussion of prospective interviewees and interview sites. These 
included senior clinicians, healthcare data statisticians, administrative workers involved 
with healthcare data, healthcare managers, and lastly a number of hospital sites chosen 
for observation purposes. The chapter then moves to a discussion of issues involved in 
gaining access to these people and places. The closing section provides a brief 
overview of the process of interviewing, including how questions were chosen, and how 
interviews were organised.
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5.2 Methodological Approach Chosen
This research has three main methodological features. These are consistent with the 
research aims and with the problem as perceived. First, it is empirical and field-based. 
Research-based studies of the problem and aims, as defined in this thesis, were not 
found. A significant gap in our understanding in this area was, therefore, perceived. 
Accounts in this thesis are based on observation in the field, which are explored through 
relevant literature.
Second, the methodology is based on discovery rather than demonstration. The purpose 
was to formulate and generate hypotheses in an area previously unexplored in this way, 
rather than to prove or disprove preconceived explanatory theory.
Thirdly, the approach sought to encompass and enable analysis of a wide scope in terms 
of organisational context. This gave equal weight to the importance of context and the 
social interactions within it. This recognised the possibility that the mutually 
constitutive nature of context and actions would yield explanatory insights.
This overall approach, of complex, discovery-based research yielding rich, qualitative 
data, was aimed at producing a deep understanding of the processes and contexts 
involved in the domain of clinical decision-making. It suggested a strategy of 
qualitative research, carried out using a range of qualitative techniques, as described by 
a number of authors (Hakim, 1987; Walker, 1985; Burgess, 1984).
5.3 Argument for the Methodological Approach
In making these choices the researcher was conscious of the aims of the research. Also, 
no single method was held to contain the key to ‘truth’. All observations, from 
whichever end of the methodological spectrum they came, were considered as having an
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interpretive, subjective dimension. This assertion was based on the notion that ail 
research methodologies intentionally adopt a specific epistemology. They all 
intentionally adopt a specific perception about the nature of problems and problem 
situations. In other words, they are ontologically intentional. Either their underlying 
worldview accepts the current problem situation as ‘real’ or it assumes it is simply an 
interpretive construct. All methodological truths are, therefore, partial, since all 
methodologies are selective. If a researcher deliberately selects, and therefore excludes, 
the thing that is being indulged in must be partial. As well as being partial, all such 
truths are ‘valid’, or have power, but only with respect to their associated worldview. 
Thus, the notion of ‘absolute’ truth is not active here, but rather contextual truth, in 
other words truth in the context of the worldview that is associated with it. 
Consequently all such truths are provisional. In addition, all such truths are non- 
refutable, but are replaceable. They are non-refutable because, as has already been said, 
they are true only in the context of a particular worldview. Therefore, it is possible to 
reject a methodology by asserting disbelief in its claims to analyse. However, a more 
useful approach might be to examine what a particular methodology means by analysis, 
what its worldview is. This may reveal that it measures up to its own standards. The 
claim of the methodology, in that case, cannot be refuted. The researcher can only 
replace it with a preferred method of analysis that reflects their own worldview. The 
usefulness of a methodology is, therefore, situationally dependent. Any methodology 
can be used in a situation as long as the intentional perceptions that govern the 
methodology are consistent with the intentional perceptions that have been chosen for 
exploration in the problem situation. This ensures a match.
Selection of a methodological approach began, therefore, with conscious exploration of 
what of what was meant by the term ‘methodology’. This resulted in a definition which 
described a methodology as a model for enquiry and action composed of an organised 
set of structured, inter-related rules and procedures, based upon, and reflecting, a 
particular set of philosophical commitments and their ensuing paradigm. It is applicable 
in research and is intended to produce a better development process and end product by
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investigating and obtaining knowledge by means of formalised procedures. This 
indicates the fundamental importance to any methodology of the philosophical beliefs 
upon which it is based. The implications of ontological realism and epistemological 
positivism, and ontological nominalism and epistemological interpretivism were, 
therefore, explored.
As discussed in chapter 3, the ontological position of realism adopts an objective stance 
and revolves around the assumption that reality, both social and natural, is external to 
individuals and independent of their cognition of it. It is composed of hard, tangible 
and immutable structures that exist as empirical entities, whether or not we label or 
recognise them. Consistent with this, epistemological positivism postulates that, if 
reality is hard and independent, knowledge gained from it is hard and capable of being 
transferred and acquired by different people, in the same or comparable ways, with the 
same end result. The act of acquiring knowledge is repeatable and the knowledge 
gained is testable against the immutable reality. Explanation of reality is possible 
through the identification of causal relationships.
The nominalist position, however, adopts a subjective stance and postulates that 
‘reality’ is inextricably linked with the individual because it is a purely subjective 
construct and has no independent existence or uniquely identifiable structure. Each 
individual will, therefore, have a different ‘reality’, because it has arisen from 
perceptions unique to them. Epistemological interpretivism follows from this view of 
reality and, therefore, considers knowledge to be non-transferrable, interpretively 
descriptive and something that, in order to be gained, must be personally experienced.
Mapping these philosophical commitments onto the various paradigms they have given 
rise to, scientific methods are reductionist; if reality is an immutable phenomenon then 
areas may be fragmented without loss of emergent properties. They are also repeatable; 
the quality of immutability renders investigation and experiment repeatable and the 
results of such work may, therefore, be refuted or corroborated. If, however, the
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interpretive paradigm is explored, methods here seek to be interpretively descriptive of 
reality, and the nature of evidence is deemed to be non-repeatable.
Methodologies formulated within either of these belief sets will reflect them in almost 
every way, from their choice of scope and objectives, to their techniques and tools. 
They can, therefore, be described as operational manifestations of particular ontological 
and epistemological beliefs, and as characteristic of a particular paradigm. Informed 
choices must, therefore, be made.
In doing so, a number of heuristic devices are available. One such framework is taken 
from Gill and Johnson (1997: 37). It represents a continuum of research methods that 
describes the conceptual differences between them and thereby describes the differences 
they bring to bear on a research situation. At a macro level, the organising principle of 
the framework is that of nomothetic and ideographic methods. Gill and Johnson 
provide an analytical table displaying the relative key differences between these 
extremes, which are summarised here, but which predictably shows great similarity to 
elements in the tables of paradigmatic parameters in chapter 3.
Nomothetic techniques and methods are most reflective of the scientific paradigm. 
They represent application to the social world of scientific method, which found success 
in relation to exploration of the natural world, e.g. in areas such as physics. Nomothetic 
methods are, therefore, highly structured and systematic, in order to ensure replicability 
of method. They seek to generate explanation on the basis of causal relationships that 
give proof to governing laws. They rely on quantitative data in this, processed via 
standardised control techniques, in order that hypotheses might be tested in accordance 
with the standards of scientific rigour. These methods are also deductive and involve 
first abstract development of:
c... a grand theoretical schema as an absolute precondition for carrying out
research.’ (Bryman,1988: 111)
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They involve testing of a pre-existing theoretical model or set of principles by 
confrontation with reality in the external, objectivist sense.
To expand, in deductive research the researcher first decides which concepts represent 
important aspects of the problem domain or theory at issue. In this way a conceptual 
boundary is drawn around certain phenomena whose totality is deemed by the 
researcher to be of interest. Concepts in this scenario are abstract phenomena linked by 
what are assumed to be causal relationships that are deemed possible or probable, but 
are in no way certain. In other words, initial theories that assert explanation of the 
relationship between cause and effect in a problem domain follow from theoretical 
considerations. They are, however, a priori to the extent that they have not been tested 
against real life situations. Testing in this sense requires that such abstract thinking is 
‘operationalised’ (Gill and Johnson, 1997: 29).
Operationalisation requires a number of things. Firstly it requires development of 
precise models and precise hypotheses for testing. Thus it requires tight definition of 
what is to be observed, i.e. development of definitions of concepts and other rules in 
order that it can be agreed and determined when an instance of a concept occurs and 
how it might be observed occurring. The example of this provided by Gill and Johnson 
is that of middle management. This can mean very different things to different people, 
and the sense in which it relates to the research problem must, therefore, be tightly 
defined in order that data collection can be standardised and the meanings of research 
output are clear. Operationalisation also requires formulation of, and adherence to, 
instructions developed on the basis of definitions and rules. In other words, it requires 
the kind of standardisation of approach to be expected, given the underpinning 
ontological and epistemological perceptions at work.
This entire process enables the next stage, which is testing of theories against collected 
data. If a match occurs the theory is taken to be a valid explanation of observed
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phenomena. However, the process also ensures that much, or all, contextual information 
is stripped away.
Turning now to ideographic methodologies, these are reflective of the interpretive 
paradigm. Again, as might be expected, they seek to generate insights and knowledge 
precisely on the basis of what nomothetic methodologies reject. Thus ideographic 
methodologies seek subjective accounts and meanings. Qualitative data gathered within 
this context is deemed key to generating required understanding (Bulmer, 1977, 
Cicourel, 1964). Replicability is not sought and systematic protocols are, therefore, 
minimal. These methods are inductive, with theory emerging from inductive 
investigation. As noted by Thompson (1995) this relies heavily on the willingness of 
the user to abandon, temporarily at least, any preconceived notions about likely 
outcomes of investigations and to adopt an open-mindedness about results and methods.
Turning now to the problem domain as perceived, this was deemed to involve 
technology, structures, tasks and processes. These could be perceived as relatively 
passive phenomena. However, and this was particularly relevant to the field research 
stage, the situation was also thought potentially to involve people as key agents in the 
problem as perceived. This selective perception of the problem domain had, therefore, a 
significant social dimension. In terms of a match between methodological approaches 
and this selective perception of the problem situation, the work of Laing (1967) was 
useful. Laing focuses on the fact that nomothetic method extends to the social world 
scientific approaches that have been successful in relation to exploring the natural 
world. The crucial distinction Laing emphasises is that individuals, unlike objects, are 
sentient creatures, which experience reality. He stresses that human action is bound up 
with individual mental constructs, composed of a whole range and diversity of 
psychologically- based phenomena rooted in an internal logic and subjective awareness.
Given that situation, application of nomothetic method was considered undesirable. It 
would require imposition of standardised structures and protocols in order to reveal
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causal relationships subject to governing laws, as in the natural sciences. It would also 
require excision of contextual meaning. This, the positivist approach would argue, 
would provide shared, useful knowledge that is open to examination, proof and refute. 
It would also enable predictive theory. However, as stated, the problem domain as 
perceived included the highly subjective and diverse nature of the human subject. 
Understanding in this contextual, social sense could not be gained via a method of 
analysis that excised meaning and context as irrelevant. In such circumstances 
behaviour could only be comprehensively explained via an interpretive approach which 
involved understanding meanings, motives and interpretations. This would enable the 
researcher to access these phenomena and achieve a more rounded account. Thus 
abstract theories could not be constructed outside the context of involved actors, rather 
they had to take account of and be drawn from them. This double hermeneutic would 
enable the researcher to see the problem domain through the experiences and 
understanding of those involved and, by reinterpreting those accounts, develop 
explanatory theory.
Gill and Johnson (1997) concur that social phenomena are seen to be most accessible to 
such inductive methods for two reasons. They argue that firstly, explanations of those 
phenomena that are closer to the truth are more likely because data collection and theory 
building are integrally linked. Secondly, where the phenomena in question have 
subjective capabilities (i.e. human actors) imposition of an a priori frame of reference is 
seen as inappropriate.
Thus, as stated above, within this research no a priori assumptions could reliably be 
made with regard to how, and even less so why, different ‘societies’ viewed and 
understood the same phenomena differently. That understanding was part of the 
purpose of the research. As discussed in the report on the literature review, it may have 
been that social labels were subject to differing uses by different social groupings and to 
different degrees of social uncertainty within that. As asserted by Schatzki (1983) and 
discussed in chapter 3 , the factors that determine meaning are the factors that determine
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understanding and the meanings of phenomena and one’s understanding of them are, 
therefore, complementary. Thus, by being socialised we come to understand the roles 
items play in our activities and consequently an item plays no role that is not understood 
by someone. ‘Socialisation’ in the context of this research was not used in its generic, 
macro-level form. Rather it was used in the sense of ‘nested socialisations’ of 
individuals, through their socio-historical general backgrounds and via vastly different 
professional spheres, each carrying their own worldviews, values and interests. Thus a 
return can be made to Rorty’s observation (1979,1982) that ‘justified’ knowledge arises 
from the pragmatic consensus o f people in a specific community. For instance, research 
thus far indicated that clinical observations tended to be grounded in uncertainty, and 
that labelling was often tentative. However, the same data seemed to be viewed in the 
culturally very different world of statisticians as hard, objective fact, its labels as sound 
and precisely descriptive of their real-life phenomena. As discussed earlier, in this 
context, and this is a view which seems to have support in the work of Barnes (1974) 
‘truth’ seemed to be a changeable artifact and knowledge reflected that which was held 
to be true by a given community at a given time. Thus, an objective of this research was 
to follow that consensual ‘truth’, and to understand, more fully both those cultures 
within which it existed and the metamorphoses it underwent as it was viewed through 
differing social lenses.
This required the researcher to immerse herself in the problem situation, and engage in:
‘.... participating, covertly or (as in this case) overtly in people’s daily lives for a 
period of time, watching what happens, listening to what is said, asking questions - 
in fact, collecting whatever data are available to throw light on the issues that are 
the focus of the research’. (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983: 1)
Data collection was undertaken, therefore partly by using ethnographic methods. 
Nascent theories were tested and developed on the basis of what Kolb et al’s (1979) 
experiential learning cycle describes as actual experiences, observations and reflections. 
This follows the inductive tradition of analyses, where explanations of human action are 
generated inductively from a posteriori understanding of the interpretations displayed
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(i.e. the cultures) by the actors who are being studied. These theories included those 
generated as a result of prior experience of the NHS, which resulted in a belief that there 
existed a problem worthy of investigation. They helped to define the problem situation 
in terms of a systemic boundary, and gave some notion at least of involved agents. 
Theories also included those generated by the literature review, which can be described 
as attempts at explanatory statements about the problem situation. These theories were 
developed, refined and tested, ultimately, against reality in the problem domain.
That the situation was approached with even tentative theories seems inconsistent with 
an inductive description. However, the approach used was to hold these tentative 
explanatory notions in suspension and to adopt an inductively open-minded approach as 
far as possible in that domain, returning to the hypotheses as relevant, but not imposing 
them in any formative way on it. In addition, no explicit definitions of concepts were 
formulated beyond those generally held socially. Nor were data collection techniques 
rigorously structured.
As discussed by Kolb et al (1979) this approach is relevant where there is a requirement 
for observation and reflection upon experience of social phenomena in order to 
formulate an abstract rule or guiding principle, which can then be extrapolated to 
explain and predict new or similar experience. It also overcomes the criticism that it 
provides only a posteriori ‘thick description’ (Geertz, 1973, Denzin, 1978) of actors’ 
interpretive schemes, by its approach to analysis and focus on analytically induced 
theory grounded in the real world interviews and observations of the research and 
observation (Glaser and Strauss, 1973). This enabled identification of significant 
relationships in the data and generated more insightful explanations as a result
The process of research was, therefore, as follows and in three phases. These 
overlapped to some extent, but in broad terms can be described as a logical sequence. 
The first stage involved the systematic collection of accounts and other data through a 
process of field research. In this stage the research instruments being applied went
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through an iterative process of design, testing through piloting, and full application. 
These instruments included approach to consultancy activities, for instance methods of 
gaining access, and interview and observation schedules and structures. That this data 
was collected at a more tentative stage of the research was taken account of in later 
stages by collection of additional data. This early data was not discarded however, as 
first impressions were treated as having value.
Following this process of immersion and engagement in the problem situation, the data 
was analysed. This process produced the conceptual framework within which 
explanatory theory emerged. This rested upon relationships between key concepts 
derived from the data. This addressed the aim of developing explanatory theory that 
was grounded in the real world interviews and observations (Glaser and Strauss, 1973). 
This gave the analysis an element of independence from the literature review. Glaser 
and Strauss recognise the usefulness of existing literature in providing conceptual 
categories for field research. However, they caution against a review before the 
fieldwork, asserting that the researcher runs the risk of disabling their ability as a 
theorist. They warn against the danger of getting stuck with an exclusive view on the 
data collected, and not allowing macro theory to enrich views on micro phenomena. It 
was, however, felt that it is possible to access existing literature without becoming 
trapped in the view that it represents the final and total truth in a given area. It was also 
felt that, because this is possible, research on micro phenomena in the NHS would be 
enriched and informed by more general macro theory on organisations and social 
processes within them.
The third and final stage of the process was the integration and linking of models 
developed in the field research with existing higher level theory. The purpose of this 
was twofold. Firstly, by introducing wider theoretical concepts it sought to generate 
more insightful explanations in the research context. Secondly, this gave an opportunity 
to contribute to particular knowledge areas.
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5.4 Data Collection Methods Chosen
A range of techniques and methods are possible within a piece of qualitative research. 
Those chosen were participant observation and semi-structured interviewing. These data 
collection methods are entirely consistent with earlier discussions, as analytic induction 
stipulates only that the method of data collection should be inductive. It was recognised 
that choices made can greatly influence the nature of data collected. The full range of 
possible techniques was, therefore, explored.
5.4.1 Data Collection Methods: Interviews
It was noted that the major advantage of the interview as a data collection method is its 
adaptability. Interviews can provide structure to the process of immersion described 
above. They also enable, albeit to varying degrees depending upon the type of 
interview used, direct interaction between interviewer and respondent. The less 
restrictive forms of interview also facilitate question clarification, through the 
minimization of unclear answers, following up of ideas, probing of responses and 
investigation of feelings and motives. Direct interaction can also be used as a platform 
from which to gain entry to observe organisational behaviour.
Interviews of different types can be viewed as part of a continuum that is an integral 
part of the overarching span of philosophical commitments. At one end of the scale are 
interviews in which the questions to be asked and the choice of response are fixed 
precisely beforehand. This is the structured or closed interview. This usually takes the 
form of a questionnaire or checklist, completed by the interviewer rather than the 
respondent. This is the most restrictive form of interview, for both the interviewer and 
the respondent. It is the only style of interview where the respondents cannot reply in 
their own words. However, it is often considered the most reliable form of interview in 
so far as, if interviews using the same interview instruments were conducted with
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another set of similar individuals, the overall results would be the same. It is a standard 
tool of deductive research.
However, this type of interview is only appropriate when the questions can be 
determined in advance, when the interviewer can do this accurately (i.e. they can be sure 
of asking the right questions) and precisely, and the possible response categories are 
known to be limited, in other words where analytic induction is irrelevant. This was 
not the case with this research.
Interviews at the other, subjectivist, end of the scale are informal or open-ended. Only 
the most vague questions can be determined in advance. Such interviews are most 
useful in situations where the researcher is at the preliminary stage of investigations and 
there is a need to find out what is of importance and what should be left out. Within 
this approach the respondents are free to talk about what interests them. However, in 
order for the activity to have purpose, they will usually know at least vaguely what the 
research is about (hence reasonable arguments claiming there is no such thing as totally 
unstructured interviewing, where no particular questions can be determined in advance). 
These are the least directive interviews. They most closely resemble natural 
conversation, the only difference being that the information sought is that which is of 
interest to, and elicited by, the researcher. Such methods are among the more usual 
precursors to analytic induction. As with analytic induction, they are often seen as 
producing the most valid data. In other words, they can get closer to the truth of the 
matter and are more likely to yield data that measures or describes what they are 
supposed to. Importantly, in terms of the trade-off between reliability and validity, an 
item that is unreliable must also lack validity, but an item that is reliable is not 
necessarily also valid. It was necessary, therefore, to consider which of these features 
was most important to this research.
As discussed earlier, the research sought to discover the ‘truth’ of the matter, rather than 
attempt to provide empirically reproducible findings, and this general approach to
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interviewing was considered most suited to that. This approach enables respondents to 
present their ‘worldview’ without being constrained by the researcher’s frame of 
reference. They are able to express themselves in language that suits them. Also the 
interviewer can respond and has opportunities to expand understanding of what the 
respondent thinks by ‘picking up’ on things the respondent says. Lastly, lines of 
questioning can emerge which might not have been anticipated but which might be 
highly relevant to the research.
The dangers of this kind of approach are that this kind of interview usually yields a 
mass of conversational, qualitative data that is not organised around any specific topics. 
As mutual discretion grows it becomes far harder to control the length and content of 
the interview. Respondents may ‘ramble on’ about things in which the researcher has 
no interest and, conversely, matters of interest to the researcher may not come up in the 
interview. Data organisation and analysis was, however, taken care of in this research 
through skillful use of the techniques of analytic induction. In addition, excessive 
freedom during interviews was curtailed by marginally moving the interview style back 
along the continuum of formality to incorporate useful but relatively unobtrusive 
elements of structure. This resulted in semi-structured interviews. This hybrid includes 
some questions that are completely structured and some that are open-ended. 
Structured questions are used to obtain factual information, and open-ended questions 
are used when opinions, explanations or other descriptions of events or behaviour are 
sought. The level of structure used in the research was increased after the initial 
tranche of interviews and observation. This was after the initial stages of analysis 
enabled much more focused data to be sought.
This semi-structured approach to interviewing incorporated, therefore, interview 
schedules as a loose guide, selecting topics around which the interviews were steered. 
The respondents were allowed a considerable degree of latitude within that framework. 
Certain questions were asked but respondents were given freedom to talk about the 
topic and give their views in their own time. However, the framework also imposed
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sufficient structure to ensure all topics considered crucial to the research were covered, 
thereby eliminating at least some of the problems of the ‘unstructured’ interview.
This approach also addressed the researcher’s perceptions of appropriate interviewing 
style. The ability for professionals like clinicians and senior executives to talk at will 
was considered important. This was both for the unexpected data it might yield and 
because it would be seen to pay homage to their perceived status as experts in their 
fields, thereby possibly aiding the interview process.
It was recognised that this form of interviewing requires skill in order to keep the 
interview on course to cover the agreed topics without interrupting the respondent’s 
flow of ideas. It also requires interviewers who are familiar with the subject of their 
research, as it requires appropriate responses from the interviewer in terms of probing, 
clarifying and developing lines of questioning, etc. Judging when something is 
irrelevant rather than just circuitous also requires skill and knowledge of the subject 
area. It was, however, anticipated that the flow of conversation would be helped by pre­
existing relationships between the interviewer and respondents, and pre-existing 
knowledge on the part of the researcher of the phenomena under study.
5.4.2 Data Collection Methods: Observation
As discussed by Nisbet and Watt (1980: 13) interviews provide important data but they 
only reveal how people perceive what happens, not what actually happens. Direct 
observation can, therefore, be more reliable and more illuminating than what people say 
in many instances. It can be particularly useful to discover whether people do what they 
say they do or behave in the way they claim to behave. In other words, direct 
observation is one of the key ways to explore the important issue of actual as opposed 
to espoused beliefs. Of the two styles of observation, the researcher’s time in the 
organisation as a worker and a researcher constituted participant observation. In other
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words, this enabled immersion in the life of an organisation to the extent of being 
accepted as one of the group. This observation was typical of its kind, i.e. unstructured 
and, as noted by Cohen and Mannion (1980):
‘.... subjective, biased, impressionistic, idiosyncratic and lacking in precise
quantifiable measures...’(Cohen and Mannion, 1980: 129)
However, these inherent characteristics were recognised, and this type of observation 
was therefore useful in generating notions of the kind of ‘foreshadowed problems’ 
discussed earlier. During the main research phase such observation was possible 
because of the strong network of relationships, and level of understanding of key 
constituent factors in the problem domain, which had built up during the researcher’s 
time as a worker in the organisation. Observation in this stage was, however, more 
focused than it had previously been, as it came at a point when the research problem had 
been defined and partially explored. Approaches used to structuring observation did not 
equate to it being described as fully structured. This would have entailed the recording 
of events in a programmed manner, usually requiring some form of pre-programmed 
and formalised schedule. Rather it followed the sorts of principles applied to structuring 
interviews. Observational settings were, therefore, chosen with loose goals in mind, and 
both observation and discussion took place.
5.5 The Researcher’s Role
As well as preparing the style and content of interviews and observations, consideration 
was also given to the role, status and effect of the researcher in this process. As 
discussed earlier in this chapter, in the tradition of most ethnographic research, this 
qualitative, interpretive account was concerned with inductively generating descriptions 
and explanations of particular phenomena and with developing theories, rather than with 
testing preconceived hypotheses. Naturalistic though this approach could be argued to 
be, it did not constitute adopting the full range of naturalistic assumptions. This was not 
least because these include a belief in a distinction between science and ‘common
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sense’, between the activities and knowledge of the researcher and those of the 
researched. This is an assumption, ironically, shared with the positivistic approach, 
which is diametrically opposed to naturalism in so many other ways. Both fail to 
recognise the researcher as part of the socially constructed reality they observe, as 
though the act of observing, rather than being a fundamental tool of social construction 
and negotiation, is somehow, for the researcher, a context-liberating activity. Both hold 
the belief that, using their preferred and very different methods, it is possible to 
eliminate the effects of the researcher on the data and thereby isolate a body of 
‘uncontaminated’ data. This rejects the concept that the researcher, like all social 
beings, creates and recreates ‘reality’. (It possibly also rejects the notion that all social 
research is based on the human capacity for participant social observation. However, 
rigorous definition of the word ‘social’ would be required before taking this line of 
argument further.) We act in the social world but are also able to reflect upon our 
actions and ourselves in that world.
It was a central tenet of this research, as discussed by Hansen (1958) that the researcher 
is, to an extent, a product and an integral part of the social world being researched, and 
that all data and methods involve theoretical presuppositions. This research recognised, 
therefore, a reflexivity in social research that implies the orientation of the author is 
shaped by socio-historic location, including the values and interests these locations 
confer upon her. The researcher was also inescapably bound by use of common-sense 
knowledge and methods of investigation. The idea that social research can be carried 
out and its findings expounded in some autonomous realm was rejected.
It was also, therefore, a tenet of this research, as discussed by Hammersley and 
Atkinson (1983) that research is an active process in which accounts of reality are 
produced through selective observation and theoretical interpretation of what is seen. 
They are produced through asking particular questions and interpreting replies in 
particular ways, and all research has consequences or effects on the social world, even if 
only through the process of doing it. None of these factors per se diminishes the
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validity of any data gathered or conclusions drawn. Methods of gathering data, 
including the researcher, must simply be taken account of in interpreting findings. All 
methods are influential in some way. As discussed by Sellitz et al (1962) social 
anthropology has shown that if any two people are in a meeting, particularly where they 
are strangers, a series of social actions and effects rapidly takes place. Hence, for 
instance the attention paid by politicians and salespeople to dress, tone of voice, 
wording of questions and statements, physical demeanor, etc. This is social behaviour 
at its most basic and pervasive level. Adding the context of researcher and respondent 
does not expunge it and may extend it. For instance, this could be the case where the 
content of the discussion is directly relevant to the respondent: where it threatens job or 
position, where it calls upon expert knowledge, etc. Thus there are a range of effects, 
including what is commonly called ‘bias’ inescapably precipitated by the human 
(researcher) in action. As noted by Sellitz e ta l(1962):
‘Interviewers are human beings and not machines.’ (Sellitz et al, 1962: 583)
However, given earlier comments on machines even these would colour the 
proceedings.
Neither is this a one-sided issue. As noted by Borg (1981) in his discussion of 
‘response effect’:
‘Eagerness of the respondent to please the interviewer, a vague antagonism that 
sometimes arises between interviewer and respondent, are but few of the factors 
that may contribute to biasing of data obtained from the interview.’ (Borg, 1981: 
87)
It is also even easier to lead in an interview than in a questionnaire. Varying emphasis 
and tone of voice can dramatically alter the communicated information content of a 
question and, therefore, the response. Also, as mentioned above, it is probably 
impossible to definitely eliminate all bias or researcher/respondent effect. However, 
knowledge of its existence, vigilance and conscious self-control can help minimise its
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unhelpful effects. For instance, self-knowledge that the interviewer holds strong views 
about an issue can enable greater care in wording questions. Self-knowledge can, 
however, also have a more positive aspect. Remaining effects should not be perceived 
merely as diminishing research integrity. They should instead be analysed with the rest 
of the data as different, but potentially equally useful, parts of it. Also, as discussed by 
Hammersley and Atkinson (1983) the ways in which individuals respond to researchers 
can be as important a source of data as the actual responses themselves. As noted by 
Schuman (1989) research can be:
\... a search for meaning, and ambiguities of language and of interviewing, 
discrepancies between attitude and behaviour, even problems of non-response, 
provide an important part of the data, rather than being ignored or simply regarded 
as obstacles to efficient research.’ (Schuman, 1989: 21)
In this approach, then, the researcher becomes part of any research instrument designed. 
While not an explicit objective of this research, this approach enabled exploration 
within the full context of the social world. It also admitted into theorising the effects of 
interpretations and their respective limits, and exploration of the benefits of alternative 
approaches.
5.6 Research Design and the Application of the Methodology
In this section the application of the method is discussed. The approach taken to the 
research is presented, as it was carried out, and the emphasis is on the technical and 
pragmatic aspects of the research design. This involves three main areas: contacts, 
sample frame, interviewing and observation. The initial results of this process, first 
phase analysis of the data, are discussed in the next chapter.
5.6.1 Research Participants
As stated above, the fieldwork phase of the research undertook to examine the validity
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of the theories emerging from the literature review. It sought to do this by focusing on 
technology, organisational context, systems and the key stakeholder groups. This 
helped to define the scope of this phase, as it required the researcher to identify, contact 
and gain access to a number of relevant organisations, people and systems. While this 
was a major objective and achievement of the research, it was helped significantly by 
the researcher’s previous background in the NHS and DH.
Relevant organisations and people were those involved at all stages of the authoring and 
use of the knowledge, data, information and processes being studied. These are 
described in the Macro Information Systems Flows model (Figure 2). The participants 
sought, therefore, were practicing senior NHS Consultants (clinical) clinical coding staff 
in NHS Trusts, Business and Information Managers of NHS Trusts, senior statisticians 
working in the DH Statistical Services Division, and policy makers to the level of Under 
Secretary of State for Health. Also sought were developers and implementers of the 
information systems used to code clinical knowledge. Apart from ensuring data 
collected was representative of all key groups and systems involved, this spread was 
used also to strengthen the validity of findings, as those coming from each key group 
were checked with relevant other groups.
Regarding the particular contributions that were sought from interviewees, senior 
clinicians were involved because they generated and applied clinical knowledge and 
created the document used as the source of classified clinical data for the DH. NHS 
clinical coders translated that clinical data into coded and classified data. NHS Trust 
managers had administrative responsibility for the data and its quality, and for 
submitting it to the DH. They also had it in their gift to use it in running their hospitals. 
Senior DH statisticians were involved because of their role in handling the data. 
Understanding the perceptions all of these groups held of the data was considered to be 
as important as gaining insights into the processes in which they engaged. Policy 
makers to the level of Under Secretary for Health were involved for the same reason.
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In addition, where it was possible (i.e. they were still alive) those who had designed the 
‘transformation’ systems in question: Read, ICD-10, OPCS-4, and HRGs were sought. 
These individuals, better than any others, could provide insights into the design process 
and intended application(s) of their systems, together with comments on current 
applications where these differed. Knowing their systems and purposes so well, they 
could also comment on their perception of the validity of any data being generated by 
them. Where the original designers were not available, current ‘expert’ users were 
sought, preferably those who had significant involvement in the further development of 
one of the systems. These individuals would be only one step removed from the initial 
design process and could have at least as profound an influence on the current 
development and applications of such systems. They could also provide insights into 
why the systems were as they were, and comment on data produced by them.
Lastly, also sought were those who felt the effects of the application of this knowledge, 
including, once again, clinicians. This would close the circle by bringing the offspring 
of their original clinical knowledge back to the clinicians. This would also enable 
exploration of the perceived truth of clinical data among these disparate but interlinked 
groups.
Further definition of the scope of the research then took place. This involved defining 
where interviewees would be drawn from and where observations would take place. 
For interviewee selection, some areas were self-defining. There was only one DH 
Statistics Dept. There was only one Policy branch dealing with clinical data. In both of 
these areas, in order to try to get a spread of views, the researcher sought out both policy 
makers and individuals more directly involved with the data. There was often only one 
inventor or primary developer of a system, and these were approached. There were, 
however, thousands of clinicians, coders and NHS business managers. The researcher’s 
own network stretched to hundreds of such individuals. Access was not, therefore, a 
determining factor. However, a realistic timescale for the research was. Selection was 
made, therefore, in order to provide a representative sample of data in a reasonable
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timeframe by ensuring a geographical spread and also a mixture, in terms of clinical 
specialties, primary and secondary care, size of hospital and coding models in use. All 
of the individuals approached, apart from one, agreed to participate. The same was true 
for selection of hospitals and departments for participant observations.
With regard to confidentiality, many of the individuals approached requested that their 
identity be withheld from this document. They were, however, happy for broad job 
titles to be used. This enabled the researcher to respect confidentiality requests, 
particularly where an individual’s role was unique, as it sometimes was. It also still 
enabled the researcher to demonstrate two important things. Firstly, their relevance to 
the research could be shown. Secondly, it enabled her to demonstrate that 
representatives of all key stakeholder groups were involved. Reasons for 
confidentiality restrictions varied, but a strong theme was sensitivity over a focus on 
healthcare information systems that might raise issues about allocation of public funds. 
The organisations and general level of the individuals have, therefore, been identified 
but the individuals themselves have not been named.
With these criteria in mind the following list of interviewees was approached. The list 
has been divided as far as possible into the respective key groups described above. On 
occasion participants fulfilled more than one role, for instance as system inventor and 
policy maker. Where this happened it is indicated in the description of their role, and 
they are listed in the primary group for which their participation was sought. Full 
advantage of multiple expertise was, however, taken during interviews, where 
appropriate and possible, by also exploring insights relating to participants’ other areas 
of expertise. This was particularly useful where clinicians had crossed the cultural 
divide from active clinical work to statistical system development. The following list 
details the interviewees. It is presented by occupational group.
Clinical participants were as follows:
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-2 Consultant Physicians, who were senior working clinicians. One was an 
influential member of The Royal Colleges Conference Information Group (CIG) a 
worker on behalf of Read 3 and clinically rather than statistically derived 
classifications. He also worked at senior levels for the WHO UK Collaborating 
Centre for ICD-10, and had worked on the management team of an NHS Trust.
-3 Consultant Surgeons, who were working clinicians. One was a key worker in 
development of HRGs for Urology. He also implemented Read 3 within his 
clinical practice.
-Consultant Surgeon, who was a senior working clinician, and represented his 
Royal College at CIG. He had also been influential in development of Read 3.
-Consultant Surgeon, who was a senior working clinician, a key figure in the 
development of HRGs, and a key user of these in everyday clinical management
-Consultant Surgeon, who was a senior working clinician and represented his 
Royal College on CIG. He also worked at senior levels on development and 
implementation policy for Read 3 and ICD-10 and OPCS-4.
- GP, who was a key figure in development and use of Read codes for General 
Practice.
NHS Business and Information Managers were as follows:
-Director of Operations (Business and Information), NHS Trust, with responsibility 
for ensuring that the Trust had the information needed to run its business and the 
DH received the required statutory clinical data returns in ICD-10 and OPCS-4 
format.
-Information Manager, NHS Trust, with responsibility for ensuring Trust managers 
and clinicians received the information needed to run their businesses, for
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implementing Read 3 in his Trust, and for development and implementation of 
the host computer system for Read 3.
Statisticians were as follows:
-Senior manager, Office of National Statistics (ONS) London, who was both a 
trained clinician and a statistician. This organisation was responsible until 1997 for 
processing, analysing and publishing the clinical and administrative data sets, 
which are a focus of this thesis. He continued to have involvement with analysis of 
this data, although processing had been taken over by an external data processing 
company.
-Senior manager, ONS, who was both a clinician (retired) and a statistician. He 
was responsible for operational management of the functions that processed, 
analysed and published mortality data. He was also responsible for helping 
development and implementation of policy in this area. He had significant insight 
into the ICD classification and influence on its revisions.
-Senior Civil Servant and manager, Hospital Episode Statistics (HES) Section, DH, 
who was involved in directing and management of collection, analysis and use of 
HES from NHS hospitals, for monitoring and improving its quality and promoting 
its use by the NHS. Customers included DH Policy Development Section, 
Ministers, epidemiologists and medical researchers, managers requiring 
comparative statistics to assist in Performance Management, and the Treasury, 
which used the HES data to help determine how much of tax payers money should 
be spent on healthcare and how it should be distributed.
-Senior Civil Servant and manager, HES Section, DH, who was involved in 
‘cleaning’ of HES data, managing its analysis, and promoting its use.
Policy makers were as follows:
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-Senior Civil Servant and manager, with key involvement in policy on the 
development and implementation of Read codes and clinical classifications for the 
NHS.
-Senior Civil Servant, manager and clinician (retired) National Case Mix Office 
(NCMO) with key responsibility for directing policy in the development and 
implementation of HRGs in the NHS.
-2 Senior Civil Servants, Policy Implementation Section, Information Management 
Group, NHS Executive, with responsibility for improving the quality of the HES 
data submitted by Trusts to the DH.
-Senior Civil Servant, manager and statistician, Statistics Division, DH, who was 
involved with directing and managing the collection, analysis, interpretation and 
publication of a range of health statistics, including the data sets (HES) which are a 
focus of this thesis. Customers included Ministers, internal departments across the 
DH, research and academic institutions, international organsations, statistics 
organisations in other countries, the independent health sector and the general 
public.
Systems developers were as follows:
-2 Senior Civil Servants, managers and researchers (NCMO) with key 
responsibility for directing statistical analysis for HRG development and 
undertaking the clinical interactions necessary to the continued development and 
implementation of HRGs.
-Senior Civil Servant and statistician, NCMO with responsibility for refining 
HRGs into the most incisive statistical tool possible. He also contributed to 
negotiations with clinicians about HRG refinement.
-Senior manager in Epidemiology Surveillance and Statistical Services, WHO,
140
with pivotal responsibility for coordinating and rewriting revisions of the ICD 
classification and for promoting its use internationally.
Other data users were as follows:
-Epidemiologist and Medical Researcher, ONS, with responsibility for interpreting 
HES data and producing conclusions and recommendations for healthcare practice 
and management on the basis of it. The work in epidemiology involved using 
clinical data sets to identity and understand variations in patterns of illness and 
death and to enable comparisons between different populations.
-2 Medical Researchers, with responsibility for analysis of specialist medical data 
sets for the purposes of medical research. They wanted to use statutory national 
data sets but felt they could not due to issues concerning the inadequacy and 
irrelevance of their content.
Fifteen clinical coders from the coding departments of 3 NHS Trusts were interviewed 
or observed.
For observation purposes the aim was to observe the process of knowledge creation and 
application, and also of computerising and coding. Observation was not sought further 
along the information chain, as human activity at those levels was minimal. Data was 
for instance, therefore, collected in Trust information departments and DH statistical 
departments by interviewing. 3 NHS Trusts were sought who would allow access to 
both clinical and coding departments. Factors considered when selecting Trusts 
included the fact that the social context would be explored. Some factors were constant. 
All Trusts must produce medical casenotes, and statutory datasets using ICD-10 and 
OPCS-4. There were, however, known to be organisational differences, the effects of 
which could not be predicted. Accounting for all organisational variance was not 
possible in a reasonable timescale. Trusts were sought, therefore, where a range of 
contextual factors considered to be relevant and key could be observed. These factors
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were spread of clinical work and experience, and models and experience of coding 
clinical data.
5.6.2 Gaining Access
The approach to interviewing took account of the fact that most of the individuals 
involved operated at very senior levels, and had very full work schedules. For that 
reason, rather than assume it would be possible to interview each one more than once, it 
was decided that more than one of each type of individual would be approached. This 
would also help to strengthen the credibility of any findings.
No researcher can demand access to an organisation or to materials. Permission to carry 
out the research was sought early, prior to registration of the research proposal, and at 
senior organisational levels. Wholehearted endorsement was secured. This was due to 
a supportive organisational philosophy towards professional development, and also 
because the research had the potential to yield important information for the DH. In 
addition, the author had worked within the host organisation until the end of 1996. This 
had the advantage of providing an established set of good professional relationships 
and, therefore, a network of relatively easy-access contacts. It also provided in-depth 
knowledge of the subject areas and context of the research, of the macro and 
micropolitics of the organisation and of the organisation generally. Furthermore, it gave 
insight into how best to approach different individuals and an appreciation of some of 
the issues they faced. It was thought likely that ex-colleagues would welcome the 
chance to air problems and to have their situations analysed by someone who 
understood the practical day-to-day realities of their work.
Stepping outside the organisation for the fieldwork phase also had advantages. It made 
objectivity easier to maintain and avoided the risk that obtaining confidential 
information could affect the researcher’s relationship with ex-colleagues. It also freed
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the researcher in terms of time and enabled a more broadly based group of contacts to 
be recruited. Ex-colleagues were, even so, being generous and needed to be advised of 
exactly what would be expected of them in terms of subject matter, length of discussion 
and use of any data produced. They also had to be convinced of the value of the 
research, and that strict ethical standards would be observed at all times. This was 
particularly so in terms of confidentiality where required, and honesty regarding the 
purpose of the research.
In terms of contacting interviewees, given the highly professional nature of the 
respondents, introductory letters were sent. These briefly, and in lay terms, re­
introduced the author as a researcher and described the research. These letters also 
contained appendices containing a more detailed description of the work to be 
undertaken. All interviewees were quite used to reading documents of this complexity. 
The details were amended only slightly, depending upon the recipient, to ensure that 
implicit criticism of the data on which the NHS runs its business did not emerge. The 
reason for a ‘lay’ front sheet was to effect a gentle introduction. Then, if time or 
inclination did not allow for reading of the appendices, this would still provide an 
adequate flavour of the research and requirements of the researcher and respondent. 
The letters also gave reasons for the approach to them, requested their participation and 
assured them of anonymity should they require it. They also assured them that initial 
meetings would take no more than one hour of their time, and be at a place and time to 
suit their convenience. These conditions were seen as crucial, not only to gaining 
access in the first place, but also to ensuring further access, both for the author and any 
other researchers if necessary. This respect for respondents was considered fundamental 
to the ethics of social research.
This final style and content of approach were based on the researcher’s experience and 
also on piloting with one clinician and one manager, who advised what would best suit 
their respective peer groups. A supplementary reason for this approach was that, as 
discussed above, the author was known in a professional capacity to most respondents
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and they were aware that she was engaged in a PhD researching information in the 
context of healthcare. There was, therefore, an expectation of a certain level of 
explanation about the research. Lastly in this regard, spontaneity of response was not 
perceived to be essential. Advance notice would not, therefore, invalidate the research. 
Where appropriate, official channels were written to first in order to request permission 
from senior managers to approach members of their staff. This correspondence was 
followed by phone calls to resolve initial queries and to arrange time, date and place of 
interview.
As a result of the above process, all of the above prospective participants were 
interviewed, with the exception of the senior manager at the WHO. This was due to 
logistics, as he was based in Geneva. This was not seen as unduly damaging to the 
research, as it was always considered to be a ‘nice to have’ rather than an essential. A 
number of local individuals listed above, including senior Civil Servants and clinicians, 
were able to provide a range of responses to all of the questions he would have been 
asked, and between them provided the necessary breadth and depth of experience.
Interviews during the fieldwork were undertaken in two tranches. In the first tranche, 
30 interviews took place with senior clinicians, epidemiologists, healthcare statisticians, 
healthcare managers and government officers.
The above process of interviewing also resulted in agreement to participant 
observations, which were undertaken in three NHS Trusts that met the criteria 
described. They were geographically distant from each other, of different sizes, and one 
was a teaching hospital. This meant that a different range of clinical work and 
experience was seen. Also, the two main models of coding, centralised and dispersed, 
were in operation and could be observed. These result in different levels of proximity to 
clinicians. One used the dispersed model, where coders worked in clinics and on wards, 
with good levels of access to medical casenotes, but less access to clinicians. The other 
two had a centralised coding function, where coders worked in an office and medical
144
casenotes were brought to them periodically. Lastly, coders varied in the length of time 
they had spent in the job and the levels of training they had received, which ranged from 
none through to the national standard training package.
These observations developed into a second tranche of a further 20 interviews with 
selected individuals. The following table summarises the total numbers of interviews 
carried out by occupational group. Some were second interviews and, as stated earlier, 
within each interview participants’ other areas of expertise were also explored where 
appropriate and possible. For instance, 6 participants listed in other groups for their 
primary role in the research were also clinicians and some of their clinical views were 
explored. Quite often such expertise was somewhat historical, and variable in 
relevance, so the table has not been developed to incorporate these contributions. 
However, handled carefully, they were a useful supplement to the number of primary 
insights for each group.
Primary Occupational Group Total Number 
of Interviews
Clinicians 12
Business & Information Managers 4
Statisticians 5
Policy Makers 6
Systems Developers 4
Other Data Users 3
Coders 16
Table 5 Summary of Number of Interviews by Occupational Group
Interviews and observations in the research phase went on over a period of 18 months.
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Interviews usually lasted between one and two hours. Each observation lasted three 
days. Three clinical and three coding observations were undertaken. All interviews and 
observations were conducted during the participants’ working day and at their places of 
work.
This was supplemented by the researcher’s extensive experience working with NHS 
clinical data over a period of four years prior to the active research phase. This involved 
participant observation in over 30 hospitals during the development of the research 
question.
5.6.3 Interview schedules
Preparation for the interviews, in terms of the frameworks or schedules, followed much 
the same procedures as it would have for developing a questionnaire. Topics were 
selected that were of relevance to each respondent, questions were devised to elicit the 
relevant information and methods of analysis were considered. A schedule including 
the probable best order of discussion was also prepared. Questions were chosen on the 
basis of indicators from the literature review. Broadly, they were directed at gaining 
understanding of each participant group’s ‘reality’ and of how that influenced behaviour 
in terms of information and knowledge. Each interviewee was also allowed latitude in 
terms of digression into areas of personal interest. This was both in order to aide the 
process of establishing a rapport and because the researcher’s previous experience 
(Drennan, 1991) indicated that such digressions often yield unexpected value. The 
researcher had a sound knowledge of the work areas involved and so was able to 
promote useful conversation in unplanned areas, and relate that to the appropriate 
research issues. Wording of the questions was given considerable thought, particularly 
to ensure that more than one question was not wrapped up together and to give 
consideration to the effects one question may have on another. It was recognised that 
some questions could start respondents thinking along certain lines and affect how they 
answered further questions. Consideration was also given to whether questions
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contained unstated assumptions. For example, the question ‘What kind of data do you 
use to manage your clinical activities?’ assumes use of data and management, and that a 
link between the two exists. Also considered were the kinds of responses the questions 
could lead to and whether or not these were the kinds of responses being sought. In 
addition, assessments were made of whether questions conveyed what the researcher 
thought, and whether this was always desirable. Lastly, leading, presumptive, sensitive 
or offensive questions were avoided. This type of consideration apart, the wording of 
questions was not considered to be important in the same way as for questionnaires. 
The interview style selected offered the ability to give and seek clarification, to change 
the order of discussion, to omit issues and to probe further where necessary. It was 
deemed important, however, that efforts were made to ensure the language used was 
understandable to respondents. The interview schedule was also designed to keep 
interviews to approximately one hour per respondent; respondents were mainly 
professionals working in highly pressurised environments. Lastly, the schedule was 
designed to ensure the needs of the interviewer were met in terms of enabling an 
efficient and comfortable interview. Interview topics were clearly written out to avoid 
embarrassing silences while the right issue was found.
As stated above, pilots were undertaken. These yielded useful data, which was 
assimilated into the general set collected, but no substantial changes to the approach 
resulted.
Interviews were recorded by making notes both during and after the interviews. Taping 
interviews was considered because it was recognised that semi-structured interviewing 
often yields a mass of data. However, transcription was considered intrusive by most 
interviewees. This was not unexpected from individuals who wished to remain 
anonymous. Other participants, for instance clinical coders, could only be interviewed 
in open offices where noise levels prohibited taping. Also, the researcher’s extensive 
background in the problem situation meant that a great deal of information could be 
retained on the basis of relatively few notes. Lastly, although taping captures
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everything that is said, transcription is a laborious process. It was considered that an 
equally good or even better result would be achieved by careful management of the 
interviewing process, and the process of writing up thoughts immediately after each 
interview. These notes were later reviewed, participants’ responses were compared and 
future interview plans were adjusted where deemed appropriate.
Both the process and style of interviews were done primarily in such a way as to both 
ensure a continuing focus on the specific research questions, and to assist identification 
of emerging, overarching issues or conceptual categories. These are addressed in the 
following chapters.
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Chapter 6, The Problem Addressed through the Data
This chapter contains findings from the first report of the fieldwork. It begins by 
discussing the process of analysis in terms of physical organisation and exploration of 
the data. It then describes and explains the development of conceptual categories. This 
part of the discussion begins with the final analytic categories. A detailed account of 
their emergence is contained within the main report of the fieldwork, as they sit more 
naturally alongside the events that precipitated them. They are included here in order to 
demonstrate their relationship to preceding analysis. The discussion moves then to 
early stages of the analysis phase, with description and discussion of the initial analytic 
categories, followed by some examples from the data analysed which explain the 
emergence of those categories. Some of these examples are repeated in the body of the 
analysis chapter as they relate, as might be expected, to development of the final 
categories as well as to early thoughts. Discussion of these early categories is included 
because it provides insight into underlying thought processes and reasoning which 
ultimately shaped the final argument. It is hoped it will, therefore, provide insights to 
the final argument itself.
6.1 First Level Analysis: Process
The approach used in the research sought to:
\ . . .  elucidate case features so as to facilitate the development of an explanatory 
framework.’ (Gill and Johnson, 1997: 13)
This entailed ‘progressive focusing’ (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983: 206) with a shift 
of concern from description to the development of grounded theory (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1973) based on analytic categories, by explicit reference:
‘.... to their involvement in a complex of inter-related variables that the observer 
constructs as a theoretical model...which best explains the data...assembled.’ 
(Becker, 1970:196)
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The explanatory theory would, therefore, rest upon relationships between key concepts 
derived from the data. Achieving this involved organising the data into a series of 
categories. In practical terms this followed the work of Turner (1981):
‘The qualitative researcher needs at least two sets of notes or files for data analysis. 
The first, conventional set will, of course, permit the recording of field data in any 
way which makes it readily retrievable. But the second set of research records is 
the one which makes it possible to manipulate and analyse the data collected, and 
to develop a theoretical understanding. Through this second set of records the 
researcher develops a gradually changing abstract representation of the social 
world which can be rearranged to let new aspects of its properties become evident.’ 
(Turner, 1981: 230)
Thus concepts were derived from the data and the process of collecting it, and some 
analysis was contemporaneous with research. This process went on throughout the 
fieldwork and after its completion. Notes were reviewed and a process of sedimentation 
was pursued, which extracted phenomena and perceptions from the general mass of data 
being collected. These were then added to, grouped and regrouped according to 
similarities and differences. This grouping and regrouping was done on A5 size cards, 
on which each potentially related concept, issue or phenomenon was listed. This made 
all of the data very accessible, thereby greatly assisting the process of analysis. 
Categories were then derived from the data on each card. These reflected common 
conceptual areas under which the listed items could be said logically to fit. Eventually, 
a point of saturation was reached in recording, grouping and regrouping. At this point 
new categories had ceased to emerge and it had become impossible to add to the 
properties of existing categories. Fieldwork was then deemed to be fully mature and 
analysis moved to identifying deeper levels of categories and possible new explanatory 
theories.
6.2 First Level Analysis: Findings
The analysis described eventually crystallised around four major categories. These 
were The Clinician as Scientist, Artist and Professional, which was nested within a
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larger concept, Socially Constructed Realities. To these were added the concepts of The 
Social Rationalists and, lastly, of Conflicting Realities.
The process leading to these predominant and lasting categories began with the 
interviews, observation and analysis, which initially yielded, and were allowed to yield, 
a fairly large number of what were considered to be ‘themes of interest’ rather than firm 
categories. This was due to two main factors. Firstly, it was recognised that ability to 
more accurately label or describe findings would improve as understanding developed, 
so initial labels for categories were expected to be imprecise and, sometimes inaccurate. 
Secondly, it was due to a desire to allow the data to ‘move’ during the analysis stage. In 
other words, this was to ensure that early assumptions did not retard emergence of new 
links and relationships, which could emerge, dissolve and re-emerge as understanding 
developed. The order of these themes as described here is purely for presentational 
purposes and does not reflect the order in which they emerged during the research. This 
is mainly because some were simultaneous during focused analysis phases and some 
slowly emerged over a period of protracted and less focused thought. Also, there is no 
implied assertion in this that the categories, connections, and subsequent assertions 
made are the only valid connections possible, merely that they have been justified in 
terms of the data available and are, therefore, a valid interpretation of the issues.
Key early categories preceding the final analysis classes were numerous. They included 
Modelling Reality; Communications and Knowledge; Knowledge Gained and 
Purpose/Need; Models of Inquiry and Knowledge Gathering; The Nature of Two 
Businesses; Politics; Culture; Accounting by Objective Means; Organisation; Pragmatic 
Management; Bureaucratisation; Assumptions; Knowledge as Truth; Knowledge 
Domains; Systems and, lastly, Data. As may be expected, given that the findings were 
generated by one ‘problematic’ aspect of the organisational situation, even at this stage 
it was clear that some links and overlaps existed between particular categories, resulting 
in their being clustered together and forming the platform for the final categories. These 
are perhaps best explained by discussion of some of the findings that underpinned them.
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The category Modelling Reality arose from findings of the type elicited from a 
clinical coder that:
‘.... all the information needed (by the classifications) is in the casenote.’
This stimulated consideration of different approaches to modelling reality, as did the 
following claims by clinical participants:
‘.... the two domains (of ICD-10 and OPCS-4) are just different....’
\ . . .  clinicians wanted terms outside the scope (of ICD-10 and OPCS-4) to record 
the detail of their patient encounters.’
This and other related findings indicated, very clearly, that disparate ways of modelling 
reality were at work. This was not in itself problematic until consideration was given to 
the fact that that the universe of discourse, and the knowledge sought about it were 
apparently thought, by the DH and the Government at least, to be the same.
A second theme which emerged was Communications and Knowledge. Findings 
underlying this concept included discussion with the designer of Read codes, in which 
he advised that the way the Read system is organised:
‘.... reflects the way doctors are trained in medical school to deal with patients .... 
It has a clinically meaningful hierarchy for navigational purposes, to help clinicians 
find things where, according to their clinical training, they would expect to find 
them.’
Findings like this indicated it would be worthwhile exploring the issue of clinical 
knowledge and how that affected communicated information. Findings here also 
included clinical assertions relating to the contents of the medical casenote, which was 
the key communication document in this situation. As one clinician put it:
‘The level of detail sought and recorded varies according to the needs of each 
clinician taking care of each patient.’
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This quote also featured in development of the next category, Knowledge Gained and its 
relationship to Purpose and Need. The relationship between these categories is clear 
and rests on the notion that knowledge gained is related to purpose and need, and this 
affects what is, and can be, communicated. However, at this stage the separation was 
useful as it was thought possible that these closely linked issues may have other and 
different links and drivers. Other findings of relevance to this Knowledge category 
included comments by an Information Manager, when asked whether he was concerned 
about the accuracy of clinical coding, because that determined the amount of money 
paid for a healthcare contract. He responded:
‘So long as the money coming back in is roughly right, who cares?’
They also included the clinical assertion that:
‘Often in reality a doctor will decide what is wrong with a patient by looking at 
them coming in and will often tend to write down what supports that.’
And that of a clinical coder:
‘The casenote was extensively searched for the information regarding the overdose, 
as the clinician had not recorded it, but the ICD requires this information.’
The notion began to emerge, as a result of this type of finding, that examination of 
purpose and its relationship to both information gathered and perception of it might be 
useful.
The next early category, Models of Enquiry and Knowledge Gathering, was closely 
allied to the first. Comments of importance here included one from a statistician, when 
discussing the DH department, known as the HES Office or HES, which provides 
Government healthcare statistics:
‘HES exist to provide consistent information about Health Service activity ... 
cleaning and manipulation of data are necessary to support this ....’
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and, from a clinician:
‘There is no nationally accepted or supported standard for the structure and content 
of casenotes....’
and, from another statistician:
‘HRGs need to be resource homogeneous and clinically meaningful.’
These kinds of findings opened up the possibility that the systems in question, the tools 
themselves, bore examination, as many aspects of them, including their rationality, their 
requirements and the inherent view of their portion of reality was clearly influential in 
determining the nature of information being transferred.
Moving on to the category ‘The Nature of Two Businesses’, this was developed in an 
effort to understand the effects of the business of caring and the business of resourcing, 
in which the two main groups active in the problem domain, clinicians and managers, 
were respectively engaged. For instance, a coder noted, when discussing the rules of the 
classifications and the fact that her job in extracting the classifications’ data 
requirements from the medical casenote was sometimes so difficult:
‘The doctors aren’t interested in them.’
Also, as one manager described:
‘Managerial data is about waiting list times.’
and another:
‘The Department of Health has to account to Parliament and the only way it can do 
this is in terms of what is spent by showing activity.... The Department of Health 
needs information for planning, policy development, monitoring and 
implementation planning.’
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This was in stark contrast to the earlier quote (see page 152) from the clinician for 
whom the level and type of detail extracted from a situation, and recorded about it, 
related directly to their own individual clinical needs in caring for each patient.
The category of Politics, both in the Governmental and organisational sense was almost 
inevitable, given the nature of the problem domain, wherein the Service is Government 
funded, but delivered by a strong professional group. However, the effect of these 
factors was significant in terms of information and information tools. For instance, as 
one researcher put it:
‘HRGs were originally designed to enable understanding of departmental casemix 
in hospitals so that hospital budgets could be rationally allocated.’
HRGs were, primarily, therefore, a management tool necessary because equity of 
service delivery and accountability for public funds was a key fact of NHS life. A 
senior DH manager added further support in this area when discussing the role of the 
HES Office:
‘If HES cannot confidently say to Ministers that, for instance, 73% of the 
population has had or, more importantly, will have a heart attack, there is no point 
in them being there.’
Organisational politics were also clear in comments from clinicians. For instance, in 
discussing the development of their clinical language, Read 3, a number raised the fact 
that the DH was very keen to have classification concepts included. As a developer 
said:
‘They (the clinicians) balked at the inclusion of ‘non-clinical’ terms in order to 
satisfy the needs of a system they had long despised. Several mechanisms have 
been introduced to smooth this problem.’
The issue of Culture, which is so intimately involved with organisational politics, and 
which plays a role in informing and reflecting the worldviews of individuals and groups, 
was also considered a worthwhile issue upon which to focus. This was on the basis of
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very different assertions by key stakeholder groups. The following clinical view was 
typical of comments reflecting on the tentative nature of much clinical work:
‘From their earliest clinical training clinicians are taught that in science the person 
with most doubts about the result of an experiment is the person who did it.’
No such doubts assailed clinical coders, whose job it was to extract definitive clinical 
statements wherever possible from medical casenotes:
‘If only doctors would write everything down they were supposed to ....we could 
really improve things.’
A similar belief system operated for the statisticians also, whose job it was to ensure the 
Government had the data it needed:
‘Grossing (of clinical data received at the DH) involves compensating for missing 
diagnoses and procedures in HES (data) .... and helps to ensure consistency and 
comparability across the whole database.’
Clearly, very different agendas were being pursued and each group involved perceived 
their methods as legitimate. This type of finding also stimulated development of the 
category of Data as a separate theme.
The last quote above also featured in development of the category Accounting by 
Objective Means. Other relevant findings here included findings from discussions 
about HRGs, some of which are related above. This issue was also closely allied to 
cultural concerns and the notion of different agendas driving different perceptions of 
reality and information needs, and also of those factors, for clinical as well as non- 
clinical groups, perhaps constraining what could be known about reality. This category 
was also influenced by assertions from, for instance, a Government statistician, 
discussing the HES office:
‘HES exists to provide consistent information about Health Service activity ....
To answer .... questions .... It exists in the belief that they can be answered and
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answered from hospital data. It follows their actions are.designed to piakp this 
belief a reality, not to question this belief.’
In other words, each group seemed to be locked into a concern about, and a relationship 
with, certain parts or types of reality. .This seemed to be driving assumptions whi< i^ 
influenced interaction with reality to a significant degree.
Organisation developed as an early category in order to ensure a focus on any relevant 
effects emerging from the ‘Professional Bureaucracy’ (Mintzberg, 1983: 191) which is 
the NHS. Of particular interest, bearing in mind Giddens’ work on ‘structural conflict’ 
(1976, 1984) was whether this arrangement had informational consequences. The type 
of finding of importance here was, for instance, revealed in discussion with a member of 
the HES office:
‘Detailed information about psychiatric patients .... is produced by HES .....
Clinical staff provide coders with only the most bland and superficial statements 
about their patients.’
While this kind of issue clearly related to differing realities and agendas, it was thought 
possible that organisational arrangements also colluded in enabling this type of thing to 
happen.
The next category, Pragmatic Management, arose from a number of observations, which 
demonstrated something about the effects on information of the relationship it had to its 
handlers. For instance, a coding manager described how:
‘The coding backlog was so great that quality had to be sacrificed for quantity. 
This meant that all orthopaedic conditions (treated in the hospital by clinicians) 
were coded as backache, irrespective of the real condition described by the doctor 
(in the casenote).’
Bureaucratisation as a category emerged at an early stage as a result of work by Dalton 
et al (1967) briefly discussed in an earlier chapter. They noted that functional 
differentiation, like that found in bureaucracies, is not only about division of labour and
157
responsibilities, but is also concerned at a much deeper and, for this thesis, more 
important level with the difference in cognitive and emotional orientations, cultures and 
loyalties between differentiated groups. The informational effects possible as a result of 
this have already been demonstrated in some of the above quotes, but were also 
demonstrated by the very different information tools and methods in use by each group. 
Thus, for instance, the bureaucrats’ preferred tool was a highly structured and definitive 
classification.
Like so many other categories, Assumptions is a thread which can run through most 
others. However, once again its development was in part to ensure that assumptions in 
their own right were disentangled from the other data, at least until such time as their 
effects were felt to be better understood. Findings of interest here included the 
following from a DH manager, discussing the processing of clinical data:
‘The process from top to bottom for this data is very distended and it is unlikely 
that each handling centre understands properly what it is they are getting and the 
effect of what they are doing. A great deal seems to be taken on trust or 
assumption.’
Thus the notion that significantly different assumptions might be at work gained 
importance, particularly when considered together with Modelling Reality.
Modelling Reality also closely linked with the next category, Knowledge as Truth. This 
category was particularly underpinned by, for instance, the assertion of a researcher 
involved with HRGs:
‘I also believe that, in order to have good statistical data you need data which is 
objective or perceived as objective .... ’
and, from a clinician:
‘Reservations (about data) get buried and assumptions are what get carried 
forward.’
158
The category of Knowledge Domains arose from insight into the focus of clinical work 
and the apparently identical focus of the classifications. Findings quickly revealed a 
difference of opinion among key groups in this area. Thus, as one researcher put it:
‘Clinicians criticise the structure of ICD because there are conditions which are not 
described in their terms with an ICD code and it does not enable them to see a true 
picture of what is happening.’
A clinical participant, who echoed an earlier clinical response, went further:
‘Clinicians wanted terms outside the scope of the classifications to record the detail 
of their patient encounters... ’
Moving now to the Systems category, again, a number of the above-mentioned findings 
featured in its development. Of particular relevance also was the fact that the 
computerised and manual systems in the problem domain were seen from the early 
stages as key features for investigation, given their role in processing clinical 
information. Also, however, findings from participants like:
‘The Read 3 system would be designed specifically for use in computers. We saw 
the need for compatibility with the established systems (when designing Read 3).’
indicated that the technical aspects of these systems were only one important feature in 
understanding informational effects. Their design rationales, etc. would also prove 
worthy of investigation, as these should reveal inherent and influential worldviews.
Lastly, a category entitled Social Structures was developed. Interestingly, when it 
emerged it was not possible to ascribe to it any particular findings. However, it 
reflected the first of a series of moves away from the above-mentioned, somewhat 
scattered categories towards higher level themes. A more all-embracing explanation, 
which was perceived to be emerging, was the influence of social positioning and 
structures on perception and action. A useful starting point to developing this notion 
was deemed to be consideration of information in the context of each key group in the
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problem domain. Thus, the analysis would consider not only the nature of information 
in each of those contexts, but also the constellation of what were perceived as relevant 
social phenomena active within those contexts. It was felt this would be likely to draw 
on several types of findings and might also weld the jigsaw-like fragments into 
something of a more coherent picture. As it was the starting point for all that followed 
in informational terms, clinical knowledge was addressed first.
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Chapter 7, Fieldwork: The Clinical Domain, Clinical Knowledge and Data, the 
Process of Generation and Application Examined
This chapter contains the main report from the fieldwork in the clinical domain. It 
describes and discusses the data collected by interviews and observation. It also 
addresses its relationship to initial theories and grounded theories, which emerged as a 
result of this process.
The part of the report that addresses the non-clinical domains is contained in chapter 8. 
This presentational style is used because opportunities for access in the field research 
stage did not follow a neat pattern through key groups involved. Research began with 
some of the clinicians, but then moved around other groups, as individuals became 
available. However, it was necessary then to present the data collected and analysed in 
a logical format, e.g. by domain and key stakeholder group within those domains. Thus 
clinical and non-clinical areas provided a natural division around which to organise the 
presentation.
With regard to the detail of this chapter, it begins with exploration of the insights the 
data offered into the nature of clinical knowledge and data. The chapter moves on then 
to description and discussion of the observed application of clinical knowledge in 
patient care settings. This is in order to explore how knowledge is reaffirmed and 
developed, and to establish the basis for, and nature of, the contents of the medical 
casenote. The casenote itself is then explored and reviewed on the basis of author, 
purpose, intended user and, consequently, valid domain of use.
7.1 Clinical Knowledge and Data
The starting point for data collection here was the assertion, discussed in the literature 
review, that clinicians, no more than any other group or individual, did not have a direct
161
line to the ‘truth’. Thus, the aim was not to judge the validity of their views on what 
knowledge might be firm and what might be tentative. However, clinicians were 
recognised as the genesis of the clinical data which flowed through the NHS and 
ultimately became statistical data sets. Their perceptions of clinical knowledge and the 
data they created, and the researcher’s own perceptions were, therefore, of interest to 
this thesis, as they would enable a more informed critique of the coded datasets, and 
decisions which flowed from them. As noted earlier:
‘The perceiver’s world of reality, no matter how difficult to evaluate, must be the 
atrating point for assessing the reliability of information’ (Bruner et al, 1947: 69)
In addition, as research progressed it became likely that, while one domain was at issue, 
two different models of it existed.
In terms of how the clinician is initially socialised into the world of medicine, it was 
beyond the scope of this research to attend medical schools. The literature review was, 
therefore, relied upon in this regard, but only in so far as subsequent research with 
working clinicians supported findings there.
Interviews and observations were designed, therefore, to enable insight into the nature 
of clinical knowledge, and the nature of the data clinicians record in medical casenotes. 
The literature review had indicated some fundamental issues about the realm of clinical 
knowledge and information, particularly that uncertainty was a central fact about 
medical reasoning. Early responses in interviews confirmed this:
‘Most (diseases) are pathognomically very difficult to diagnose definitively. There 
are some; for instance blood sugar above a certain level is pathognomic of diabetes 
mellitus, but these (instances) are rare.’
‘There is an underlying scientific logic to medicine, but not to how it is practiced 
or recorded.’
‘No definitions are taught in medicine, and neither are there any approved 
definitions documents.’
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‘ ......  clinicians are never taught terminology or describing and recording as
accurately as possible.’
The practical outcome of this situation was experienced by the inventor of Read codes. 
Commenting on the issues he faced in trying to capture key elements of clinical 
terminology, he stated:
‘What I realised I could not overcome was the phenomena that clinicians, like 
everyone else, can often see the same thing and label it differently. So one 
clinician’s ‘asthma’ was another one’s ‘wheezy chest.’
Thus, the evidence supported the notion of uncertainty and subjective opinion being 
typical rather than exceptional in clinical work. This tended also to support suspicions 
of an irregular relationship between clinical data and its statistical counterpart.
Further investigation indicated, however, that such suspicions might be unfounded. 
During an interview with a senior statistician it seemed as though this situation was 
recognised and addressed by the developers and users of the classifications and their 
output:
‘.... it would be difficult to store the full English or Latin name of every diagnosis 
and operation .... There is always the possibility that someone will .... substitute 
other words having the same meaning ... it would be virtually impossible to take 
account of all the descriptive variables that clinicians might use.’
However, closer questioning about how the problem was addressed indicated that 
earlier suspicions were justified:
‘This problem is solved by using a set of alphanumeric codes. Diagnosis is coded 
in .... ICD-10. These codes clearly use a lot less record space and are much easier 
to search for.’
This pragmatic solution patently addressed the issue of volume of data. It also ignored 
the essential value of the heterogeneity that is clinical terminology, or rather clinical
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phenomena and their associated terminology. It also overlooked any problems inherent 
in shoehoming it into aggregate, static labels.
The existence of a problem was further confirmed when findings like those above were 
woven into later clinical interviews:
‘Read 3, which makes no claim to capture all possible clinical terms, contains 
between 200,000 and 300,000 terms. ICD-10 contains approximately 12,000 and 
OPCS-4 even fewer.’
‘In reality, when we look at Read 3 in use we find that users actually use relatively 
few terms in the main. However, that has to be seen in the context that, before we 
developed Read 3, we undertook a test, using ICD-10 and OPCS-4 to try to code 
the in-patient work of a geriatrician. It simply was not possible to accurately 
describe a significant amount of his work using those terms. So numbers of terms 
are only part of the problem. It was what they describe that is the real issue.’
Taking these findings to non-clinicians began to reflect the endemic conflict within 
which the key groups were operating. For instance, difficulty in establishing 
definitions for the classification of clinical phenomena was seen by managers as the 
result of clinicians being difficult. As one managerial participant put it:
‘Clinicians just can’t agree - if you get more than two together in a room you have 
no chance’
A second managerial participant stated:
‘They always throw just the exception to any definition at you, and often insist that 
everything is an exception. They do not have the will to sort definitional issues 
out.’
Thus underlying conflict was manifesting itself in clinical resistance to managerial 
involvement. What was also clear was that this approach rejected, or failed to 
recognise, the notion that an inherent problem existed in attempts to ‘define’ complex, 
often relatively poorly understood, natural phenomena. This lack of understanding, and
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the organisational conflict which nurtured it, was evidenced by the remark from one 
NHS manager:
\ . . .  for instance if the clinical statement is ‘baby bom well’, the DH is not 
interested. If it is ‘baby bom sick’, the baby is defined as a patient and the DH is, 
therefore, interested, but only after 28 days.’
Thus, research confirmed a situation wherein the universe of discourse was imperfectly 
understood, and where cognitive perception, knowledge, and information, in terms of 
methods of describing observations and views of elements of it remained, even after the 
clinical training phase, subjective and heterogeneous to an unquantified degree in 
relation to the phenomena with which they dealt. This was not to say that there were no 
definitives, no absolutes, simply that no work was found which analysed types of 
clinical knowledge in such a way as to list or spell out which phenomena fell into 
which category and what the relative percentages were. Lack of this type of work by 
the non-clinical users of clinical data was thought to be a result of socially-held 
perceptions of clinical work as scientific and, therefore, precise, certain and objective. 
Further support for this assertion is discussed in chapter 8.
Thus two clear issues began to emerge at an early stage of analysis. Firstly, an 
underlying objectivist philosophy could be seen running into an inherently interpretive 
area of reality. In such a situation, if Schatzki’s observation that ‘the factors that 
determine meaning are the factors that determine understanding’ (Schatzki, 1983: 135) 
is correct, consensus or any sort of meeting of minds was not likely between groups so 
philosophically distanced and also so distanced by the roles into which they had been 
socialised. Secondly, this was an interesting context in which to reflect on Giddens’ 
(1976, 1984) work on Structuration Theory. Constant efforts at definition by one and 
resistance by the other could be interpreted as use and maintenance of interpretive 
schemes which individuals use to make sense of, and continually validate personal 
views of reality.
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These findings led to the researcher’s original perceptions of the ‘Clinician as Scientist’ 
being enhanced by consideration of the ‘Clinician as Artist’. This emerged as the first 
major, higher level analytic category around which to organise observations and 
findings. It knitted together earlier themes of Modelling Reality, Models of Enquiry 
and Knowledge Gathering, and Culture and Knowledge as Truth, and in doing so 
provided a more coherent explanation of behaviour and issues observed.
This perception was deepened by further interviews and observations of clinicians, 
aimed at progressing insights into the nature of clinical work itself, and enhancing these 
by exploring the social context of the professional. In their responses each participant 
was at pains to stress how different clinicians are in terms of application of clinical 
knowledge and output from that process. The following statements were typical:
‘My responses apply to me.’
‘Clinicians are very different and their styles are very different.’
‘Experience, etc. can vary dramatically.’
This was perceived as raising the possibility that levels of expert, individual discretion 
that characterise this profession were achieved by trading off the kind of global rigour 
expected from a ‘scientific’ endeavour. This perception was not dispelled when a 
clinical participant revealed:
‘There is an underlying scientific logic to medicine but not to how it is practiced or 
recorded. All of this affects the objective value of information.’
Nor was it dispelled when a clinical participant described how a large amount of data is 
acquired during the consultation:
‘.... through application of the standard medical approach: taking the history, 
which can include personal history, past history, family history, social history etc., 
examination, which can include inspection or observation, palpation, auscultation
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and percussion. You then come to a provisional working plan, including tests of 
blood, urine, X rays, scans etc., and when that lot comes back you may come to a 
provisional ‘diagnosis’ and treatment schedule.’
Globally this could be considered a standardised approach, but it was worth 
reconsideration of the context within which this approach is used. It includes a lot of 
‘cans’, indicating a level of discretion reflective of this profession.
Research then took exploration to a deeper level, in an attempt to get closer to the 
essence of knowledge gathering and application. As discussed by Kay and Purves 
(1996) and Kluge (1996) the personal consultation is:
‘ not an interpretationally neutral fact gathering exercise, because it involves
something other than a neutral information transfer this entire process carries
its own phenomenological burden ...the physician ... records ... information with 
an ineluctable phenomenological bias.’ (Kluge, 1996: 88)
As discussed earlier, cognitive psychology (Bruner et al, 1947, Postman et al, 1948) 
supports the phenomenological view. Fieldwork with clinicians confirmed this:
‘Classically the medical history a doctor takes is subjective from both the doctor’s 
and patient’s perspective and doctors are trained not to try to put an interpretation 
on that, in other words, not to put words into the patient’s mouth, but to use the 
patient’s words. However, in reality lots of doctors cannot help themselves.’
Consultation emerged, therefore, as highly standardised in terms of the broad 
procedures of history taking etc., but variable in terms of questions asked, responses 
acted upon and inferences drawn, as evidenced by the following clinical quote:
‘The other day a colleague of mine reported feeling a hard liver edge in a patient. 
My own examination indicated this was not so.’
This was further confirmed by a Consultant after conducting a consultation. He 
confirmed that his qualified colleagues:
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\ . . .  would be quite likely to go about the consultation differently and may even 
come to different conclusions, depending upon a number of factors, including the 
patient’s personal characteristics, the relationship established, the Consultant’s 
interests, experience, demeanor, etc.’
In order to gain further insight into this and earlier findings, a number of consultations 
were observed. The following extracts from the transcript of some of those 
consultations begin to demonstrate these points. They each begin with a transcript of 
the letter from the GP referring the patient for a consultation.
7.1.1 Patient A:
‘Dear Mr X
I should be grateful if you would see Mrs. A.
For several weeks she has complained of persistent pain in the lumbar areas with 
occasional dysiiria. Urine cultures have often been negative but they show 
persistent pyuria greater than 1000 into 10 6 per litre. I should be grateful if you 
could look into her problem. A recent full blood count incidentally showed mild 
iron deficiency anaemia.
Yours Sincerely
Dr Z’
On discussion with a number of GPs and Consultants it became clear that the level and 
type of detail contained in this letter are not predictable. In other words, such sources 
are non-standard.
To an extent, although it was an entirely different case, this point was demonstrated a 
little later by a second case, Patient B (see page 171) whose GP went into great detail 
and included mention of her smoking habits and living arrangements.
To continue for the moment with Patient A, the receiving Consultant noted in the 
casenote all the clinical information he deemed relevant to him in undertaking this
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consultation, which proceeded as follows:
‘-Hello Mrs. A. I see from your GP that you have a pain in your back.
-Yes, on my lower waistline, more to the back than the front.
-When did it start?
-About twelve months ago.
-Was it a gradual onset or was it sudden?
-Really it started when I was sterilised in 1995 and it was gradual from then.
-Has the pain got worse since then or has it stayed about the same?
-It varies. I have been taking Solpedol, about six a day, and obviously it’s less after 
I’ve taken one.
-Do you mean Solpadeine - large soluble tablets?
-No, Solpedol.
-O.K. Do they help?
-Yes, but the pain is here now.
-Is it constant?
-Yes.
-Any blood in your urine at all?
-No,
-Have you taken any antibiotics in the last year?
-Yes.
-Did they make any difference to the pain?
-I don’t think it was there then. I can’t really remember.
-Is your weight steady?
-Yes.
-Is your appetite OK?
-Yes.’
The Consultant then proceeded with an examination of the patient while continuing to 
talk to her and explaining what was happening and why, following which the dialogue 
continued as follows:
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‘-We know from our own and the GP’s urine checks that there are crystals in your 
water, which may account for the pain.
- My GP thinks it may be a kidney problem.’
The Consultant then explained how the kidney works and why, therefore, the GP may 
have thought it a kidney problem.
He then brought an ultrasound scanner in and scanned the patient’s lower abdomen, 
watching the monitor as he did so and ultimately printing the screen images for 
inclusion in the patient’s casenote folder. He then advised the patient:
‘-The kidney looks a bit distended and we need more information to tell us why. 
The most likely cause is a small stone blocking the tube from the kidney to the 
bladder. So, I’ll send you for an X-ray today and an IVP - that is an injection of 
dye to show how the kidney is working. The IVP will not be today, but it will be 
arranged as soon as is possible, because if it is what I think it is the kidney is being 
damaged by it so we need to sort it out.
-What is the cause?
-It is probably associated with diet, probably you are not drinking enough fluid.’
The patient then went off to the X ray Department. She returned a little later, and the 
consultation resumed. The Consultant showed her the X-ray, which showed a lot of 
stones in the kidney, and basically advised her that was the source of the pain. He also 
advised:
‘-We still want to know how well the kidney is working, so we will proceed with 
the IVP I mentioned earlier, but I am also going to arrange a renogram, which will 
measure function of the kidney more accurately. When all the information is back 
we will either remove the stones or the kidney if necessary. It depends on kidney 
function and also how difficult taking out all those large stones would be without 
removing the kidney. The problem is there is some infection associated with those 
stones as well - we have had a urine sample from you today - so I am going to 
prescribe some antibiotics through your GP. We’ll get the tests done as soon as 
possible ’
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7.1.2 Patient B
‘Dear Mr X
I would be grateful if you would arrange to see this pleasant 86 year old lady in the 
Urology clinic.
In the 1940s, at St. X hospital, she had a hysterectomy, but shortly after this she 
developed a urinary fistula, which was utero-vaginal. The fistula’s opening was 
near the left ureter about 1cm from the ureteric orifice and an excretion urogram 
showed extensive hydronephrosis and poor function of the left kidney with a 
normal right kidney. She therefore underwent a left nephrectomy. She has had no 
further problems with her kidney but in May this year an MSU showed an increase 
in RBCs but no significant growth. Subsequent urinalysis was negative and she 
has no urinary symptoms. However, in view of the fact that she has only one 
remaining kidney I would be grateful if you would advise on further investigation 
and management of this microscopic haematuria. Abdominal examination is 
unremarkable. Past history includes myocardial infarction in 1990 which was 
treated at home, she is also hypertensive on treatment and recently started 
Simvastatin for hypocholesterolaemia. She was investigated in the 1970s by the 
neurologists at St. X for blackouts, which were felt to be some form of transient 
ischaemia. She also has a history of Candida infection of the tongue and is known 
to have degenerative disease of the lumbar spine.
She lives alone and is independent. She continues to smoke cigarettes.
Yours Sincerely 
DrY’
The consultation began with the usual greetings etc., and used the GP referral letter as 
the basis for discussion:
‘-So, you have had a hysterectomy?
-Yes, and they cut my ureter by accident.
-And you have had your left kidney removed?
-Yes.
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-And you know that the reason you are here today is that your GP has checked 
your urine and found a trace of blood in it and he is concerned because you only 
have one kidney?
-Yes.
-Do you have any difficulty passing urine?
-No.
-Is there any blood when you pass urine?
-No.
-Do you have any pain when you pass urine?
-No.
-How frequently do you pass water?
-I take Frusemide, so I go more often after I have taken that, and I am slightly 
incontinent.
-But basically you are passing water normally for you?
-Yes, but I do have some pain in my back.
-Where?
-In my lower back, here, and I cannot walk far without getting that pain.
-Do you have any pain down your legs?
-No, but it is in my back after walking short distances.
-Do you have any pain in your calves?
-Yes.
-Do you smoke?
-Yes.
-How many?
-Do I have to be honest?
-Yes.
-Twenty a day - at my age, indulge me.
-Well, we have checked your urine again here today and there is some blood in it, 
but that does not necessarily indicate problems. But today I also want to scan your 
kidney and check your bladder with a small telescope. It is very easy to do, does 
not hurt and can be done under local anaesthetic. If all that shows normal we will 
know today that everything is OK. OK? The most likely cause of the trace of
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blood is a slight infection so we have sent a sample off to check it. Which kidney 
did you lose?
-This one.
-OK. Stay quite still.*
The Consultant then scanned the patient’s abdomen, watching the monitor and 
explaining what he was seeing as he did so:
‘-That looks like a perfectly normal kidney to me, slightly large as you would 
expect, because it is compensating for the one that was removed.’
He then printed the image from the scanner and gave the patient a leaflet on flexible 
cystoscopy, which was the procedure he was about to perform on her bladder, to read 
while she waited for it to be done. The cystoscopy was then performed and revealed a 
small transitional carcinoma, which was biopsied, there and then, and diagnosed as 
‘very early’ and ‘benign’. The patient was advised of this and the treatment planned. 
Using his consultation notes, the Consultant dictated a letter to the patient’s GP.
The above transcripts describe the work of two Consultants. They confirmed that the 
process of applying clinical knowledge was standardised to the extent of the processes 
described above, i.e. history taking, examination, etc. What the researcher was then 
interested in was whether inferences drawn from these processes could differ between 
clinicians. Findings in this respect would help either support or refute the notion that 
clinical knowledge is affected by the personal and professional characteristics of 
individual clinicians. They might also add a commentary to the notion of the Clinician 
as Artist.
This evidence was acquired during the hospital observations, when the researcher was 
lucky enough not only to observe experienced consultants at work in consultations, but 
also to be present when trainee doctors worked in the clinic as a means of pre- 
examination preparation. In this situation, both the trainee and the Consultant attended 
the same patients. The trainee undertook the first consultation, and was followed by the
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Consultant, who repeated the consultation. It was not possible to be present in the room 
during these consultations because there was already a consultant, a trainee and a 
patient in a small consultation room. Patient privacy was also an issue. It was, 
however, possible to observe the Consultant questioning the junior as to findings and 
opinions after each consultation.
Invariably the trainees displayed uncertainty, most obviously due to lack of confidence. 
Their opinions also showed inaccuracies, due to incomplete knowledge and experience. 
This not only manifested itself in their findings, but also in how they arrived at them 
(questions, weightings, associations, etc.) and how they expressed them. As one 
Consultant remarked:
‘For instance, a junior would say ‘anterior myocardial infarction, a senior might 
say ‘anterior septal myocardial infarction.’
Interestingly, the reverse could also be true, but as a result of ‘professional’ and not 
purely clinical reasons. As one clinician explained:
‘Seniors can record less, both because of their level of expertise and because, 
culturally, it is a symbol of seniority.’
The effects of the social arrangements surrounding the profession were once again, 
therefore, evident.
Discussion was then taken back to exploring the underlying knowledge which had been 
observed in action. As described by a clinical participant:
‘The clinician starts with two main groups of knowledge, prefaced by locational 
knowledge .... the setting confers some knowledge, i.e. if I know the patient will be 
in Outpatients I immediately assume they cannot be too sick. If I am scheduled to 
see them at home I assume they may be quite ill, or they would have been 
scheduled to attend Outpatients.’
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That type of knowledge can be seen to nest within the two main groups which he went 
on to describe as:
general knowledge and experience, which can apply to all patients, and 
consisting of formal knowledge: that which has been taught to me, and informal 
knowledge: that which has been gained through experience, (and) specific 
knowledge about each individual patient, gained from personal consultation and 
communications .... *
As another clinical participant remarked:
‘.... the basis of clinical medicine is an amalgam of others’ knowledge and 
personal experience.’
Thus the knowledge clinicians bring to each consultation was seen to be variable in 
quantity, quality and nature, and its application, within the broad, standard framework 
of actions, was seen to be equally variable. What also emerged, particularly when read 
in conjunction with the other consultation transcript, (see Appendix 3, where the patient 
was a five year old boy) was the highly variable nature of patients’ concerns, self- 
knowledge, responses and ability to respond.
The next stage in the process of knowledge generation and application was described, 
again by a clinical participant, as follows:
‘Following the initial discussion with the patient I take the data collected and put it 
to my personal knowledge base and conclude a number of things about the present 
state of the individual .... But what I conclude may be very different from what 
another clinician, faced with the same data might conclude ....’
The discussion then explored the nature of the differences discussed, particularly in 
terms of quantitative and qualitative data. The researcher had a growing belief that at 
least some clinical data was highly subjective. What was unknown was which. 
Explorations here focused, therefore, on the extent to which quantitative data (in other 
words the sort that statisticians feel they can rely on) was objective. Responses
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indicated that this view of quantitative data was simplistic. As discussed by a clinician 
turned systems developer:
‘.... for instance this happens in measurement of blood pressure, which relies on 
hearing as well as sight and measurement. The same is true for any quasi­
objective measure. Only physically measurable objects are not subject to this, for 
example, specific enzyme levels.’
In other words, taking blood pressure depended upon myriad human attributes. The 
social element of ‘scientific knowledge’ was neatly demonstrated here.
Discussion then returned to the process of applying clinical knowledge. The above- 
mentioned process of ‘history taking’ was then described as:
‘.... interwoven by planning actions to confirm, improve, maintain, or disprove 
various clinical states, and postulation of some future states: goals for the patient 
or a prognosis.’
In exploring the conclusions which underpin this process, further evidence emerged of 
the uncertainty that is inherent in the nature of clinical work. Even the most senior 
consultants observed and interviewed made it clear that:
‘.... some (conclusions) are firm, some are tentative .....  some (knowledge) is
subjective, some objective ....’
and:
‘Conclusions, including written ones, are usually tentative .... i.e., ‘found lying on 
the floor- ?’, ‘fracture leg of femur ?’, ‘cerebral hemorrhage?’.’
The question mark here was routinely used in written casenotes to denote these were 
options the clinician was considering, one, many, or none of which might turn out to be 
relevant. As another clinical participant remarked:
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‘Often the clinician never has a clue why the patient is on the floor and often they
never find out.’
Even where apparent certainty existed, for example, where death was recorded as due to 
a heart attack, anecdotal clinical evidence suggested otherwise. As one clinical 
participant suggested:
‘.... it is not unusual for a post-mortem to reveal a perfectly healthy heart.’
What became clear was that, as shown above, although the physical approach was 
standardised the intellectual one was not, and neither was the patient’s ability to 
articulate on their condition. Many ‘social’ factors were operational and these affected 
the type and amount of knowledge elicited. These factors were discussed in the 
literature review, particularly in relation to work undertaken by De Dombal (1996) and, 
during the research, were confirmed as including experience, clinical acumen, 
confidence, culture, and specialty. Thus, the clinician is trained to act independently 
and confidently on the basis of the information available or acquirable, even where 
certainty is not possible. Resulting clinical findings and the totality of those findings 
were shown as sometimes remaining tentative, subjective and heterogeneous to an 
unquantified degree. Initial hypotheses that healthcare data was not what it appeared 
to be were, therefore, strengthened.
Also strengthened were hypotheses regarding social influences as potential causes of 
this situation. The analytic category ‘The Clinician as Scientist, The Clinician as 
Artist’ was now nested, therefore, within a larger concept of ‘Socially Constructed 
Realities’. The latter category followed reflection on observed behaviour in clinical 
work. This reflected observed adherence to socially constructed notions of what 
constitutes illness and what constitutes appropriate actions, including exercise of 
individual discretion. It also included consideration of issues like the fact that, until 
little more than ten years ago, AIDS was not recognised as existing. As discussed 
earlier, ‘an item plays no role that is not understood by someone.’ (Schatzki, 1983: 135)
177
and no action is taken specifically towards it. As one clinical participant observed:
‘Certain countries do not recognise as schizophrenia what we in the UK do ....
Ideas of what constitutes a suicide vary ....’
In terms of the research, prior to adoption of this perspective towards clinical work and 
knowledge, it was felt initially that clinicians, like scientists and other social groups, 
did not hold a direct line to the truth. However, clinicians were known to be the most 
direct investigators of that reality. On this basis their version of it was perceived to be 
inherently purer and generally more valid than that of other groups in respect of the 
same phenomena, particularly, for instance, statisticians. Research clearly indicated, 
however, that socially-defined norms underpinned both. What then became interesting 
was the objectivisation of clinical knowledge which followed. This is dealt with in 
later chapters.
Thus the picture of uncertainty could be enlarged upon by considering the basic 
universe of discourse, which observations indicated was considered by clinicians to be, 
in parts at least, relatively poorly structured. It might, however, be more accurate to 
assert, given for instance the AIDS issue, that it was current understanding of it which 
remained poorly structured. Further insight was gained, as shown, through 
consideration of clinical training, which added to initial perceptions of elements of 
heterogeneity in knowledge acquisition and application, based on human nature, 
judgement and experience.
This picture was then set against a key final output from this process, DH statistics 
about healthcare. As discussed earlier, in order to be reliable statistics must be based 
on quantitative, objective data. While it is arguable that ‘objectivity’ is a subjective 
concept, the extent of subjectivity the research found in the clinical domain 
immediately reinforced concerns about the validity of healthcare statistics. It also 
reinforced concerns about general assumptions surrounding ability to transfer such 
knowledge, without disturbing meaning, across social boundaries, particularly through
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the medium of the medical casenote. That the knowledge was adequate to clinical 
practice was not at issue here. As discussed, the nature of the profession means that 
true transfer of knowledge between professionals is by no means a prerequisite for 
practice, beyond the clinical training environment. This point is important here 
however, because for the clinician transferability, particularly outside the clinical 
sphere, was not a primary factor in clinical knowledge use and development, and hence 
in recording practices when it came to the casenote. As one geriatrician advised:
‘I always have a belief there will be other carers, which is the main reason why I 
am comprehensive (in recording clinical information in the casenote).’
He recognised, however, that he was not representative of the profession in this. He did 
not consider use outside the clinical sphere. As one of his colleagues, from another 
specialty area stated:
‘I get the casenotes but I usually rely just on the GP’s letter and my own 
assessment of the situation.’
When asked why, he advised:
‘Casenotes are such an unknown quantity in terms of quality and even whether or 
not you always get them.’
Further exploration in this area yielded the following key insight:
‘Most clinical conclusions are tentative .... doctors are forced, for the 
classifications, to put morbidity labels on patients, which they dislike doing. This 
issue probably causes most trouble with clinical coding. ICD data could, 
therefore, be said to be ‘fabricated’ at this point.’
This found support in the literature:
‘There is no guarantee that local vocabularies for identifying reality coincide with 
administrative nomenclatures, except in the rare cases where regulatory language 
is put to use by employees themselves. There is, therefore, a tension between the
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attention that doctors give to the local universe and the standardized administrative 
definition of pertinent objects for judgement.’ (Dodier, 1990: 205)
The importance of this issue was emphasised by reconsideration of the casenote itself. 
As stated earlier, the medical casenote is the main source of clinical information for the 
rest of the organisation, up to and including the DH and its customers.
7.2 Clinical Data, The Medical Casenote
Review of this document was helped by work by Barzun and Graff (1977) and 
Krippendorff (1980) on the critical analysis of documents. This holds as a main aim 
assessment of whether fact or bias is the main characteristic of a document. It includes 
consideration of such factors as who produced the document, what its purpose was, 
whether the author aimed to inform, remind or have some other effect on the reader, 
and whether it is complete. It includes whether the document has been altered or 
edited, and whether the terms used are understandable by its readers. It also focuses on 
what the author’s social and professional background is, whether the author was 
experienced, whether they Observed what was described and, if so, to what extent the 
author was an expert on what was being witnessed. It also considers whether the author 
reported events truthfully, or distorted them, and how long after the event the author 
composed the document. Evaluation of these factors is designed to help with selection 
and evaluation of evidence, primarily in the field of historical investigation. However, 
it was also a useful framework to draw upon in analysing the medical casenote.
Interview data indicated that the nature of the contents of the casenote was extremely 
heterogeneous, simply when viewed in terms of the paradigm, professional training 
and individual variations which generated them. A physical review of several hundred 
casenotes confirmed these findings and revealed these documents to be highly 
personalised to each individual clinical author. They lacked an agreed structure, so not 
only was what was recorded variable, how and where it was recorded was also variable. 
They also tended to be hand-written, adding the issue of legibility to the other factors
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which characterise them. They were, however, a clinical ‘tool of the trade’ and they 
were considered by clinicians to be adequate to the clinical job they perform.
From the managerial perspective, this document was the only primary source of 
information on the clinical details of patients encountering the NHS. Prior to this 
research the author had not found written evidence of the precise purpose with which 
managers endowed this document, or the assumptions they made about its contents.
Returning to the above-mentioned framework, the factors listed were explored in a 
series of interviews. The clinical view of the purpose of the casenote was described by 
a clinician as follows:
‘The purpose of the casenote is to be a contemporaneous medical record of the .... 
features of the consultation .... It is a tool of the trade. I do not even think about it 
when I am doing it, it is so much a part simply of the practice of medicine ....We 
are taught that creating these is a sign of good medical practice.’
This conformed to statements in the BMA handbook of practice (British Medical 
Association, 1998). These assertions were important, not least because subsequent 
observations seemed to indicate that clinical assumptions about the possible uses and 
users of this document defined the nature of the information they contain. The booklet 
itself gave no insight into who the record was for: other clinicians, administrative 
managers, patients, etc. Nor did it define the word ‘features’. Considerable latitude 
existed, therefore, and observation and discussion revealed the practical outcome of this 
to be a highly personalised document, the parts of which were often structured solely to 
the needs of its clinical authors, who may be many. As one clinical participant 
observed:
‘When you are writing the record you are writing it for yourself. You never think 
of anyone else. You are looking after that patient and what you write has to do 
withyowr care.’
This helped to make sense of key characteristics of the medical casenote, as described
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by another clinical participant:
‘There are no rules in clinical recording, we are not taught any .... there is a degree 
of disarray, there are no set educational patterns for recording.’
This was manifested by the lack of any standard structure and by the content of the 
medical casenote. Clinicians were found to be at liberty, as discussed in earlier work 
by the researcher (Drennan, 1994) to record as they will, what they will, providing they 
felt it represented a contemporaneous record of the ‘features’ of consultation, as defined 
by and for them. As another participant went on to say:
‘It is about a recorder and a patient as an individual.’
In other words, it need not be about fulfilling the requirements of the DH, or anyone 
else, for clinical information:
‘ ....  The primary thing in my head when I am writing the record is a blind
following of clinical practice, in other words, habit. Also I know my patients will 
return and what I have written down gives me the necessary picture to keep 
checking back to. It is my baseline status for monitoring.’
In terms of the remaining characteristics of the medical casenote contents, a Consultant 
Geriatrician then confirmed the assertions of De Dombal (1996) and findings from the 
researcher’s observations:
‘The extent and selection of recorded material depends upon a number of factors. 
These include self-perception: juniors are expected, and know they are expected, to 
record everything. Seniors have discretion, which some exercise, to record less, 
down to a few sentences. Some are comprehensive and use the casenote as a 
template for the next reader, some do not.’
As another clinical participant explained:
‘.... In General Medicine the patient, not the wound is dealt with, in other words, 
the whole of the patient, not the hole in the patient. In surgery the wound is dealt 
with. The more subspecialty the work, the more focused and detailed and deep the 
record becomes.’
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Further insights on this issue were provided by a Consultant surgeon, who confirmed 
the comment of another clinician quoted above. He commented:
‘Usually I am the treating clinician for my patients. If I need a colleague from 
another specialty to take a look I’ll probably have a word with him. The (case) 
notes don’t usually come into it, apart from the fact that I will probably make a 
note in them that I have asked for an opinion from a colleague. In fact, when I see 
a patient for the first time, I rely most heavily on my own consultation in terms of 
understanding what the problem is and any associated conditions. I note key 
aspects of my consultation in the notes, for myself, but other than that I don’t 
really use them.’
Discussions with GPs did nothing to challenge this assertion, with the following 
response being typical:
‘Often in reality a doctor will decide what is wrong with a patient by looking at 
them coming in and he will often tend to write what supports that. For instance, 
for what he thinks is a case of ‘nerves’ he will want to write down a few key 
questions that exclude pathological illness.’
This demonstrated a focus in recording data which involved justifying his actions for 
possible defensive use at some later date.
Variety and a focus on the idiosyncratic needs of the professional continued to be found 
throughout interviews and observations:
‘I record most of the history, planned actions are likely to be recorded, as are 
current states. Possible or planned future states are not likely to be recorded.’
‘The patient’s view of what is wrong with them is rarely recorded or taken account 
of, apart from as a spur to action towards certain actions and not others.’
The issue of assumptions about potential users and uses of casenote information, 
mentioned above, became increasingly important given this situation. Both these 
clinicians and other evidence collected suggested that the entries many clinicians made 
in the casenote were assumed to be for them. Consequently no consideration was given 
to the requirements of others in terms of contents, structure, understanding of language
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used or legibility. When asked his opinion of the way in which the DH uses the 
contents of casenotes in order to produce statistics about conditions and treatment for 
NHS patients, a clinician reconfirmed earlier discussion o f ‘fabricated’ data:
‘That is just pointless, that information simply is not there usually. OK, possibly it 
is more there for treatments, but conditions, no. Nobody believes those things 
(healthcare statistics) anyway. Does anyone seriously use them? We certainly 
don’t. They have no relevance to clinical practice. I’m not sure what relevance 
they can really have to anything.’
Apart from confirming concerns about the casenote as a source for DH clinical data, 
this also began to hint at the possibility that some clinical data: that which is treatment- 
related, was more valid for statistical classification purposes. This was explored further 
with a clinical participant who, in the course of a piece of research, tried to code his 
work using the ICD classification. He claimed:
‘The assumptions built into the classifications about the clinical world are not 
borne out in real life .... for instance, there is no concept of ‘absence o f. I might 
see a patient with a swollen calf and postulate a deep vein thrombosis. On 
examination I find that there is no deep vein thrombosis. ICD does not allow me 
to record all th a t....’
This clinical heterogeneity, or rather the assumptions and social norms which underpin 
it, affected not simply what was written, but also how, as demonstrated by the 
following copy extract from a casenote history sheet prepared by a Consultant during 
observation of a consultation. The notes he made in the casenote (note the use of the 
query symbol *?’ which, as mentioned earlier, indicated that the clinician considered 
this a possibility) were in barely legible handwriting. There may, therefore, be errors 
in this transcription and, in fact, it appears from a clinical reviewer of this document 
that ‘Urine PR +++ does not make sense:
‘Wt. 50kg BP 120/80 
Urine PR+++
BL+++
LEUC+++
-pain varies
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-Solpydol taken for pain - helps pain 
-has pain at present 
-no other symptoms 
Loin pain _L
Started 12/12 global onset
weight steady 
no discharge 
periods regular 
bowels OK 
U/s - L kidney 
?stone
-IVP -  urgent’
A diagram was also sketched to demonstrate the location of the stones.
Thus it became clear that the information was also highly subjective in terms of 
arrangement. This sample note also demonstrated the dimension of language through 
the use of ‘clinical shorthand’. As one clinician explained, discussing an instance in his 
own and colleagues’ practice:
‘The clinicians thought ‘diabetes’, the manual record said ‘diabetes’, the system 
contained ‘diabetes’. Each clinician knew that (of all the possible types) he meant 
‘diabetes mellitus’.’
Given comments above about the perceived uses and users of this information, this was 
not surprising. This is not to say that no dissatisfaction was expressed by clinicians 
about this issue. A Consultant physician maintained:
‘The issue of the content and structure of the medical record is one we must sort 
out. We really must agree standards. Work has been going on unsuccessfully in 
this area for years.’
Interestingly his concern came from a desire to achieve computerised patient records. 
The concept of a fundamental clash of philosophical extremes, not least in terms of 
technology and subjective knowledge, was however relevant here. It was also one
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which, during earlier observations of clinical systems working groups, the researcher 
found no evidence of clinicians addressing or being aware of.
The issue of presentation of information, in terms of structure, or arrangement, had an 
additional aspect. As a clinical participant explained:
‘Clinicians hold the concept of clinical freedom dear. Therefore, structuring the 
record may be considered an assault on that freedom .... being a professional in 
medicine you are not answerable to your boss but to the professional body. The 
more you structure the data and put it into the market place the more you come 
under the control of the hospital boss.’
This was not, therefore, simply an issue of language being used to protect professional 
independence by achieving social closure. Content and structure of this key document 
were being used in the same way. The notion of clinical resistance to managerial 
involvement mentioned earlier therefore found support here and gave some insight to 
the notion that both cultural and structural issues were influential in informational 
terms.
The issue of language was further elaborated upon by a researcher working on 
development of HRGs, when describing a database of clinical data he was discussing 
with a clinical group. On the basis of what Consultant psychiatrists wrote in casenotes, 
80% of patient episodes were being coded by the treating clinician in the ICD 
classification to categories intended for patients with mental conditions unspecified as 
to their nature or aetiology. As the HRG researcher observed:
‘The doctors, it turned out, had meant ‘senile dementia’ (a much more specific 
condition) but they did not write that.’
Common understanding was assumed to prevail amongst clinicians within the context 
of the patient, the casenote and the clinical community. Users and uses of the 
information were clearly being assumed to reside within that community also.
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This kind of use of a tribal language happened and worked successfully and 
demonstrated, as described by Mervin Pollner (1987) that when we are discussing and 
describing features of our world with others: what we saw, what we did, what 
happened, we make a fundamental assumption; that we all have at least potential 
access to the same underlying reality. This is, of course, one of the basic assumptions 
of empiricism, that any neutral, competent observer, placed in the same position, would 
see the same thing. It is not the intention to argue either for or against that 
philosophical commitment here, although this arguably simplistic assumption might be 
a reasonable consideration when trying to explain the approach of the DH to clinical 
data. However, it was equally possible that the fundamental philosophical 
characteristics of the clinical domain do not, in practice, take the assumption that far. 
Rather, they may simply assume the same, or a sufficiently similar, underlying reality 
amongst the group into which clinicians have been strongly socialised, and make no 
assumptions thereafter. This notion found further support when consideration was 
given to the fact that a number of clinical participants did not know that the casenotes 
were used for derivation of classified data. As one clinician put it:
Tn between consultations the casenotes go somewhere. I’m not really interested 
where so long as they are back when I need them for consultation. I don’t know 
what, if anything, happens to them in the meantime.’
When advised that national healthcare statistics came directly from them he was 
astonished and replied:
‘But how? That information isn’t even in them is it?’
Thus no assumption of use outside the clinical context was often considered, and those 
within that context had been suitably equipped to operate the casenote system. To refer 
once again to Schatzki (1983) people gain understanding by being trained into a form 
of life. This helped to explain why The BMA Handbook (British Medical Association, 
1998) referred to above did not define the ‘features’ of the case which must be
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recorded in the medical casenote. The evidence suggested there was an assumption that 
they flowed naturally and differently from the process of care in each unique case, and 
that they must be allowed to emerge in this way if the individualistic demands of care 
situations, and clinical professionals were not to be impeded. Again, this was also 
reflective of an assumption that the only users of the casenotes were clinicians.
Thus, to the uncertainties discussed earlier, which included the nature of the universe of 
discourse, and the diversity of knowledge acquisition and application, could now be 
added highly personalised medical documents focused solely on what each clinician 
felt, at any given point in time, was the necessary contribution to the care of their 
patients. These might be firm conclusions, but were apparently more often tentative 
working hypotheses. The clinician entered only that data he perceived as relevant, 
relevance being a product of his conceptual framework, which was focused at keeping 
patients alive and well. He entered it in tribal terms, not always accurately decipherable 
or translatable outside the clinical sphere. Also, as mentioned earlier and also described 
by another clinical participant, the clinician may:
undertake actions to exclude possibilities, so tests, etc. that are recorded 
usually indicate absence of something not presence of something.’
As another clinical participant remarked:
‘The fact that I have ordered a barium meal can mean I am trying to exclude the 
possibility of bowel disease, and I might write in the case note ‘?bowel disease, 
?kidney stones, pyelogramY
Casenotes emerged, therefore, as a minefield for any non-clinical user. This statement 
was important when consideration was given to the actions of coders, which are 
described in chapter 8.
All of these findings contributed to further development of the initial category 
of ‘The Clinician as Scientist, The Clinician as Artist’ to include ‘The Clinician as
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Professional’. This addition reflected observance of the highly specialised, sometimes 
defensive use of tribal language. It also reflected awareness that actions in these 
respects were very much characterised and enabled by membership of a powerful 
profession. This set communications standards, endowed members with ‘scientific 
status’ and, within the broad definition of the practice of medicine, encouraged and 
necessitated behavioural independence and discretion. It also, as mentioned above, 
could be argued to endorse and sustain a trade-off of rigour, in terms of practice on a 
global scale, for the sake of the kind of individualistic arrangement which helps sustain 
the position of the profession socially. The more flexibility a system incorporates, the 
less control is possible, particularly by outsiders. However, it is also arguable that what 
could be perceived as a lack of rigour could also be perceived as entirely consistent 
with the nature of understanding of the associated universe of discourse. That 
perception stimulates notions of a rigour and orderliness which were ultimately shown 
to be partly a result of the image the clinical profession conveys to the outside world, 
but which are also imposed by Government behaviour and which, being imposed, must 
be considered artificial. This is not to say that all social constructions of reality are not, 
to some degree ‘artificial’. They must be in that they are constructs. The degree of 
artificiality was what was of importance here, particularly as the DH clinical ‘models’ 
at issue were shown to be based on indirect investigation of that reality. In other words 
they were constructs fabricated out of the data selections made by another, distinct and 
very different social group, arranged according to a blueprint upheld by the DH. An 
analogy might arguably be a house which is built in India, knocked down and 
reassembled without knowledge of the original plans in Iceland. It is only marginally 
possible that the model which would result would be a house at all, and if it did it 
would most probably resemble an igloo.
To return to the phenomena of the linguistic aspects of these socially-defined norms, 
this also had relevance to discussions about the transfer, or what came to be seen as 
lack of transfer of clinical information through various organisational settings and 
groups. In the above example the Consultant was querying whether the patient had
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kidney stones, which in the event she had. However, a doctor would know these are 
not necessarily the cause of the pain. As one clinician remarked:
‘Many people have kidney stones with no pain at all.’
As discussed further below, when presented with this casenote, a number of clinical 
coders immediately decided that, using ICD-10, they would record kidney stones on the 
patient’s computerised clinical record as the main reason for treatment. Not being 
clinically trained, this was the only thing they could decipher from the above. As 
mentioned earlier, and drawing again on the work of Bruner et al (1947) and Postman et 
al (1948) in the field of Cognitive Psychology, words of a high value to a perceiver are 
rarely rejected in the face of meager information. People see what they wish to see, 
perception is guided by inner cognitive sets that reflect past learning experiences, and 
by values, motives, basic personality needs and self-confidence to act effectively in a 
given situation. A coder’s cognitive sets are framed by knowledge, not of clinical 
work, but of the contents of the classifications and by what might be described as more 
‘common-sense’ knowledge which fastens on the familiar. It was likely, therefore, if 
cognitive psychology is correct, that coders would fasten on terms in the casenote 
which were familiar from the classifications. How consistent this was with the clinical 
‘reality’ of the patient consultation it records is discussed further in the next chapter. 
For the moment it is important to recognise that, where this happened, transmission of 
data occurred, something was sent and something was received. True ‘transfer’ did not 
occur, because change of meaning intervened.
In exploring this issue further it is necessary to describe the context, in terms of other 
people and systems, within which this as yet ‘clinical’ knowledge began what is often 
described as its ‘transfer’ around the organisation, although, as discussed above, and as 
later research showed, ‘transformation’, not transfer would be a more appropriate 
notion.
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Chapter 8, Fieldwork Continued: Beyond the Clinical Domain
This chapter contains the remainder of the fieldwork report and focuses on the non- 
clinical domain. Once again, it describes and discusses the data collected by interviews 
and observation. It also addresses its relationship to initial theories and the grounded 
theories which emerged as a result of this process. It is structured around key analytical 
categories which emerged as an inductive product of data analysis.
The chapter begins by discussing the process of coding clinical entities from medical 
casenotes to classifications. This is the point at which clinical data is extracted from 
the clinical domain. The discussion includes consideration of both people and systems. 
The chapter also explores the relationship of managers, Ministers and statisticians to 
these data and processes.
8.1 Coding Clinical Information
Coders are part of the non-clinical staff of hospitals. Their job is to abstract 
information from medical casenotes which describes patients’ complaints, problems, 
diagnoses, treatments or other reasons for seeking medical attention. Like managers, 
their loyalties and behaviour are broadly towards organisational objectives and norms. 
They are taught and, as will be demonstrated below, their behaviour indicated they 
believed, that the information they required was, or should be in the casenote. When 
focusing on this in interviews numerous responses consistent with the following 
emerged:
8 If only doctors would write down everything they were supposed to and write it 
legibly and if only we were properly staffed and had more medical training .... we 
could really make a difference and improve things ’
This kind of statement reflected an underlying belief that all of the clinical information 
required by the Government and the classifications emerged, in some form, within the 
process of clinical consultation and treatment, and could be recorded in the medical 
casenote. If this was not so, coders had no way of executing their organisational role 
and Government had no way of demonstrating public accountability. Whole careers 
rested, therefore, on perpetuating this approach.
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Armed with this belief, coders went about trying to abstract, code and record the 
required information by applying the above-mentioned classifications, ICD-10 and 
OPCS-4, to the best of their non-clinical ability. Their aim was to produce consistent 
and comparable sets of clinical data. In this sense coders, like the classifications, were 
Government-defined instruments of social enquiry.
The aim of consistent data stumbled at the first hurdle. Clinical classifications are not 
unproblematic instruments for non-clinical users. However, their application is not 
always taught. The official basis of coding training is ‘The NHS Executive Clinical 
Coding Instruction Manual’ (DH, 1994). This instructs that:
‘All codes assigned must represent an accurate translation of the diagnostic 
statements or terminology as used by the clinician.’ (DH, 1994: 1)
Accuracy is stated as resting upon adherence to the principles and rules of ICD-10 and 
OPCS-4, on development of coding skills through training and experience, and on a 
basic understanding of medical terminology. However, coders are not clinically 
trained. Most receive, as one coding manager described:
‘.... the most basic level of training in human anatomy, physiology and medical 
terminology.’
As admitted by one of their training groups, they also have:
‘.... inadequate training in the content, structure and rules of application of the 
classifications.’
This was confirmed by a number of coders interviewed, and summed up by one:
‘I was supposed to go on a training course but we were too short-staffed so a 
colleague showed me what to do.’
Given this situation, it was not considered surprising that, as mentioned above, 
assumptions about the existence of the required information in the casenote were not 
challenged.
In addition, analysis of the dataset that is the output of this process was generally 
performed independently of reference back to clinicians and casenotes, and by
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individuals not involved in its coding. Knowledge of rules for structuring and defining 
the data elements were, therefore, the only ways in which users could understand its 
contents. End-user understanding of the meaning of such data was, therefore, limited.
It could have been helped by knowledge of the ways in which the classifications 
operate, in term of rules and definitions, but this would not address the effects of the 
variability of coding skills, clinical statements, etc.
Further exploration of the coding process continued to reveal insights of interest. These 
included the fact that, while definition of some clinical concepts was patchy, definition 
of the clinical fields on the coded record also remained nebulous at best. This was 
explored with a senior manager at HES:
‘Different coders seem to have different opinions  There is a definition for
‘Primary Diagnosis’ but that is ‘main condition treated’ and that is very 
ambiguous. One coder might code kidney failure as the main reason for being 
treated, another might code the underlying disease, which could be, for instance, 
multiple myeloma which caused kidney failure, as the main reason.’
This finding was supported by unpublished work undertaken by the researcher (Sutton, 
1994) within the NHS Executive, which showed that at least six different definitions 
were in operation in 1994. Thus, when a patient was admitted with a heart attack, one 
coder would code the heart attack into the first position on the record. Another would 
code congestive heart disease, another would code collapse, because that was all that 
was known when the patient was admitted. The same situation applied to surgical 
procedures. As a HES manager advised:
‘Some say the most resource intensive (should be coded first) some the first 
(procedure) chronologically, and there are probably others.’
The importance of this rests in the fact that the conditions or treatment coded in the first 
field of each computerised record are those which make up the bulk of Government 
healthcare statistics regarding the activity of NHS hospitals in these areas. The 
technical biases or limitations of the systems, and personal limitations and biases of 
individuals, are largely at issue here, but again, socially-based perceptions of systems’ 
yields masked the implications.
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With the background described above, and the researcher’s considerable professional 
experience of hundreds of coders, dozens of coding departments, and the main coding 
models and methods, three hospital coding departments were visited to specifically 
focus on the coders’ worldviews, and on their views of the casenote contents and their 
relationship to them. Also sought were insights into the effects of these factors on the 
clinical data.
There could be no greater extreme of difference in the NHS than that between the 
world of the clinician and that of the coder. Coders complained bitterly, and the 
researcher’s experience supported this, that they were understaffed, underpaid, 
undertrained, underequipped and undervalued. In terms of their place in the 
organisational picture, their salary scale and organisational classification indicated that 
they were classed as low-skilled administrative staff. They ranked among the lowest 
paid of all healthcare personnel groups. One of the departments in question had three 
full-time coders, two part-time staff, and some call-out staff, and faced a throughput of 
in excess of 100,000 cases per annum, which was not atypical. In addition, as 
mentioned earlier, coders were not clinically trained. Not surprisingly huge backlogs 
of work piled up. Where fundholding applied, the hospital was only paid for work 
done when it raised an invoice based on the clinical coding of a case. One coder voiced 
the comments of many:
‘All of this leads to us taking short-cuts with the work, like coding fewer items 
from each casenote than we feel we should, or coding to a lower level of detail 
than we have been trained to, given the level of detail in some of the casenotes.’
This was confirmed by a coding department manager from another hospital:
‘Our backlog was so great that all gynaecological cases were coded as ‘well baby’. 
That way we got up to date and got HES off our backs.’
These kinds of observation were at the foundation of the major conceptual analytical 
category of ‘The Social Rationalist’.
In order to gain first-hand insight into the practical implications of this, coders at a 
number of sites were observed coding clinical casenotes. A typical example of one of 
these exercises is described below.
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8.1.1 The Coding Process
Most coding was done using the medical casenote as the source document. Some was 
done using a proforma created from the clinical encounter by either the clinician or a 
medical secretary. Medical casenotes were collected daily from the hospital wards. 
Without a nationally used format for the contents or structure of these documents, what 
the coder received varied enormously in terms of order of contents, level and type of 
clinical detail recorded by the clinician, and details of content. Some contained the 
results of investigations, some did not. Some contained the case history, compiled by 
the clinician during the consultation and described above, some did not. Legibility also 
varied greatly. All casenotes were hand written by the clinician and those seen by the 
researcher varied from the legible, to the legible but incomprehensible, to the illegible. 
Regardless of these factors the coder’s job was to assign clinical codes from either 
ICD-10 or OPCS-4, or both, for each casenote presented. Whether or not they were all 
presented seemed to be a matter of trust as no actual systems were in place to cross­
check numbers of patients registered as admitted with the numbers of cases coded. 
This was only checked retrospectively on the production of statutory returns. Any 
discrepancies were dealt with by changing the numbers on the cross-referenced returns, 
at either hospital or DH level, rather than searching for and coding missing cases.
Coding of a large number of casenotes was observed. The following is a typical 
example.
8.1.1.a Patient A:
This patient had been seen in a colposcopy clinic and the notes had come to the coder 
directly from the clinic.
The coder accessed her PAS system, entered the patient identification number, as 
written on the casenote, and checked that the name and address on the screen matched 
those in the casenote in front of her. Apart from demographic details and 
administrative hospital details, for instance ‘Consultant’, ‘specialty’ and ‘hospital 
ward’, the screen also held fields for primary diagnosis, subsidiary diagnosis and
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secondary diagnoses, numbered 1 to 5. It also provided a field for date of primary 
diagnosis. This last field was not universally present across the NHS and this was one 
reason why statutory NHS data could not be used by epidemiologists and researchers to 
study prevalence of disease, even though official Government documentation indicated 
otherwise.
The coder perused the doctor’s hand written casenote sheet to find out why the patient 
had come in this time, and to pick up anything else she considered relevant to their 
treatment or management. She stated:
T can’t read the Consultant’s handwriting so I’ll have to see what else might tell 
me. The GP referral letter indicates an abnormal smear. The Consultant will have 
done investigative tests to work out the cause of the abnormality, but the histology 
report has not yet been inserted into the case note. I’ve got no choice now but to 
code it as ‘abnormal smear’, even though I know more specific information has 
been gained by the hospital at some point during the patient’s visit.’
She looked up the diagnosis in the index to the ICD-10 classification and came up with 
code R87.6, which assigns the case to the statistical category ‘abnormal cytological 
findings or abnormal papanicolaou smear’, (WHO, 1994:13) which she keyed into the 
system. She was asked whether she would change this at some future date:
‘When the histology report is received, and if I happen to have the casenote still, 
and if the histology report showed a malignancy I would go back and change the 
diagnosis I’ve recorded to the precise condition suffered by the patient, not least 
because the hospital must register all malignancies with the Central Cancer 
Registry.’
In addition, she deciphered from the Consultant’s handwriting, after some effort, that 
the patient had an intra-uterine contraceptive device in place, which she also coded.
A second screen was then accessed, which allowed one primary and five secondary 
procedures to be coded. Looking at the casenote, the coder stated:
‘I can’t actually read this but it must be a biopsy.’
The primary procedure was, therefore, coded using OPCS-4 as Q03.9; ‘unspecified 
biopsy of cervix uteri’ (HMSO, 1990:154). The coder also coded P27.3; ‘colposcopy,
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not elsewhere classified’ (HMSO, 1990: 153). She went on:
‘I know this was not written in the notes as having been performed, but I know one 
is always done.’
Asked how she knew she replied:
‘Everyone knows, we (coders) all agreed this.’
Once the coder had completed the data entry for that patient she registered this by 
filling in the completed box on the screen. The system was then immediately updated 
for all users.
A number of issues were evident in the above scene. Firstly, the characteristics of the 
source document, in terms of purpose, content and legibility were clearly problematic. 
Secondly, and this has already been discussed at length, there was an assumption that 
the kind of data that was needed, in terms of both its objectivity and its coverage, 
existed, or should exist, in the medical casenote. Thirdly, a whole range of 
organisational factors were at work which rendered the pure process of data extraction 
and collation inadequate and transformational in terms of the meaning of the data that 
was extracted, not the least of which was lack of training. As noted above, the only 
training some coders received was from the person next to them or from their manager. 
This had a significant impact on data which was already perilously loosely connected to 
clinical reality, as one clinician explained:
‘This leads to some ridiculous errors. We have had hysterectomies coded to the 
Eye Unit.’
When this lack of training was combined with lack of access to clinicians, more 
‘ridiculous errors’ occurred, as described in later interviews with one of the developers 
ofHRGs:
‘.... some medical costing work showed loads of rigid bronchoscopies (in the 
coded data). The respiratory clinicians said they had gotten rid of rigid 
bronchoscopes five years earlier, but nobody had told the coders.’
This was explored with coders. The following response was typical:
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‘We would like to work closely with the Consultants, and in some hospitals coders 
do, and it works well. But ours don’t want to know. They have no time for us.’
Although the implication here was that this behaviour was unreasonable, some clinical 
awareness of the inappropriateness of the classifications to clinical work might 
arguably have been the cause.
Thus it emerged that the first line of scrutiny of clinical data in relation to the demands 
of the classifications, the coders, were a group which relied for doing its job on 
knowledge which, even where formal, and even if model inconsistency were not an 
issue, was inadequate. They were not equipped with the kind and level of knowledge 
demanded by a source document like the medical casenote. They were also without the 
wherewithal to challenge the validity of clinical data, or their own activities, for 
classification purposes.
Increasing evidence was also amassing for the notion that this was the point at which 
‘transfer’ of knowledge was broadly lost and that actual construction of situational 
realities began. Whatever the level of training, coders’ views of the clinical world and 
clinical information were shown to be defined by the content, structure and rules of 
their own frames of reference. These included, primarily, the imperatives of 
organisational arrangements and demands, and the classifications, in terms of what they 
looked for and how they recorded it. It was also combined, inevitably, with a similar 
constellation of personal characteristics as were shown to affect clinicians and 
classifications, the difference being that in classifications these characteristics are 
‘frozen’.
A focus was then placed on the extent to which this situation was known amongst 
coding and clinical groups. This revealed that where coders’ work was checked, and 
this was not always the case, it was usually checked by occupational peers. As one 
commented:
‘We do have a system of audit, our supervisor samples our work .... ’
One Ophthalmic Consultant described how he routinely checked classification coding 
to ensure accuracy to his own clinical statements:
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‘There is rarely any change to the meaning of the clinician’s data when classified. 
ICD and OPCS cover the same domain in Ophthalmology as the clinical 
knowledge in the casenote.’
However, as he went on to note:
‘Ophthalmology is conceptually one of the simplest systems in medicine.
Possibly, therefore, his comments regarding domains should be read in this context. 
Earlier comments regarding the difference perceived between the domains of the 
classifications and clinical work came from a generalist physician, whose work spanned 
the spectrum of that which is encountered clinically.
This was evidence also, however, that models and translation could be true to the 
original, in some areas. The overwhelming issue, however, was that this was assumed, 
on the basis of no identifiable evidence, to be the case across clinical work. In 
exploring this with clinicians the following response was significant:
‘Most of the contents of ICD-10 are a list of diseases that cause death; diseases 
that in medical practice on the living are very difficult to pathognomically 
diagnose.’
Another clinical participant to this research, as discussed earlier, elaborated further 
when discussing coding diseases in ICD-10:
‘There are a few you can, for instance a blood sugar above a certain level is 
pathognomic of diabetes mellitus, but this happens very rarely. In General 
Practice I would say less than 5% of the time.’
This echoed a statement from as long ago as 1825 by John Finlaison, who testified 
before a Select Committee that, while mortality was subject to a known law of nature, 
sickness was not. Such a situation was as unacceptable to the Government of 1825 as it 
is to the Government of today, where management by credible and impartial means is 
considered to be an integral part of Ministerial work. This went some way towards 
explaining the application o f ‘governing laws’ or scientific principles to a somewhat 
interpretive area.
Interviews then sought to take this situation forward to the arena of clinical coding.
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One clinical participant observed:
‘Consultants see approximately 2-3% of a GP’s patients, and we are getting more 
into the labelling stage there, but the key even for the hospital doctor is still what 
the patient is complaining of and what he finds .... the label is the least important 
thing to him, so tends to be the least well recorded .... he is treating a whole 
constellation of symptoms, looking at tests as well. What he finds, the label, might 
just happen to coincide with something in ICD-10, but it might just as often not.’
Another went on to advise:
‘The coder wants a reason the patient was treated, but their mental picture of this 
reason is something from ICD-10. Sometimes this coincides with the reality of 
what the clinician saw and wrote, like in some straightforward cases like diabetes 
and epilepsy, but that is serendipitous when it happens .... As often as not the 
Consultant is treating symptoms, so he might write ‘right loin pain, ?kidney 
stones’, and may even find stones, but the only real ‘diagnosis’ at this stage is 
‘renal colic’, because the doctor does not know if the stones are causing the pain. 
Lots of people have them with no pain.’
As discussed earlier, this view was checked by presenting this case to a number of 
coders. They advised they would code ‘kidney stones’ as the main diagnosis, because, 
as one of them asserted ‘that was the problem’.
One reason for this pursuit of the definitive was found in discussions with the HES 
office. They advised that, in Government returns from hospitals on live patients coded 
under this system, high percentages of patients with signs and symptoms recorded as 
the main reason for treatment were deemed by HES and by coders to be an indicator of 
poor quality data. The belief was that vagueness was the exception, not the rule, in 
clinical work. When coders were questioned about this issue they responded that:
‘Sometimes a sign or a symptom is all that is in the casenote, and when you can 
get to talk to a Consultant about it, they provide no more information.’
This was quite at odds with the assertion of a clinical participant that:
‘Doctors treat symptoms until, or unless, or as well as the condition - if it ever 
becomes known, which it regularly, in some specialties, like Gastroenterology, 
does not.’
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This type of finding again demonstrated the difference between the perceptions of 
clinical reality which existed in the problem domain.
Comments and discussion ultimately showed that this assumption revealed more about 
the non-clinical perception of clinical work than it did about clinical work itself. 
Briefly, these confirmed findings from the literature review that clinicians sometimes 
never definitively ascertain the clinical problem. This assertion also found support in 
comments, discussed at greater length below, by the developers of HRGs. These 
showed that attempts to classify medical work met with much less success than those 
aimed at surgical work, work handled by medics being generally much more 
characterised by uncertainty than that handled by surgeons. By implication, application 
of a defined treatment, like surgery, apart from when it is exploratory, indicates 
understanding of patients’ clinical conditions to the extent that predictive action can be 
taken. Again, this gave support to one of the very earliest assertions of this thesis, 
which was that the complexity of reality is such that a variety of investigative and 
explanatory tools are required. It also gave support to the assertion that the clinical 
world spans that spectrum. What was becoming evident was the transformational, if 
pragmatic, application of the same data handling techniques to the totality of that 
spectrum, rather than to those parts of it which had appropriate characteristics.
In reflection of its changed focus, WHO (1993) now define the purpose of ICD-10 as 
to:
‘.... permit the systematic recording, analysis, interpretation and comparison of 
morbidity and mortality data collected in different countries or areas and at 
different times.’ (WHO, 1993: 2)
It remains, however, primarily a list of causes of death and, as noted by one of the 
clinical participants:
‘Causes of death are not common causes of illness in life. ICD is only 
comprehensive in terms of causes of death.’
Thus, earlier observations about the effects of the frame of reference of coders, and the 
notion that transfer of information was not happening, were reconfirmed. Reflecting on 
the analytic category of ‘Social Rationalists’ it was considered that ‘social construction’
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of reality rather than any notion of transfer remained appropriate. The versions of 
reality observed: clinical and classificational, while being influenced to one degree or 
another by the unique psychobiology of each of the participants, both as individuals and 
as groups, could be seen to be most highly characterised by occupational social 
influences. Thus, the coder was observed to ‘construct’ a reality from the casenote that 
was consistent with broad, non-clinical expectations, in terms of the classification, and 
reflected the social phenomena which produced it much more than it ever reflected the 
clinical reality. The clinician was seen to construct a version of reality which lay 
within the predefined parameters of medicine. As will be seen later, the statisticians 
and Ministers were observed to construct, and ensure maintenance of, a reality which 
served the vested interests of Government and was consistent with the imperatives of 
global control within which Government works. Government reality also depended, by 
necessity, on statistics as the afore-mentioned ‘technology of distance’ (Porter, 1995: 
ix) and of those lacking expertise. Meaning created within this setting was, therefore,
seen to be static. It was not transferred, as was the general perception, rather it was 
created anew out of the frames of reference of various groups. In that sense it could be 
seen to create and maintain a ‘situational’ reality, which was based on paradigm- 
located social factors. It was also one which was bolstered by ontological 
protectionism and imperialism, which sought to promote, or even impose a worldview 
and, thereby maintain it. This interpretation of these activities was further supported by 
Giddens’ work on Structuration Theory (1976, 1984). It was also deemed to provide a 
justified, real life example of that theory. Thus meaning was observed to be the 
product of each group and was seen to remain undisturbed, hence the continued ability 
of statisticians to base their information to Ministers on what were perceived to be 
objective, scientific facts, but which were, more often than not, observed to be 
subjective, tentative opinion. This key issue of social construction of reality is dealt 
with in more detail in the next chapter.
8.2 The Coding Process: Further Findings and Reflections from the Fieldwork
The focus of the ICD was, therefore, shown to be different to that of clinical work in 
treating the sick. WHO do make it clear in their instruction volume (WHO, 1993) that 
ICD is not intended or suitable for indexing of distinct clinical entities, or for use in
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billing or resource allocation, the implication being that it deals in broader types of 
aggregation. This does not, however, reflect any awareness of the domain issue. In 
addition, this did not deter the Government. ICD had been used in hospitals for 
collection of morbidity data, based on distinct clinical entities, for over twenty years, 
and continued to be so. Some insight into why the Government had so favoured this 
system may be provided by the comments of a practising clinician:
Tf you want a service based on activity and numbers you use ICD.’
In addition, however, the social basis of some forms of authority warranted exploration. 
As noted by Porter (1995):
‘.... the culture of ‘public’ bodies, life and servants licenses academic specialists 
 to assemble very specific findings.’ (Porter, 1995: 7)
As discussed in an earlier chapter, the nature of these findings could be seen as lending 
a required and influential air of objectivity to pronouncements made on the basis of 
them. Arbitrariness and judgement appear to have been dispensed with. This both 
protects the Governmental user and:
‘.... lends authority to officials who have very little of their own.’ (Porter, 1995: 8)
To return to the nature and root of the conflict with clinical phenomena here, this was 
perhaps nowhere more clearly demonstrated than by the emergence of Read 3. As 
discussed earlier, one of the clinicians involved in the development process advised:
‘I could not record and code the clinical statements I needed to using ICD or 
OPCS. Before the decision on developing Read was finalised a colleague got the 
Heads of the Royal Colleges to try to find in ICD all of the clinical statements they 
routinely used, which had exactly the same meaning as their own statements. I 
don’t know the figures, but the percentage success rate was small enough to
encourage strongly development of Read  The two domains are just different.
If I was to draw it, it would look like this :
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GP work:
Clinical record domain
Hospital work:
ICD focusClinical record domain
Figure 4, Clinical and Classification Domains
 A slightly larger overlap exists between the ICD and hospital work but only
because hospital doctors are forced to put morbidity labels on patients, which they 
dislike doing, and they often don’t do, for the reasons discussed earlier. The ICD 
is used by the Government to enable it to know why patients used hospital 
services. But if the clinician does not know, and this is the case often enough, and 
if each patient has a reason for using services assigned to them, the data produced, 
whether manually or by using a mapping table of some sort, must be suspect.’
As a colleague of his asserted:
‘Even if clinicians always knew they would often assign patients to the ICD 
category simply titled ‘Other reasons for contacting healthcare services.’
As discussed by Clancey (1995) in his work on coded terminologies:
‘This push to formalise medical description into a standard vocabulary is blind to 
the nature of conceptualisation and interpretation .... typical efforts to formalise 
medical records proceed as if ‘doubt’ is not part of a physician’s vocabulary.’ 
(Clancey, 1995: 8)
As discussed above, a tentative nature in much clinical work had been revealed, and it 
now appeared that, not only was the significance attached by clinical and non-clinical 
groups different, the DH according it the status of objective fact, but the fundamental 
domain of interest was different also. Thus, to return to the analogy of the Indian house, 
our Eskimos can be seen to have built a dog sledge. The DH data used the socially
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agreed labels; it described diseases and mental illnesses, but the details it provided 
about these labels could increasingly be deemed to have no more than a passing 
relationship with some of the clinical experiences on which it purported to be based. 
As one clinician put it when looking at some of the statistical data about his practice:
‘These figures are wrong in enough instances to make me doubt the entire set. I 
suppose I passed a few of these patients in the corridor - I can think of no other 
contact I could possibly have had with some of them.’
Thus the labels and the resulting data could more accurately be seen to have a primary 
relationship with the model of clinical work which persisted among the non-clinical 
groups at issue, and with the social context of those groups. This again further 
strengthened hypotheses regarding the dubious rationality of healthcare policies based 
on this data.
Another clinician went on to point out issues, not only with the ways the classification 
models reality, but also about the transfer or portability of specialist knowledge outside 
those specialist groups:
‘The labels in ICD and OPCS are collective descriptions which are designed to 
reflect the entirety of any entity assigned to a category. How can a person who has 
not been clinically trained decide what individual clinical entity belongs where?’
Thus it seemed to be the case that, even if the model were consistent, ability to 
accurately populate it in the current circumstances would be limited, and ability to 
transfer knowledge and information similarly restricted.
In addition, as Giddens (1976, 1984) has argued, all social structures, and this would 
include professions and systems, are the product of reflexive actions. We create them 
and legitimate them by trying to work with them. They are a product of a worldview. 
Their implementation in a professionally and paradigmatically diverse situation 
inevitably reflects a power struggle of some description. A key question was how far 
apart the worldviews in question in this research were. The classifications stem from a 
rationalist, objectivist philosophy, which embraces the scientific paradigm, and reflects 
a belief that the reality in question is an external shared phenomena which can be 
accurately captured and described. But if, as argued by Schatzki (1983) the meanings
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of phenomena and one’s understanding of them are complementary, and socialisation 
results in understanding the role items play in our activities, the cross-profession and 
cross-paradigm portability of specialist knowledge by outsiders must be questioned. 
This research has shown that, within the NHS, there were two models of information 
recording, of information requirements and of decision-making processes. The clinical 
‘narrative’ has been shown above to be context-laden. Elements of that narrative were 
extracted from their original context by outsiders, and structured. This process itself 
created structure, e.g. the fields on the computerised database and the categories of the 
classifications have context assignations, but it has been shown that the context of the 
fields and categories was not the always the same as the original clinical context. Some 
context was lost and some imposed, as assumptions about it were structured and 
employed on the basis of diverse frames of reference.
8.3 HRGs: Findings from the Field Work
The issue of different domains was found to be perpetuated in the HRG system, as it is 
based on ICD-10 and OPCS-4. Exploration of HRGs was also useful, however, in that 
access to its developers provided further evidence for highly subjective, socially, rather 
than scientifically-defined categories and, therefore, for further challenge to healthcare 
policies based on statistical clinical datasets.
Selected data classified using ICD-10 and OPCS-4 was routinely and statutorily further 
transformed by hospitals using HRGs. As discussed, this was the Government’s chosen 
instrument underpinning contracting within the internal market. As described by one 
of the developers:
‘HRGs were originally designed to enable description and measurements of 
treatments provided in hospitals .... so that budgets could be rationally allocated.’
Basically, in a number of specialties hospitals had to demonstrate that the contracts they 
set had been informed by applying this system. As another of the developers went on to 
say:
‘HRGs work by classifying the mix of therapeutic activities into clusters which are 
clinically meaningful and homogeneous with respect to resource use.’
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In that respect they were a typical example of a pragmatic trade-off of detail in order to 
render complexity manageable, and of a ‘rationalist’ approach to defining, 
understanding and negotiating reality.
In exploring this notion of rationality further, as discussed above, the data showed that 
the most fundamental belief underpinning this system was, therefore, that the universe 
of discourse; clinical reality, could be acceptably, if not entirely successfully, captured 
in classifications. However, after that, the basic characteristics of HRGs were totally 
driven by a belief that clinicians, as the key gatekeepers of NHS hospital resources, 
would have to be involved in using the system, and it would, therefore, have to be 
written and structured in such a way that it would appeal to them. But, if it was to do 
the job, it had to also produce categories that were resource homogeneous. The issues 
this created were described by one of the statisticians working on the development of 
Version 3 of the system:
‘Firstly, as there is no usable direct data about resource use, length of hospital stay 
is used as a proxy. The aim, therefore, was to group together all treatments or 
conditions with sufficiently similar lengths of stay to inform users that any patient 
with a given condition or treatment should be likely to stay in hospital for a given 
number of days.’
Rationality and control of environments through prediction were, therefore, at the heart 
of the system. The statistician advised:
‘I wrote a programme yielding about fifty descriptive statistics for each group .... I 
then used a statistical ‘reduction in variance’ technique to improve (the 
homogeneity of) the group further .... Each group was split and resplit, formed 
and reformed on this basis until the sharpest predictive tool possible was 
produced.’
However, as mentioned above, it was found that this technique was not universally 
effective:
‘It works well in some specialties and not as well in medical specialties, 
particularly in respiratory medicine.’
Asked to comment on why this should be, he replied:
‘Most of the variability .... comes down to differences in clinical practice.’
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When questioned further about this he replied:
‘There simply can be no excuse for the vast variations in resource use we see when 
we look across the country through the datasets. Why should treatment of certain 
conditions take three times as long in one hospital as in another? We feel that by 
publishing this kind of data we can standardise practice much more than at 
present/
The implicit assumption, therefore, was not of an unavoidable level of variance, given 
differing levels of expertise, insight, patient input and data collection systems etc., but 
of an unnecessary and unwarranted laxness in clinical practice. This was not supported 
by a clinical participant, who advised:
‘.... There is a much clearer understanding of surgical interventions and the 
resources associated with them. It is less easy to categorise in medicine. There is 
no process for this in medicine in terms of activity; people tend to think in terms of 
conditions .... response to treatment is less clear in medicine.’
In either event, it seemed the world simply refused to fit the system, although this did 
not stop attempts to make it do so and, consequently, to infer and imply that it did. 
However, when questioned further on this issue an HRG developer admitted that:
‘Nobody has ever forecast resource use and cost using HRGs and then checked 
how well they did after the allotted period.’
It seemed the system gave the appearance of control but little more.
This description of the system could, arguably, characterise it as lacking validity, but 
this should be considered in the context that the central development figure was a 
trained clinician. Thus, an alternative view might be that, providing its severe 
limitations are known, it is a pragmatic attempt to gain some insight into the quicksilver 
phenomena that can be clinical work, from the perspective of resource use. The danger 
and the difficulty seemed to be, if a return is made to earlier discussions about 
perceptions of computerised data and of statistics, that remote users lost sight of, or 
were usually unaware of these limitations and were primarily affected by the socially- 
defined characteristics of truth, certainty and objectivity which, as discussed in an 
earlier chapter, attaches to computer data and to clinical work.
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Returning now to a statistician developer of the system, what he referred to as the 
‘subjective elements’ of clinical work, were, in his opinion, added to by clinicians’ 
subjective knowledge of their work as it related to resource use. Version 1 of the HRG 
system had relied more on what clinicians said about treatments and conditions with 
similar lengths of stay and less on statistical analysis of the data. This was found to 
result in a situation where, when analysis was performed, group distributions were 
found to be unacceptably erratic. In other words, as one developer put it:
‘Conditions which should have attracted similar lengths of stay were found not to.’
The belief, however, was in the system, or at a deeper level, the belief was in the 
appropriateness of the rationalist model, which characterised the system. It was 
assumed the clinicians were wrong in their subjective assumptions about treatments and 
associated resource use. Even so, the developers stuck with a socially-defined need to 
appease the clinicians first. As one participant put it:
‘We have to start with a clinical structure and then adjust it with statistics, or else 
clinicians will not engage with the system, they will not use it and, if they do not, 
we will not be able to refine it.’
This led to other structural issues as later versions of the system developed:
‘This is nowhere more evident than in the number of (case mix) groups which 
make up the system, which is 530. The same statistical performance could be
achieved with 10 groups, as there are only that number of distributions that cover
the whole of clinical work within H RG s this would be adequate for finance
managers, providing ten simple cost bands .... However there would be no clinical
meaning to th is  There are a percentage of groups that exist simply because
people want them.’
As another of the developers put it:
‘The system often reflects the vested interests of the clinicians and not the needs of 
the system for internal consistency.’
The developers saw this, predictably, as undesirable, although the alternative 10 groups 
might arguably be seen as pursuit primarily of statistical elegance rather than an 
accurate model of clinical work. The ten tidy distributions could be simply an artifact 
of such questionable data.
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The above types of issues were found to apply also to ICD-10 and OPCS-4. For 
instance, the Orthopaedic chapter of OPCS-4 is noticeably more detailed than any 
other. As one of its designers confirmed:
‘This was because the Orthopods shouted loudest during the revision process.’
ICD-10 contains a mechanism for coding and identifying not only manifestations but 
also aetiology for some diseases. Coders were observed spending a great deal of time 
and effort trying to ensure they applied this mechanism in accordance with the rules of 
the classification, in the belief that, as one coder put it:
‘This gives us better quality data.’
This was even though this information was not always in the casenote. They were 
generally ignorant of the fact that this characteristic emerged, not because it was 
statistically useful, but as a ‘sop’ to the clinicians consulted during the system’s 
development, who thought it necessary for their own purposes. Hence the continued 
relevance of the category ‘The Social Rationalists’ and a deepening insight into nature 
of the relationship between the data produced by these systems, the realities this helped 
to create and validate, and the clinical reality which underpinned it all.
Thus, earlier comments by Porter (1995) to the effect that such categories are socially- 
determined were bome out and, together with this data, enabled the apparent 
‘rationality’ of such a system to be questioned. With that was also questioned the 
ability of such systems to ensure the ‘faithfulness’ of any representations of reality they 
produced. The classification’s structure and content reflected a particular philosophical 
commitment and largely social issues of power and negotiation. As one of the 
developers put it:
‘They (HRGs) are based on coded information, which is difficult to validate .... on 
clinical judgements, and expertise, which is difficult to gainsay ...The level of 
specificity precludes doing all we want to; diagnoses do not classify activities, 
they classify problems, so for the medical (as opposed to surgical ) specialties 
HRGs are not classifying what they do .... They involve aggregations of data (so) 
they inevitably involve a trade-off of specificity against construction of general 
classes.’
21 0
All of these problems were, however, rationalised by an empirically unsupported belief 
in the need for, and success of the system:
‘It is deemed (however) that users achieve their objectives more than if they did 
not have these (HRGs).’
It seems logical that, if more is known about something, in this case about the resources 
used in clinical work, it can be better planned and controlled. However, this logic 
presupposes users were actually learning more about these factors. This was not 
proven and it seemed likely, given the data presented and discussions thus far, that the 
presupposition could only ever hold true in certain areas of clinical work. Typically 
these seemed to be surgical areas, or areas where behaviour might predictably be based 
upon understanding of problems, rather than in areas more characterised by conjecture, 
like medicine. Overall, knowledge improved, but that improvement was not consistent 
in all areas.
Another developer was asked about his views on the contents of HRGs in terms of data 
inputs, in the context that the statistical literature indicated a requirement for statistics 
to be based on objective, factual information. He responded:
‘I am not a clinician and I am therefore removed from direct knowledge about this 
.... I believe they (clinical observations) are a mixture of objective measurements 
-  tests, etc., subjective medical opinion about what happens, and a lump of culture 
.... I also believe that in order to have good statistical data you need is data which 
is objective or is perceived as objective.’
Questioned further about this last point, he continued:
‘One of the main things we are trying to do at this stage is get people to think 
about and examine what they do. Presenting data does that.’
In other words, totally faithful reflection of reality was not at issue; the system was 
recognised as providing some insights of some types, and as being reliant on other 
insights. Biases were, therefore, confirmed as being inherent, but could also be 
perceived as neither good nor bad, right nor wrong, rather simply as inevitable. The 
need was for informed awareness of these biases. Once again, however, the problem 
was that remote users, who were not involved in the system’s development, were
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subject to socially-defined misconceptions about such systems and the data they 
provided.
8.4 The Managers
As a key stakeholder group, hospital managers were interviewed in order to find out 
what this data meant to them, in other words, what their perspectives and assumptions 
about it were. As one manager put it:
‘Activity by contract and how that generates income is the key information 
running hospitals.’
This sounded logical and promising in terms of the use and validity of clinical data, 
particularly as he went on to advise that three items were necessary to assign a patient 
to a contract and, therefore, generate an invoice for payment for hospital services to the 
purchaser of care. The three items were specified by him as being:
‘. . . a  post code, whether or not it is a GP fundholder, and the clinical coding, as 
prepared from the contents of the medical record.’
In his view:
\ . . .  the first two are straightforward (but) regarding the clinical coding, we are 
only interested in whether there is a clinical code and the order of multiple codes, 
because that determines payment amounts ....’
Again the notion of transfer of information from the clinical record to the statistical 
data set became increasingly questionable. Another manager explained further:
‘So for instance, where a patient has had an abscess removed and has also had a 
bone marrow transplant it is important that the transplant is coded in the first 
position on the computer. Only what is coded in the first position is paid for, and 
it is massively more expensive to do a bone marrow transplant than to remove an 
abscess.’
When questioned about the accuracy and general validity of the clinical data, he 
replied:
212
‘We have no way of checking whether the coding is correct, apart from by audit, 
which we are not equipped or structured to do .... we look for missing codes .... 
So long as the procedure fits with the specialty we look no further really.’
Further evidence that this might be the case was found in the quote discussed above, 
from the manager who, in order to clear a coding backlog, coded all Orthopaedic cases 
as backache. To return, however, to this example of the bone marrow transplant, this 
issue was important. As discussed earlier, at the level of the DH, analysis of this data 
for the purposes of national data sets accesses only the first field on each clinical string. 
Only the first diagnosis and the first procedures coded were, therefore, used in routine 
production of Government statistical datasets. There was an important and, arguably, 
pragmatic schism here. The Government need was for data to be recorded in such a 
way that it can know the main treatment and condition of each patient accessing NHS 
hospitals. The hospital need was to ensure data was recorded in such a way that the 
most expensive operations, and ultimately conditions, were paid for. Research 
indicated that the two needs did not always coincide with each other or with clinical 
reality, although the extent to which this was the case could not be assessed, given the 
size and diversity of NHS hospitals and their patient populations, and the lack of 
adequate and relevant research.
In terms of how this affected the business, another managerial participant explained:
‘.... sometimes the price is challenged - the classification code determines the 
price .... (but) so long as the money coming back is roughly right who cares about 
the code ?’
In seeking to understand this the views of a further managerial respondent were useful:
‘Budgets are set on a wide range of procedures or diagnoses and there is an 
expectation that this is roughly what will happen over the course of a contracting 
year. So long as the total number is large enough and on target, the Trust will 
generate enough income in a year.’
In other words, the contracting process was sufficiently crude to ‘work’ in spite of the 
data. Initial hypotheses that business management and planning, was not, therefore, a 
reliable process found support:
‘Planning for NHS managers is seat of the pants, not evidence-based.’
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was how one DH participant put it. When questioned about any possible uses of 
‘clinical data’, the manager responded that it was:
quite removed from the running of the hospital ....We do use it, for instance, 
if we were analysing the day-case rate because we were expecting an increase and 
there was none, we would go back to the clinical data .... There is little other use 
of clinical data.’
There had been, therefore, a conceptual separation in the mind of this manager between 
‘finance data’ and ‘clinical data’, even though one drove the other. Clinical conditions 
and treatments are the direct cause of patient expenditure. In exploring this it became 
clear that this was, to an extent, a residue of pre-internal market mindsets. As one 
participant explained:
‘Before the advent of the internal market budgets were allocated annually purely 
on the basis of what you got last year plus a margin for inflation.’
Thus hospital management and clinical datasets had traditionally been unrelated, the 
one having no impact on the other. The prevailing business environment and working 
practices had done nothing to change that. As the manager went on to explain:
‘.... it does not matter what they had wrong with them, something has to be done 
with them, so the ICD code is irrelevant.’
Although the internal market should have changed that, outmoded behavioural 
characteristics persisted, reflective of ‘historical imprinting’ (Stinchcombe, 1965). The 
fact that a gynaecologist who asked how many hysterectomies had been done in a given 
period was told ‘6’ on the basis of the data, when it was common knowledge that there 
had been at least several hundreds, was seen by the manager to be of no consequence in 
terms of running his business. Many similar examples were found. An Orthopaedic 
surgeon routinely performed hundreds of hip replacements, but the coded data revealed 
under one hundred in a year. A Urologist was surprised to find coded data about his 
practice showed him as treating a clinical condition known as ‘stricture’. He had no 
idea what this referred to. As far as the manager was concerned, however, to be 
successful he needed only to ensure that income approximately met expectations and 
expenditure. This could arguably be accomplished if most or all of the coding was
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wrong, so long as the prices attached to the codes used added up to the right amount. 
Thus, as one manager observed:
‘Theoretically, if you had a price for bone marrow transplants of £10,000, and one 
for kidney transplants of £10,000, it would not matter if you coded all your bone 
marrows as kidneys; the income to the Trust would be correct.’
Thus the need for a link between the meaning of the data and its purposes, which is 
vital to preserving meaning, was missing.
This view of the world was further confirmed by one of the clinicians interviewed, who 
had been a Medical Director at Trust Board level for 3 years:
‘In that time the only clinical information that was ever used was when we 
reviewed casenotes in order to deal with complaints.’
Asked about the management process, he explained how this situation could persist. In 
his view:
‘NHS managers at Trusts do not manage.’
Another clinical participant further supported this view:
‘At Trusts decisions are made on the basis of no information, on the basis of length 
of hospital stay and numbers (of patients) only (and at DH level) to plan hospitals 
but not to run the service, not to run the business .... but then you must define what 
you mean by running the business.’
The evidence above demonstrated the management mindset in this regard. This 
evidence indicated that the clinician’s view of running a business was markedly 
different. However, as running the business was outside the clinical sphere of 
professional interest, each group allowed the other to continue.
Comments like those above about running the business, taken in conjunction with the 
some of the findings leading to development of early analytic categories: 
Communications and Knowledge; Knowledge Gained and Purpose/Need; The Nature 
of Two Businesses; Accounting by Objective Means; and Pragmatic Management, led 
to development of a second major analytical category: ‘The Rational Pragmatists’.
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This category reflected observance, drawing on the data, that ‘rationalism’ is no less 
socially-defined than any other approach to reality. It also reflected observance of the 
significant behavioural differences between professional and non-professional 
participants. The former showed a loyalty to and, primarily, behavioural characteristics 
of their governing body, rather than their host organisation. The latter’s loyalties, 
vested interests and behaviour were much more reflective of their host organisation’s 
underlying culture and objectives. It reflected also observance of quite different views 
of reality amongst these groups, or rather of differing selections from available realities, 
both in terms of those elements deemed significant and in approaches used to negotiate 
them. The clinical professionals were seen to recognise clinical conditions, but at first 
hand, by direct, interactive application of expert knowledge, and often to attach 
tentative significance to those observed phenomena. The behaviour of the non­
professionals was seen to reflect agreed organisational norms and assumptions, and was 
characterised, as discussed above, by indirect involvement with the real world of 
clinical phenomena, where ‘knowledge’ of it was much more based on an assumed, or 
inferred, model of reality.
What this evidence also further emphasised the need for was a review of the conceptual 
model of information flowing and being transferred round hospitals, and from hospitals 
to the DH. The term ‘transfer’ does not carry any notion of change. It implies 
movement without alteration, although it was considered by the DH that some change, 
albeit considered to be relatively minimal where Read was involved, was inevitable. 
As one DH manager observed:
‘There is a limit in clinical coding to the amount of change you can avoid.’
However, his concept of change agents involved only the number of handling points the 
data routinely went through:
‘The ideal is the clinician selects a computerised term and that flows through other
systems, thereby cutting down on later transformation points.’
He expressed no insight into unavoidable change occurring when clinical observations 
discussed were classified. However, the evidence discussed thus far shows that
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transfer was clearly not what was happening, certainly as far as the clinical domain and 
the hospital manager were concerned.
What was also important in this observation was the firm assumption that, in terms of 
real world phenomena, the focus of attention for both clinicians, in caring for patients, 
and the DH in running the business of caring for patients, was the same. There was no 
evidence of a notion at the DH that the elements of clinical reality a clinician would 
choose to describe in computerised terms might not be the same domain as that 
believed to exist by the DH. Indeed, as discussed by one participant, and mentioned 
above, it was assumed that what the DH needed for statistical datasets was contained in 
the medical casenote. Observations made during the research phase cast doubt on those 
assumptions and indicated that, even if there were not myriad issues concerning 
hardware, software and handling agents, transfer would not be possible because 
different realities were sought and constructed. These issues can be seen more clearly 
below in the discussion about Ministers, and in earlier descriptions of use of the clinical 
classifications in relation to the contents of the medical casenote.
8.5 The Ministers
It was not possible within the research to interview or observe Ministers directly. 
However, a number of senior Civil Servants were interviewed, to the level of Under 
Secretary of State for Health. Also, as discussed above, in terms of Ministers and the 
Government, the literature demonstrated that two characteristics of the NHS were of 
key importance here. Firstly, the NHS represents a commitment to a particular political 
ideology, and on that basis political images, ambitions and careers are developed and 
promoted. Secondly, it is funded by public money, with the result that Government has 
a key responsibility to demonstrate accountability in terms of how the money was spent 
and whether or not the public is getting the best for its money. During this research key 
elements in the Government’s approaches to discharging this responsibility were the 
healthcare classifications ICD-10 and OPCS-4 and, to a lesser degree, HRGs and Read. 
The Government required hospitals to ensure that, using ICD-10 and OPCS-4 as 
appropriate, they coded the clinical conditions and treatments of every person who 
came into contact with the NHS and who classified as either an in-patient or a day case
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(no overnight stay). Their precise instruction was as follows:
‘ Medical terminology as it is written by the clinician to describe a patient’s 
complaint, problem, diagnosis, treatment or other reason for seeking medical 
attention must be translated into a form which can be easily tabulated, aggregated 
and sorted for statistical analysis in an efficient and meaningful manner.’ (DH, 
1994: preface)
The job of the clinical coder was to do this, i.e. to:
‘.... extract the relevant information from the casenote and to assign codes which 
represent a complete picture of the patient’s hospital stay.’ (DH, 1994: 1)
Statistical returns from hospitals to the DH, based on this data, are how the Government 
demonstrates to the public accountability for public expenditure. It is also partly how 
Ministers develop policy, as evidenced in some of the findings above and as also 
described by a senior statistician:
‘For instance the data is used to study waiting times for cancer patients, to 
determine the need for psychiatric in-patient services, and to plan acute-care 
services, e tc ....’
Another managerial participant confirmed this:
‘For instance, we have two acute coronary care facilities in this locality. We have 
been examining the statistical data to try to decide whether it might be possible to 
rationalise these and have just one. So we are looking at how many AMIs (heart 
attacks) we have and the pattern of occurrence and so on .... ’
Ministers, statisticians and coders were not only, thereby, seen to demonstrate a belief 
that such information was in the casenote, they also demonstrated a belief that it could 
be successfully extracted and transferred round the organisation. Furthermore, they 
promoted that belief and precipitated subsequent beliefs in the contents and validity of 
the data they produced, by acting upon the data and by publishing it. Evidence of this 
was found in the annual publication ‘Hospital Episode Statistics, (DH, 1998a, 1998b) 
which purports to publish lists and analyses of, amongst other things, diagnoses and 
treatments of NHS patients in given time frames. This publication is based on clinical 
data from medical casenotes coded in NHS hospitals, using ICD-10 and OPCS-4.
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8.6 The Statisticians
The group that collected, analysed and presented these hospital returns as statistical 
data to Ministers is the HES Office. As one of its senior managers explained:
‘HES sits in the Statistics Division of the DH and belongs to the Government 
Statistical Service. Our loyalty is to the Department Minister of the day, like all 
Civil Servants.’
The importance of this statement lay not only in its implications for organisational 
loyalties and norms, etc., but also in its implications for clinical data. As another senior 
manager explained:
‘.... the Minister must not be embarrassed by the data and must, therefore, know if 
there is something embarrassing in it.’
In attempting to understand the notion of ‘embarrassing’ items in the data, it emerged 
that these would consist of:
‘.... unexpected changes in trends, like numbers of operations for instance.’
Steps taken to adjust such ‘anomalies’ as they were called by another statistician, are 
described below. It is interesting, at this stage, to note that the assumption was that it 
was a data quality problem, but only in the sense that it is assumed avoidable errors 
occurred during the coding process. These avoidable errors were believed to be due, as 
described by one statistician, to factors like:
‘... doctors’ handwriting .... coding expertise ... lack of coding training........’
Belief in the integrity of the fundamental assumptions about clinical reality, and 
methods used to explore it, remained secure.
The same manager went on to advise that part of their code of practice dictates that 
HES should:
‘.... maintain the relevance of statistical activities to the needs of government, 
and that, working to their own code of practice:
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‘HES must produce statistics in an objective, scientific and unbiased manner .... 
we will never put the figures in the light the Minister wants, we present facts only, 
not judgements.’
Interestingly no conflict between the two above-mentioned sets of statements was 
recognised by the participant. When asked what was meant by ‘facts’ the response was:
‘For instance we would say there had been a rise of ten percent in an area of 
disease, we would not say there had been a minimal rise.’
‘Facts’ in this sense were deemed to be so on the basis of fundamental statistical 
principles, which required that qualitative statements like ‘minimal rise’ were 
represented in quantified format. Claims to present the ‘facts’ did not necessarily, 
therefore, have a strong relationship with the nature of the knowledge in question, and 
might better be described, therefore, merely as quantified data. Thus, once again 
socially-defined construction of reality could be seen, in some ways, as was seen to be 
the case with clinicians. What the statisticians sought, how they sought it and what, 
therefore, was knowable about reality was determined by the context within which they 
operated. In other words, it was socially-determined. However, statistical models 
differed from clinical models in that they were not the result of direct interaction with 
the real-life phenomena in question. Rather, they were a representation of a 
representation of that interaction, and one reflective of very different frames of 
reference.
In trying to explore this further, a statistician was asked how ‘factual’ the contents of 
clinical casenotes and of coding were. The response was:
‘We take a lot on trust at present. We recognise that we must establish much 
closer links with coders and that we need more clinical and coding knowledge here 
at HES. All our staff have now had one-day awareness sessions on clinical coding 
and one has had a three-day course, but we know we need more. Really, I think 
we should put our figures out as ‘best estimates’ not as facts.’
While this represented a laudable admission that knowledge of the data was not all it 
should be, it also reconfirmed two important assertions. Firstly, the implicit message in 
this statement was that, if there was a deviation from reality in terms of what HES got 
from the clinical coders of medical casenotes, it was due to coder issues, not to the
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basic content of the casenote. Secondly, it reconfirmed the assertion that there was an 
underlying assumption that what was needed was in the casenote. Further evidence of 
this was gained when participants were asked what the ‘ideal’ would be for HES in that 
context. As one responded:
‘If doctors were to write legibly and coders were well trained and data was sent to 
us in a timely way, it would improve quality immeasurably.’
Lastly, this shed light on how this situation could exist. HES admitted considerable 
lack of clinical knowledge and of understanding of clinical phenomena. The degree of 
fit between tools like ICD-10 and OPCS-4 and clinical work was, therefore, taken on 
trust. They were the Government’s chosen instruments, and had been in use for a long 
time. They might, therefore, be argued as having achieved cultural and organisational 
sanction. They were part of the way things were done at the DH, to the extent that their 
use was not challenged.
In exploring these issues further, the concept of quality of data was pursued. Time did 
not permit direct questions about how quality of HES data was measured, although 
reference to a range of HES publications indicated that the dimension of quality most 
focused on by HES was coverage of records, i.e. what percentage of the hospital 
population was captured, rather than any notion of relationship to observed clinical 
reality, because, as discussed above, this was assumed. The stated aim of HES was:
‘....to  capture a ll  episodes (of care).’ (DH, 1997a)
HES participants were asked what, if any, routines they performed on the data in 
relation to the quality issue, particularly in terms of any basic changes to it:
‘The data is sometimes changed. Where we are 95% certain we are right which 
fields in a record are wrong we change them. We still however have, for instance, 
‘male pregnancies’, which we cannot change because, with no access to the 
casenote, we have no way of knowing whether it is the gender or the condition that
has been wrongly coded  In any case the data is quite historical when we get it
and we handle millions of records.’
Notions of what was right and wrong in the data were, therefore, believed to be based 
upon the model of expectations arising from familiarity with the data. In other words, 
these notions were a result of observed patterns and trends, as much as they were
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common sense. This was a fine example of what Porter (1995) described when he 
discussed his assertion that:
any domain of quantified knowledge .... is, in a sense, artificial.’ (Porter, 
1995:5)
Thus the frame of reference for sense-making was built around and from the world 
described by the data. Expectations and assumptions and, therefore, actions could be 
explained in these terms. This was not, as it may appear, a departure from the basic 
premises of this research. It did not condemn the statistician’s worldview as 
fundamentally lacking integrity. Rather it must be viewed in the context of earlier 
philosophical discussions, that, as Porter (1995) goes on to assert:
‘... reality is constructed from artifice.’ (Porter, 1995: 3)
This can be viewed then, as simply one form of artifice. What was at issue was not the 
artificiality of the view, but rather, as stated earlier, its relationship to the artificial 
model of reality on which it was built.
In terms of other changes to the data, a DH publication (1997a) indicates ‘grossing’ is 
done. A HES manager explained:
‘Grossing was done for specific publications, for instance the official annual 
Government tables of numbers of operations and conditions split by various 
means: by ordinary admissions, by ordinary admissions and day cases, etc. 
Hospitals rarely use these publications. Grossing was done to balance the figures; 
we knew from other returns what numbers should be in HES so what used to 
happen was we inflated the returns from (X) whose data was so bad nobody could 
tell, until the figures balanced. It is still done to an extent but as little as possible.’
Thus the underlying model for this data moved further from the underlying clinical 
reality and became characterised more by pure mathematical precision and ‘tidiness’, 
the focus being on balancing the figures. What, in effect, this did was add validity and 
power to all sets of figures involved, to the extent that, as one manager put it:
‘Strangely, the further you get from the clinical workplace, the greater your 
confidence in the data.... ’
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This was not felt to be so strange when consideration was given to the fact that one set 
of figures which counts an item might, given sufficient knowledge of the collection 
procedures, have power in terms of user confidence in its accuracy and the reflection of 
reality it presents. This power is, however, increased where two or more sets counting 
the same thing from different perspectives each confirm the findings of the first. While 
at face value this balancing can seem, therefore, to be merely a mathematical exercise, 
fundamentally it could be argued to reify and bolster the strength of the resulting data.
Asked about percentages of records this affected, the participant was unable to provide 
a response, but could advise:
‘We also ‘clean’ the data. Cleaning really helps improve the data. In our view it 
means we call all the rubbish the same name, so it is easily identifiable. This has 
made the data much more accessible to users.’
Another participant supported these assertions:
‘Changing, grossing, cleaning all improve the data as they improve consistency, 
particularly from one submission to the next.’
In addition to the comments on reification made above, this statement, and use of the 
clinical classifications, was deemed to reflect a deep philosophical commitment to the 
rationalist assumption, so clearly evidenced in AI work. These included the assumption 
that there existed an external, commonly perceivable reality, which included clinical 
work and phenomena. They also included the assumption that this was logically 
ordered and could be successfully analysed by modelling the entities and relationships 
between them. Thus cleaning the data could only improve it. These kinds of 
observations reaffirmed the relevance of ‘The Rational Pragmatists’ category. They 
also further strengthened initial hypotheses regarding the misguided rationality of 
healthcare planning policies based on clinical data, and the impact of social influences. 
Together with findings from managers, and those leading to a number of earlier 
analytic categories, particularly Modelling Reality, Knowledge Gained and 
Purpose/Need, Models of Inquiry and Knowledge Gathering, and Knowledge Domains, 
these observations also characterised an approach to reality and to the reality expressed 
in clinical models, which was sufficiently different to generate a third analytic 
category: ‘Conflicting Realities’. At this stage this reflected observance, given
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knowledge of clinical models of inquiry and communications mechanisms, of a discord 
between them and similar factors in the Ministerial and statistical realms.
Observance of social influences at this stage also led to further development of the 
category ‘The Rational Pragmatists’ into ‘The Social Rationalists’. This reflected 
observance that, for all the calculative assumptions about clinical reality and the 
associated behaviour, in terms of investigation and reflection of that reality, 
considerable social influences were at work and, although apparently more ‘scientific’, 
the socially-defined nature of those actions maintained the status of ensuing knowledge 
and information as insecure. As has been seen, the almost total lack of insight by the 
non-clinical groups into the reality, as perceived by clinicians, which they routinely 
reconstructed, led to a judgmental, subjective, albeit possibly unwitting, representation, 
and one which was no less defined by social norms than that of clinicians.
The next chapter takes this range of findings and draws together observations 
crystallised into the four key analytical categories, and offers a second level analysis 
based on that.
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Chapter 9, Findings from the Field Work, Second Level Analysis
This chapter describes explanatory insights developed from the second level of 
analysis.
Initial conclusions confirmed and added depth to the findings from the literature 
review. In summary, these conclusions were that a percentage of healthcare data is 
invalidly transformed into fact, and that this happens as a result of enactment by 
individuals and groups of their respective social contexts. This included clinical 
practice, which was shown to be a knowledge-creating process. This set a context both 
for how data might be produced and also how it might be validly used in decision­
making within and outside the domain of clinical work. It also included the social 
enactment processes of managers. This resulted in a tenuous relationship between 
clinical data and its statistical counterparts.
The supporting evidence for these conclusions showed that a degree of objectivity 
existed in clinical work, but this was not inherent in all areas of it. The clinical 
universe of discourse was shown as being often characterised by uncertainty, with most, 
rather than few, diseases being pathognomically very difficult to diagnose definitively. 
These findings were intrinsically bound up with those relating to the relationship 
between the social knowledge processes involved in clinical decision-making and the 
nature of data produced from those actions. Findings showed that even apparently 
scientifically objective measurements carry the subjective element of individual 
physical ability, skill and interpretive ability. This uncertainty was shown to be 
compounded by the nature of the practice of medicine, wherein the underlying 
scientific logic of medicine was shown not to extend to how medicine was practised or 
recorded. Uncertainty was also shown to be further compounded by lack of any 
definitions of clinical concepts and lack of training in clinical terminology, describing 
and recording. Thus, to the basic uncertainty of the universe of discourse was added 
heterogeneity in perceptions and description of perceptions. As discussed, one 
clinician’s ‘asthma’ was another one’s ‘wheezy chest’. Thus, the evidence supported
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the notion that uncertainty and subjective opinion were typical rather than exceptional 
in clinical work.
The evidence also confirmed a situation wherein, while the physical and procedural 
approach to clinical work was standardised, the intellectual one was not. Human 
influences were, therefore, active. Cognitive perception, knowledge, and data, in terms 
of methods of describing observations and views of elements of it, remained, even after 
the clinical training phase, subjective and heterogeneous to an unquantified degree. 
The process of clinical knowledge generation and application was, therefore, shown to 
have a phenomenological essence. This was not to say that definitives and absolutes 
did not exist, simply that no work had been found which analysed types of clinical 
knowledge in such a way as to list or spell out which phenomena fall into which 
category and what the relative percentages are.
Social factors continued to emerge as influential when a focus was placed on the nature 
of the key stakeholder groups, and of their relationship to each other and their wider 
social contexts. These included human attributes such as ability, experience, and 
professional background and training. They also included loyalties, vested interests, 
beliefs, etc. These were shown to result in distinct and conflicting modes of behaviour. 
They affected perceptions of reality and selections from that reality. They also affected 
labels applied to describe those selections and decisions about information systems 
used to represent them.
Returning now to the original focus of the research, which was to examine the 
relationship between clinical knowledge, its social context and its statistical 
counterparts, the research showed that outside the clinical sphere meaning was not 
transferred, rather it was attached to a construction based on the meaning ascribed by 
non-clinical groups to the original clinical data.
In exploring why this happened, inter-group structures and interpretive schemes were 
shown to reflect not simply, for instance, the norms of the clinical or managerial 
professions, but also the effect of inter-group location and interaction. The nature,
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therefore, of the relationships between entities, and their relative positions, emerged as 
influential.
One area of the real world was explored, that of clinical phenomena. It was explored, 
however, through the lenses of two different domains, that of the clinician and the 
manager, and two very different versions of that world were shown to exist. The 
following model of this dimension of the domains draws out their key characteristics, 
as revealed by the research, and shows their effects on information:
clinical 
universe of discourse
socially-constructed realitie:
the inward- clinician as artist
■the outwardscientistface of-
face of■professionalmedicine
medicine
DATA + MEANING
VTA
DATA + MEANING
socially-constructed realities
Managers, Ministers, 
statisticians
Figure 5, Two Domains
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This model shows that analysis revealed not one unitary bureaucracy, but two separate 
domains, characterised quite differently. The first was the clinical (domain, wherein 
clinical understanding of the universe of discourse was partly well structured, and 
partly poorly structured. There were areas of relative certainty and areas where 
knowledge was much more tentative. The second was the non-clinical domain, wherein 
understanding of the universe of discourse was held by its participants to be highly- 
structured. The belief within the non-clinical groups was that relevant aspects of the 
clinicians’ knowledge of their domain were extracted from the data flowing from the 
clinical domain, and that it was definitive. However, as the model shows, data flowed 
between clinical and non-clinical domains. Meaning did not; it was created anew in 
each.
To expand upon this, at the centre of this universe the clinician enacted social context 
by engaging with reality in a manner consistent with the encompassing social structure 
of medical work, always with the possibility of changing those structures. The 
mutually constitutive nature of this context could be seen in a number of ways. It was 
one in which clinicians were self-regulating and had their expertise taken for granted. 
This knowledge provided ‘a powerful control over nature and society’ (Johnson, 1972: 
33). This in turn meant, as noted by Barnes (1977) that only practitioners fully 
understood the implications of their own practices, so they were allowed the dominant 
role in controlling their application. The research showed that this combination of 
expertise, which to an extent made professional knowledge a ‘black box’ to lay people, 
and social power, not only assists with ‘ontological protectionism’, but also facilitates 
manipulation, for purposes of public presentation, of the nature of professional 
knowledge.
The fieldwork also revealed that medical structures of clinical control and professional 
closure were greatly strengthened by what Johnson (1972) refers to as:
‘.... a highly developed community language or jargon.’ (Johnson, 1972: 56)
As discussed, this performed the double function of maintaining internal homogeneity
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and increasing autonomy from outsiders; both competing specialists and laymen. Thus 
clinical language is, in some respects, designed to ‘repel all boarders’, and achieve 
social closure (Bernstein, 1971) by, as discussed in chapter 4, assisting the process of 
‘mystification’ of outsiders and thus maintaining the control of the clinical profession 
over what they consider to be the clinical universe of discourse. (Johnson, 1972). 
Clinical behaviour, aimed at rejecting the healthcare classifications and their data, and 
work on developing Read 3, can be considered as a further expression of the clinical 
desire to maintain this professional ‘net’ around their language in order to protect 
clinical freedom and professional status. It was also considered to be an expression of 
the kind of ‘structural conflict’, which is discussed in the next chapter. This was also, 
however, considered in terms of how this behaviour affected knowledge and 
information, and the realities perceived. To implicit collusion in scientific treatment of 
the clinical domain in order to buttress social status, was added this explicit pursuit of 
methods to maintain external mystification and, thereby, further reinforce that status. 
Action was also consistent with wider social structures, which require confirmation of 
scientific certainty in clinical work in order that medical structures can remain 
unchallenged.
In summary, the clinician presented two faces. The inward face combined that of 
clinician as artist, scientist and professional. This was the enactment of self played out 
amongst peers. The second was the clinician as scientist and professional. This was 
the enactment of self played out to the outside world. This colluded to produce a 
knowledge-creating context within which clinical knowledge and data were internally 
known to be less than totally certain and objective. Data produced reflects this. 
External groups were, however, allowed and encouraged to view this world as scientific 
and the data from it to be likewise. This outwardly scientific appearance has been seen 
to lead to such comments from senior DH managers as:
‘Doctors are scientifically well-developed...’
Hence, the model shows data and meaning within the clinical domain, but only data 
flowing between that and the domain of managers and statisticians. Meaning of a 
different sort is created anew within the latter domain, as a result of that very specific
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knowledge-creating context. Thus two socially-constructed realities are shown in the 
model, and two sets of meaning. This is not, therefore, a simple case of conflicting 
views of reality, in terms of it being external or not to the individual, but rather a case 
of an intricate social dynamic leading to emergence of what are only superficially 
straightforward and apparently isolated differences.
Moving to the managerial and statistical domain, behaviour here can now be argued to 
be a result, at least to some degree, of the behaviour of clinicians. That the clinical 
groups have been described as operating within the scientific paradigm might be argued 
from the same basis. However, Ministers are not scientists, and to that extent they are 
subject to the same social influences about the truth and objectivity of scientific work, 
and what presents itself as scientific work, as any other social group.
Statisticians might be argued to operate, by professional training, from the scientific 
paradigm, but again clinical behaviour has been seen to influence their perception about 
clinical knowledge and data as being scientific and, therefore, fit for their purpose. 
Thus the frames of reference of these groups have been shown to attach a status of 
‘truth’ to clinical data, albeit within a recognition that the representation is not perfect, 
and their actions, primarily in terms of using that data in statistical operations and as the 
basis for far-reaching planning and control decisions, reflect that.
However, a focus on clinical behaviour provides less than a full picture for the 
motivation behind the different but consistent behaviour seen among non-clinical 
groups. Legitimacy for these groups has been shown to rest upon demonstrable ability 
centrally to understand, plan and control public affairs. The essential public credibility 
and trust this is designed to engender must be further ensured by presenting the 
appearance of informed management of the NHS based on high quality, impartial 
decisions based on good information. Ministers must acquire information, therefore, 
to support policy development and performance management, to illustrate variations in 
health status and delivery and to help determine how much taxpayer’s money should be 
spent on healthcare and how it should be distributed (DH, 1997a). Classifications and 
statistics are a way of doing this. If sickness cannot be quantified, it cannot be centrally
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controlled and managed, and it cannot be quantified unless it is mapped out, 
subdivided, and for ease, coded. In this sense it might be argued that, although clinical 
behaviour encourages a scientific perception of the clinical domain, this social 
imperative faced by Government results in a process which further reinforces that view.
Also, many different methods of describing and measuring are cumbersome and 
complicated, give no appearance of describing like as like, and preclude comparison 
and control on that basis. Hence the national application of a standardised 
classification for each domain: disease and treatments. As discussed by Porter (1995) 
the superficiality inherent in these systems, which by-pass deep issues, and their output, 
then provides the means by which Ministers can defy disciplinary and organisational 
boundaries, to link academic to political discourse. This has a parallel, as Porter goes on 
to discuss, albeit in terms of the arguably less contentious area of wheat and the wheat 
trade. Development of quality grading categories, to which all farmers had to subject 
their produce, eventually led to a situation where the knowledge needed to trade wheat 
became separated from knowledge of the product and its production. Trading 
knowledge came to consist of price and production data. Wheat could then be traded 
by people who had never seen it and never would, who could not distinguish wheat 
from oats. In the same way healthcare can be managed by people who have never seen 
the inside of a hospital and cannot not distinguish coronary artery disease from cancer.
As also mentioned above, what Ministers also need is the appearance of impartiality; 
their own judgement must not appear to be active or criticisms of bias and personal 
interest may result. As Porter (1995) notes, this is why faith in objectivity tends to be 
associated with political democracy, or at least with systems in which bureaucratic 
actors are highly vulnerable to outsiders. A decision made ‘by the numbers’ has at least 
the appearance of being fair and impersonal. As Porter (1995) also notes:
‘Scientific objectivity thus provides an answer to a moral demand for impartiality 
and fairness. Quantification is a way of making decisions without seeming to 
decide.’ (Porter 1995: 8)
Potter’s (1996) work offers useful additional insights into how such ‘facts’ gain
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further substance. He discusses how ‘externalising devices’ are used and goes on to 
assert that:
‘ . this provides for the reading that the phenomena described has an existence by 
virtue of actions beyond the realm of human agency.’ (Potter, 1996: 157)
Woolgar (1988) elaborates further, describing achievement of transfer of agency from 
author to phenomena by presenting ‘ facts’ in terms of ‘the data show’ and ‘it was 
found that’ (Woolgar, 1988: 75).
However, as Potter (1996) further discusses, it is then a short step to the process of 
conflation of objectivity as impersonality and impartiality, with objectivity as truth, and 
behaviour undertaken on that belief:
‘Thus support for objectivity is built up in part from constructing the facts, the 
record, the evidence as having its own agency. Such constructions obscure the 
work of interpretation and construction done by the description’s producer.’ 
(Potter, 1996: 158)
He argues that, basically, the empiricist repertoire can be seen to divest agency from the 
producer and invest it in the facts, by depersonalising accounts and investing them with 
the appearance of scientific method based upon universal procedural rules. Also, the 
official rhetoric of handling organisations stresses both neutrality and an emphasis on 
reporting facts, as was discussed earlier in terms of the HES participant. As Porter 
(1995) discusses, this rationalism has all the appearance of an effective tool for 
understanding a world it has itself helped to construct, particularly as it has never 
understood the world it has lost. But, as discussed above and as Potter (1996) argues:
‘. ... this official story about facts is itself a construction.’ (Potter, 1996: 156)
Thus classifications in the NHS can be interpreted as media through which dissimilar 
needs and desires gain the appearance of commensurability, and where people’s 
conditions and treatments are studied in classes which abstract their individuality. But, 
as Latour (1987) argues, and this has, to an extent, been shown to be the case in this 
thesis:
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‘.... all measures construct a commensurability that did not exist before their own 
calibration.’ (Latour, 1987: 41)
The research showed that, by their actions and use of certain systems the Government 
did not simply take what it perceived to be objective clinical information and use it 
basically unchanged. Rather it ‘created’ what never existed in the clinical consultation: 
uniform categories of diseases and uniform classes of patients with those conditions. 
Their classifications and manipulations achieved, therefore, what might be described as 
internal consistency, in that the contents of each category were internally comparable 
and also comparable with other such collections of data compiled via the same 
mechanism. However, they were externally incompatible. In other words, they did not 
always describe the real world phenomena they purported to. Given clinical and other 
comments discussed above it is debatable whether these phenomena even exist. 
Clinical classification categories and statistics may be seen, therefore, to construct 
entities. Consequently, their application may be seen to be instrumental in the 
construction of a version of reality which is fabricated. It is based not upon 
investigation of the real world but upon a predetermined model, the relevance of which, 
to the real world, has not been demonstrated but has been criticised by agents in the 
domain it purports to reflect.
To return again to Structuration Theory (Giddens, 1976, 1984) this behaviour can then 
be seen not only to define the world that can be known, but also to direct future actions 
within that frame of reference. Thus, as Giddens describes, by their actions humans 
define their realities and by subsequent actions which reinforce them they often 
legitimise those realities. In the case of the Government and DH statisticians, systems 
have been selected which reflect beliefs about clinical reality, and which reflect 
required achievements in terms of allocation of resources and maintenance of a sort of 
power. This system ‘tells them what they want to know’. In this sense, as Porter 
(1995) discusses, statistics can be seen to have reflected values before it created them, 
and to reinforce those values thereafter. As noted by Barnes (1977) such organisations 
can be seen as searching for, or creating, the information that will maintain their role 
and appearance. Thus, statisticians suppressed ‘embarrassing’ data. The data actually
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reported the belief that was needed to build the dataset, rather than the reality it 
purported to describe. Again, it must be noted that this does not reflect a situation of 
transfer of information, but one of construction anew of an artificial reality, based on a 
rationalist excision of detail and complexity, wherein, as observed in this thesis, 
statistical constructivism shapes notions of reality. Also, however, that is all it can tell 
them, by virtue of its design characteristics. This returns the discussion to the 
observation made by Barnes (1974) that:
\ ... scientific statements have taken on the nature of tautologies; science has been
allowed to define what we hold to be true about the world.’ (Barnes, 1974: 5)
In other words, they have become, and could only become, self-fulfilling prophecies.
9.1 Summary of Second Level Analysis
The notion of the social construction of reality was, therefore, a key one in this 
analysis. Also key was the notion that this relationship between the individual and the 
social structures with which they interact is not a one-way process. Social enactment 
does not stand in a vacuum. In addition, longer-lasting social structures like, for 
instance, professional norms, have been shown to be equally active. Mutually 
constitutive factors and social relationships have, therefore, been observed and 
discussed. These insights focused these more mature stages of analysis in the direction 
of two connected areas of work, which specifically explore these kinds of perception: 
Structuration Theory (Giddens, 1976, 1984) and Actor Network Theory (ANT) (Callon, 
1986, 1997; Law et al, 1989; Latour 1989, 1991, 1997, 1998). Both promised to 
provide deeper understanding of the observed phenomena and also an opportunity to 
contribute to current knowledge. Structuration Theory in particular appeared to be the 
theory which came closest to accommodating observations made. Further exploration 
using these areas of work is the subject of the next chapter.
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Chapter 10, A Return to the Literature: Social Construction of Reality
This chapter takes second level findings and integrates them with relevant meta-level 
theory. This is done in order to achieve enhanced explanatory insights and also to 
contribute to those bodies of theoretical work. In particular, the notion of social 
construction of reality applies. Specifically, concepts developed in Giddens’ work 
(1976, 1984) on Structuration Theory were used to explore the effects of 
sociologically-based frames of reference on creation and transfer of meaning. A review 
of this work found it to be an abstract and general heuristic theory, which explicitly 
excludes any explanatory or descriptive application to real-world situations. It was, 
however, perceived as coming closest to explaining observations made and as having 
great strengths in relation to this thesis. It provided a more likely conception of the 
basic possibilities of social life, and offered generic principles of the constitution of 
society, which were consistent with findings thus far, and against which further 
explanatory analyses could be attempted
The discussion then extends the notion of the social construction of reality further by 
addressing the concept of ontological security. This discussion explores the perception 
that both groups believe themselves to be dealing with the same universe of discourse 
and seek to promote and promulgate that view.
Organisational structure is then explored, in terms of the effects of the above factors on 
the transfer of information. This again draws on Giddens’ work (1976, 1984) on 
structural contradiction and conflict as an explanatory factor and cites the complete lack 
of true communication between the clinical and non-clinical groups as evidence of this 
occurrence.
Actor Network Theory (ANT) ) (Callon, 1986, 1997; Law et al, 1989; Latour 1989, 
1991, 1997, 1998) is then used in order to achieve a more fine-grained analysis which 
includes exploration of the relationships between human and non-human agents in the 
problem context. While not amounting to a theory, this work was seen as 
complementary to Structuration Theory (Giddens, 1976, 1984) in that it addresses a 
different and more detailed level of the social world.
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10.1 Structuration, ANT and Further Findings
The research found that the social contexts studied were neither fully determining of 
their constituent individuals, nor were they fully determined by them. Rather, these 
structures were shown to emerge from a process of repetitive human action, which they 
influenced, but that action was reflexive rather than slavish. It was shown, particularly 
with clinicians, that they reflexively both drew on the larger social structures of which 
they were part and, by doing so, created and recreated those structures. Thus each was 
in a mutually constitutive relationship with the other.
That observation represented a departure from the two traditional and opposing 
approaches to understanding social contexts, which were those of the individual, of 
human agents and human action, and those of collectivities, or (structured) social 
systems. Neither fully accounted for findings from the research, which indicated that 
the arrow of determination does not point exclusively in either direction. What was of 
particular interest in Giddens’ work was that he offered a view which does 
accommodate those findings. He asserts the existence of unifying factors in the social 
world, previously overlooked by earlier approaches. Giddens observes structure and 
action not as two independent phenomena, but as inextricably linked in social terms. 
He draws connections, therefore, between structuralist perspectives, which emphasise 
the bureaucratic and formal aspects of society, and the interactionist approach which 
focuses on less formal structures and dimensions arising from human actions. He 
argues instead for a social world which is neither exclusively determined by individuals 
nor determining of them. He perceives structures, or social rules and resources, being 
drawn upon by actors in a process which is mutually constitutive, wherein actions are 
formulated and reproduce social structure and change, or produce new structure.
In describing these ‘structures’ Giddens uses a number of labels, including ‘rules’, 
‘resources’ and ‘memory traces’ (Giddens, 1984: 17). In light of some of the 
observations in this thesis, particularly in terms of clinical actions, the term ‘frames of 
reference’ is used here, by which is meant the unique and changing template produced 
by each individual’s history, background, experience, social and professional training, 
etc. It is also meant to include the assumptions each individual makes about past and/or 
present and/or future contextual issues (for instance, as discussed, who will use the
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information recorded in the casenote, for what, and whether actions will at some later 
date be challenged, etc.). Collectivities here are taken to be social groups characterised 
by often repeated and, therefore, enduring practices, such as organisations or 
professional bodies.
Thus, as observed by Cohen (1998) for Giddens:
‘.... everything in social life, from encompassing world-systems, to an individual’s 
state of mind originates in social praxis (that is the skilful performance of conduct 
and interaction).’ (Cohen, 1998: 280)
This focus on social praxis was influenced, to an extent, by the work of Goffinan (1959, 
1967, 1972) who undertook detailed explorations of interaction in everyday life. That 
mutual interaction is seen as being informed by both wider societal experience, and 
organisational norms.
Human agents are, therefore, seen as determining, but not overwhelmingly so, and 
determined, but not totally so. As discussed by Cohen (1998) given this mutability and 
perversity perceived in social praxis, it is out of the question for Giddens to insist upon 
the centrality of one mode of conduct (like Marx on Labour) or to perceive an 
inevitable destination for history (e.g. communism) or to claim that insidious practices 
or structures thoroughly dominate our lives (e.g. Weber on the ‘iron cage, Foucault on 
power and knowledge). Thus social life appears far messier for Giddens than in many 
theoretical works.
These insights enabled Giddens to develop an analytical framework structured around 
intertwined concepts of social structure and human interaction. Each concept is broken 
down into three dimensions, Thus interactions can be characterised by a focus on 
communication, or the exercise of power, or sanctioning. The corresponding structures 
are classified respectively as being for purposes of signification, domination or 
legitimation. These are linked by modalities. Thus human communication involves 
sense-making by use of interpretive schemes. These schemes reside within existing 
knowledge stocks. In that way human actors produce and reproduce structures of 
meaning, described by Giddens as structures of signification. In other words they are 
the structures from which meaning is developed. In the same way, structures of
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legitimation underpin sanctioning or sanctioned interaction, and structures of 
domination underpin actions focused on the exercise of power.
Applying Giddens’ analytical framework helps, therefore, to explain observations made 
in this thesis about both people and systems. Looking first at the actions of clinicians 
and managers, these were shown not to exist in a vacuum. Rather they were seen to 
have been shaped, to some extent, by what went before, by existing structures of 
signification, domination and legitimation, defining, for instance the theory and 
practice of medicine, and the representation of clinical reality purveyed by the 
statistical data sets. Thus the evidence has shown how individuals in both groups came 
to situations with ‘structures’, which informed how they made sense of situations and 
how they responded to them. The process Giddens so astutely describes can be viewed 
as an iterative cycle:
Frames of reference Action
Figure 6, Giddens’ Structuration Model, Adaptation 1
All models are simplifications of the complexity of the real world. However, therein 
lies one of their key strengths, in that by recognising their simplistic nature, we are 
prompted and enabled to explore that complexity further. Closer inspection of this 
cycle and its context indicates improved understanding of this key social process may 
benefit from explicit inclusion and consideration of the processes in play between the 
frames of reference and the resulting actions, namely the reflective process, which has 
been shown in this thesis to be reflection on selected data. That selection process is not 
random. It is informed by prevailing social structures. It is, therefore, a selection from 
any number of available realities. That selection is then endowed with meaning. This 
is drawn from existing structures, but this time in the form of individual frames of 
reference. These frames of reference are a mixture of individual characteristics and 
prevailing structural influences. This results in the production of either information,
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which can be seen as confirming existing knowledge stocks, or of knowledge itself, 
which can be seen as adding to existing knowledge stocks, and may change prevailing 
structure.
Looking now at information systems, in the case of clinicians, the medical casenote is 
used to record some elements of their decision-making processes. Using the analytical 
scheme above, this document can now be reinterpreted as being deeply implicated in 
the modalities linking structure and action. It has been shown to be used to establish 
control, and it has been shown to encapsulate norms. Essentially, therefore, it is an 
active manifestation of the interpretive scheme of its authors. In other words it both 
reflects those schemes and, by its existence and use, reinforces them. This document 
can now be seen, therefore, to be a ‘situated’ creation of its author (Giddens, 1976: 63). 
In other words, its incomprehensibility and its use outside the clinical domain can be 
better understood in these terms.
Management behaviour can also be better explained using this approach. This has been 
shown to include use of scientific instruments of enquiry and data collection, and 
promulgation of a reality for which no basis has been found in the evidence presented. 
This behaviour can be explained when the notion of situated, mutually constituted 
structures is employed. Thus prevailing structures here are built on a belief in the 
scientific rigour of clinical work. This belief system is broadly sustained by the 
knowledge-creating context within which it sits. This situation has been shown to be 
produced partly by the actions of clinicians. Their action in presenting themselves as 
‘savants’ etc. can now be interpreted as contributing to the structures influencing 
behaviour in non-clinical groups. Hence, when clinical data shows gross 
inconsistencies they are assumed to be an artifact of the collection system. This makes 
sense of action to ‘clean’ data. This not only helps to explain such actions, it also 
indicates the far-reaching and dangerously obscure effects of belief systems.
The evidence suggests this influence is a one-way process in the problem domain. This 
indicates a level of power being exercised by or accorded to clinical groups that does 
not prevail for non-clinical groups. Thus, where power allows, groups have been shown 
to work not only within their own domains, in terms of producing and reproducing 
structure, but also in a tangled web of cross-domain relationships.
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The remaining information systems can also be reinterpreted, in the same way as the 
medical casenote. They too have been shown to embody the interpretive schemes of 
these non-clinical stakeholders, and by their existence and use, to reinforce them.
Thus the above model can be enhanced:
knowledge/information production
frames of reference action
(knowledge/information
application)reflective processes
situationdata
Figure 7, Giddens’ Structuration Model, Adaptation 2
In this enhanced model, an individual’s frame of reference is taken to include 
professional training, personal history and assumptions about past and/or current and/or 
future contexts. In the case of clinicians, they result in significance being attached to 
particular phenomena in the social world and also inform the nature and status of that 
significance. For instance, clinicians attach a ‘tentative’ status to much clinical 
knowledge, thus the significance of what they observe is uncertain. In other words 
their knowledge in these areas, and what can be known, is uncertain and remains so in 
the absence of additional and possibly different enquiry. A clear connection can then be 
seen in terms of the actions they take as a result of this structural context. These
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include actions which are designed to reduce that uncertainty, albeit not usually to the 
extent of completely removing it. These actions, which can be seen to be part of a 
repeated pattern, in turn reinforce the ‘structure’ from which they were drawn. 
Managers, on the other hand, attach a status of fact to statistical data sets. As discussed 
above, this ossified knowledge assumes a host of characteristics not associated with its 
dynamic and tentative origins, and these in turn generate a different reaction than would 
otherwise have been the case. They both complement and reinforce both the 
interpretive scheme of the manager and the underlying structures of signification. This 
knowledge then legitimises decisions which amount to the exercise of power.
What has also been demonstrated by this thesis, as briefly referred to above and as 
explored by Giddens (1976) in focusing on the durability of social structures, is that 
the enduring repetition of such action can be seen to establish these orchestrated sets of 
actions as durable structures, in other words sets of actions that are repeated so often as 
to give them a ‘thing’ like existence. This does not disallow the notion of variance 
within even these structures, but accords it sufficiently low effect as not to disturb the 
overall ‘structure’, until and unless its effects become sufficiently powerful to result in 
change. This explains the practice of medicine as described in this thesis. Thus the 
social world benefits from analysis which recognises organisations as collectives of 
individual agents, and which also recognises that collective and individual actions are 
different in their effects. As noted by Cohen (1999) Giddens asserts that:
‘... most groups exhibit two characteristic features .... enduring patterns of 
positions and relationships, characteristics, structural features (for example moral 
codes, types of domination, class structures).’ (Cohen, 1999:282)
Structuration Theory (Giddens, 1976, 1984) has, therefore, enabled better sense to be 
made of the actions and systems described in the fieldwork, as they form the fabric of 
medical and management ‘structures’. Examination of these actions also demonstrates 
the strengths and weakness of analytical models, which must tease apart essentially 
interlocked elements of human action. Thus, for instance, in the clinical domain 
investigatory actions draw on structures of signification. They also display the exercise 
of power and are facilitated within legitimating norms. Examinations and tests are, 
therefore, undertaken, which are sanctioned by the power of the profession and 
facilitated by its existing knowledge stocks. Similarly classifiable actions also include
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those aimed at justification, justification being increasingly important as the 
opportunity for disagreement increases. Thus, some of those tests and examinations are 
designed to exclude, for instance, the presence of pathological cause. They also include 
actions based on low levels of significance being attached by clinicians to each other’s 
information. As discussed in chapter 7, clinicians often disregard the details gathered 
by colleagues in favour of their own primary findings. Thus medical casenotes are 
idiosyncratic to the point sometimes of impenetrability.
10.2 Social Construction of Reality Extended: the Issue of Ontological Security
Staying at the level of the stakeholder groups, a further perspective on observed 
behaviours can be gained by consideration that both groups believe themselves to be 
dealing with the same universe of discourse. That two such fundamentally different 
‘realities’ can emerge from what are apparently the same phenomena is an example, as 
discussed by Checkland and Hoi well (1998) that different people may attribute 
different meanings to the same data, or different meanings at different times, because 
the agent is human not machine. This is not to say that social reality is a ‘hotchpotch’ 
of unique responses. Clearly social order exists. As argued by Layder (1994), these 
relatively ‘independent’ characteristics of individuals have an organic connection with 
wider social processes, hence ‘social order’. Thus, it can be seen that subscribers to 
these beliefs are not passive. In their own ways each seeks to protect and promulgate 
their own preferences, worldviews and philosophies. Observed behaviour might, 
therefore, be explained in terms of what Giddens describes as the need for ‘ontological 
security’ (Giddens, 1984: 375).
Giddens (1984) describes ontological security as:
‘Confidence and trust that the natural and social worlds are as they appear to be,
including the basic existential parameters of self and social identity.’ (Giddens,
1984: 375)
He elaborates on this as being the foundation upon which ‘routine’ rests, routinisation 
being claimed as a necessary element of human personality structure. For Giddens, in 
most circumstances of social life the sense of ontological security is routinely grounded 
in mutual knowledge employed such that the interaction is unproblematic or can be
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largely taken for granted. In other words, as observed by Craib (1992) for Giddens 
social order exists because we are creatures of habit. Craib argues against this, 
maintaining that Giddens* approach amounts to primacy for the routine ways we 
construct institutions etc., rather than the routine ways we construct meanings.
It is useful at this point to return to the notion, discussed earlier, that all knowledge 
claims exist in the form we know them:
‘.... In response to particular interests in prediction and control, which are in turn 
related to social interests.’ (Barnes, 1977: 30)
and that interests, particularly robust ideological interests can lead to consideration of 
questions like:
‘What account of reality would lead others to act so that instead of furthering their 
own interests .... they furthered ours?’ (Barnes, 1977: 30)
What is being considered, therefore, is the extent to which observed behaviour was 
reflective of a need for ontological security pursued through ontological protectionism 
and ontological supremacy. Reconsideration of the context of these two groups is 
useful here.
It is no coincidence, and it was wholly predictable that the arena in which this is played 
out is what Mintzberg (1983: 191) refers to as a ‘Professional Bureaucracy’. As 
discussed earlier, in Mintzberg’s analysis this type of organisation is predominantly 
bureaucratic, in terms of approaches to organising core work. However, some 
standards referred to are generated not by the organisation, but by self-governing 
institutions residing outside the organisation and holding primacy in terms of 
professionals’ loyalty. As discussed in the literature review, in the NHS the core work 
is characterised, at least at a macro level, by a reductionist, scientific approach. 
However, the external, clinical standard-setting body is the BMA. The support work is 
more characteristic of a machine bureaucracy, with professionals’ support staff 
facilitating their work and performing as many of the ‘routine’ tasks as possible. This 
gives rise to an organisational form in conflict, wherein parallel hierarchies operate; 
one top-down with a commitment to a machine bureaucracy for support staff, wherein 
power comes from position, and one bottom-up and democratic for professionals,
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wherein power comes from expertise. This phenomenon will be returned to later in 
discussion of what Giddens (1976, 1984) describes as ‘structural conflict’. At this 
point, however, it can be seen as a situation, discussed earlier, where key groups are:
‘.... thrown together .... and are forced to maintain themselves and their ideas in
the face of the onslaught of .... heterogeneous groups.’ (Mannheim, 1970:118)
In other words, it is arguable that this situation of conflict leads to behaviour oriented 
towards maintaining ontological freedom, or ontological protectionism, and possibly 
also to ontological imperialism, or the pursuit of ontological supremacy. Thus, to look 
at one of the two key groups under study, the Government’s pursuit and promotion of 
their worldview by the promulgation of information based on ICD-10, OPCS-4 and 
HRGs might be considered in the context of an attempt to achieve ontological security 
by a kind of imperialist approach. As discussed by Bowker and Starr, these systems 
have been described as ‘frozen organisational discourse’ (1994: 187) in that they are 
reflective of the belief system, the values, opinions and philosophical commitments of 
their subscribers.
In summary so far, what has been observed can be perceived within the notion of 
outward manifestations or, to use a clinical analogy, symptoms of protection and 
furtherance of deep philosophical commitments which determine what is structured as 
‘reality’. What can also be perceived is something about how those structures emerge, 
some of the effects of their emergence and the implications of their emergence in terms 
of the kinds of conflict inherent in Mintzberg’s model (1983:191) of the Professional 
Bureaucracy, and in Mannheim’s (1970) work on the organisational implications of 
multiple occupational groups. What were of key interest to this thesis were the effects 
of these phenomena and situations on information transfer. Once again Giddens’ work 
(1976, 1984) offers useful insights, this time with the concept he describes as 
‘structural contradiction’ or ‘conflict’.
10.3 Structural Contradiction and Conflict
Use of Giddens’ concept o f ‘structural contradiction’ or ‘conflict’ (1976, 1984) enabled 
analysis which embraced the organisational context as a whole. This concept refers
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to an inconsistency in organising principles which manifests itself in eruptions of 
conflict along the fault lines. It is argued here that this should be taken explicitly to 
mean structuring of reality, as described above, and that manifestation of this discord 
can be found when action and interaction is seen in terms of what constitutes the 
‘structure’ we refer to in describing organisational forms. Thus, as Giddens (1976) 
argues, Marx identified the central contradiction in structural principles as that between 
socialised production and private ownership. In other words, we produce collectively 
and are mutually interdependent in doing so, but what we produce is appropriated by 
private individuals. In the case of the NHS it might be argued that there is inherent 
structural contradiction manifest between the two key groups. On the one hand, there is 
the centralist, objectivist role, whose collective, financially and politically accountable 
responsibilities of administrators are reflected in their actions and informational 
behaviour. On the other hand, there is the professional, independent, individual- 
oriented role of the clinician and their consequent actions and informational behaviour.
Manifestations of this phenomenon include the information systems which are at the 
heart of this thesis. They each reflect the knowledge-creating contexts of their 
sponsors. Thus previous analyses of the medical casenote were supplemented with the 
notion that it is reflective of the power base originally agreed for clinicians. It serves 
their needs, not those of the wider organisation. Classifications similarly reflect a 
reified justification of the original decision that a service like the NHS could be 
controlled. Thus the original agreement is one which holds each key stakeholder group 
in constant conflict, which is manifested and maintained by the systems in use. Hence, 
the total lack of exchange of meaningful information between two groups with different 
agendas, whose information systems are so deeply implicated in pursuit of those 
agendas. To return to Figure 4:
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Figure 8, Two Domains Revisited
The original aims of the research were to better understand the nature and validity of 
data underpinning key social processes, namely in the area of healthcare and, broadly, 
to do this by exploring the issues surrounding transfer of clinical knowledge and 
information from its origins with the clinician, through various transformation points, 
to its emergence as healthcare statistics. As figure 8 shows, this importantly reveals 
that transfer, the passing on in essentially unchanged form, of clinical knowledge or 
information is not occurring. What exists are systems which allow the extraction of 
pure data by the non-clinical groups from the clinical domain, which is turned into
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information by the application of meaning reflective of the non-clinical domain. This 
represents construction of a new and different reality, again reflective of the frame of 
reference of the non-clinical domain and not reflective of the clinical reality it purports 
to represent. This data transfer is done without debate and with little discussion. 
Where discussion occurs conflict, in the form of complete lack of mutual 
understanding, results. The systems are, therefore, consistent with the political 
structures of their sponsors, but inconsistent with each other and with any notion of a 
unitary organisation. They reflect and maintain a situation where the relationship 
between the key groups is one of duress.
This observation led the analysis to further exploration of a different dimension of the 
problem domain, that of relationships, and to use of some of the insights offered by 
ANT.
10.4 Actor Network Theory
ANT (Callon, 1986, 1997; Law et al, 1989; Latour 1989, 1991, 1997, 1998) is argued 
as offering only limited analysis of either wider or more local social structures. Nor is 
it a theory (Callon, 1997). It does not, therefore, provide a coherent explanatory 
principle. It does, however, focus on how things get done, and explores this by analysis 
of the creation and maintenance of coextensive networks of human and non-human 
elements. Hence, its use in combination with Structuration Theory in the context of 
this research, and given findings thus far, was considered useful.
The approach used in ANT began with an initial concern with the sociology of science 
(Callon, 1986, Latour, 1987) which grew into exploration of technology and 
information technology (Latour 1996a and 1996b). As discussed by Callon (1997) 
ANT in part focuses on:
‘ .... the role of technical devices and scientific skills in the performing of the 
collective.’ (Callon, 1997: 12)
In the case of information systems these include people, organisations, software, 
computer and communications hardware and infrastructure standards. As further noted
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by Callon (1997):
‘ANT was developed to analyse situations in which it is difficult to separate 
humans and non-humans, and in which the actors have variable forms and 
competencies.’ (Callon, 1997: 3)
The particular contribution of ANT to this thesis was in its focus on the network of 
relationships which operate between individuals and groups, and the notion that the 
‘social’ world results from successful networks of aligned interests, which are created 
by enrolment of sufficient allies. This is achieved by translation of their interests so 
that they are willing to participate in particular ways of thinking and acting which will 
maintain the network. Together with Structuration Theory (Giddens, 1976, 1984) this 
helped to further explain the nature and practice of the clinical and management 
professions. Its focus on relationships also resulted in reconsideration of the apparent 
lack of relationship between the two groups.
In terms of clinicians the evidence has shown that, in order to protect the current status 
and practice of medicine, to general society they must cloak their work in the mantle of 
science and mask those unscientific characteristics. Thus clinical groups have 
successfully enrolled management as allies, by colluding in a representation of their 
work which encourages the management practice of wide promulgation of data, which 
then reinforces consequent social perceptions of medicine. Clinicians, therefore, 
actively sustain a representation of clinical work which constitutes its socially accepted 
structure, and thereby protect their social position. They also, however, work within a 
substantially different structure, which supports notions of pursuit of ontological 
security, as discussed above. This insight revealed action and structure as pluralistic 
and not unitary. This supports the notion of the knowing or reflexive subject, and 
disproves assertions of action being fully determined by structure.
Both domains may now be interpreted as existing as a result of successful achievement 
of networks of aligned interests, which were created and are maintained by enrolment 
of sufficient allies. This is achieved, for instance, by Ministers by perpetuating a 
representation of the NHS and of their role in achieving its effectiveness and efficiency, 
to the extent that they are willing to participate in those ways of thinking, and the 
actions which follow, and thereby maintain the network. Clinicians’ success is in part
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at least the result of expert power, which has been shown to manipulate wider society to 
its own ends. In both domains action can now be seen not as purely pragmatic, or 
misguided, but as an active attempt to enrol allies which will enable socially 
constructed contexts to be perpetuated. What is also now apparent is that, although 
pure data flowed between the two domains, allowing meaning to be situationally 
created, a second, informal flow existed as part of this network, which informed non­
clinicians that clinicians were engaged in scientific activity and enrolled them in that 
view.
This analysis was further enhanced by ANT’s insights into non-human resources, 
which in this theory include computers systems and software (Bowker and Starr, 1994). 
These are recognised as inherent parts of these networks because they are not seen as 
passive. They are seen also to exert influence by standing in or speaking for particular 
viewpoints which have been inscribed in them. This is consistent with Bowker and 
Starr’s description of computer software as ‘frozen organisational discourse’ (Bowker 
and Starr, 1994: 187). Where these delegates are robust and resistant to change they 
are known as ‘immutable mobiles’ and viewed as taking interaction to a point where it 
is no longer possible to return to a point where alternatives exist. To that extent they 
fix certain elements of relationships in any related network. They also significantly 
strengthen them. This helps to explain findings from the research which gave every 
indication of permanence to both the classifications and the behaviours which 
surrounded them. They can also be explained by Barnes’ (1977) observation that:
‘Often (invalid) descriptions are the product of social interests which make it 
advantageous to misrepresent reality, or social restrictions upon the investigation 
of reality, which make accurate perception of it impossible.’ (Barnes, 1977: 1)
ANT enabled, therefore, a fuller appreciation of the problem context, by suggesting and 
supporting exploration of both the superstructure and relevant actions, and the tensions 
and dependencies existing among and between groups, and also by enabling deeper 
understanding of the formal and informal relationships and flows between them.
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Chapter!!, Final Conclusions, Implications and Recommendations
In this chapter the final conclusions and implications of this thesis are discussed. Also 
discussed are recommendations for further work. As clinical knowledge, data and 
information formed the vehicle for this thesis, the discussion focuses first on the area of 
healthcare practice and management. It then broadens to a more general level.
In making these conclusions and recommendations, a number of things are recognised. 
Firstly, the problem as perceived has not been ‘solved’. Such a concept was considered 
inappropriate to research which sought, instead, to advance knowledge in this area. 
Secondly, many of the findings reflect issues with deep-seated sociological causes. It is 
recognised, therefore, that ability amongst practitioners and key stakeholders to make 
changes at that level would be limited and success would be slow. This is because the 
changes implied by such issues are both behavioural and wide-ranging. They are also 
highly contingent. This does not, however, invalidate them, for two reasons. Firstly, 
what could be achieved much more quickly, and with great affect, is awareness among 
practitioners that such factors exist, awareness of the likely causes, and more informed 
practice as a result. Also, recommendations can be made which relate to current issues, 
including those involving long-term investments, which can have even longer-term 
effects. Deep exploration of the recommendations, in terms of detailed implementation 
issues would be the subject of a further piece of work. They are, therefore, presented in 
a relatively brief format here. However, even at this level, together with the evidence 
presented in this thesis, they have the potential to influence important perceptions 
among key groups. This alone would be an important first step in achieving the kinds 
of wider social changes suggested.
11.1 Conclusions for Healthcare Practice and Management
This research began by asking the following questions:
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• Is there an objectivity inherent in clinical data?
• Can it be so readily translated into the body of statistical fact that underpins the 
data sets for healthcare decision-making?
• What is the relationship between the social knowledge processes involved in 
clinical decision-making and the nature of data produced from those actions?
• What is the impact on decision-making in healthcare management?
Taking the notion of objectivity to mean that about which there are high levels of 
consensus, as discussed in chapter 3, the findings have shown that clinical work 
produces a mixed assemblage of highly subjective and more objective data. Evidence 
also demonstrated that, because of this heterogeneity, an irregular relationship exists 
between clinical data and its statistical counterpart. In this way it was demonstrated 
that all clinical data can technically be readily translated into the body of statistical fact 
which underpins healthcare decision-making. However, it was also demonstrated that 
accurate technical performance does not necessarily equate to transfer of knowledge. 
Rather this process gives a partly illusory and misleading representation, which 
confirms the socially-held perception of clinical work. This results in and from 
situational realities. Ability to translate such data in such a way as to transfer such 
knowledge across social boundaries, without disturbing meaning has, therefore, been 
shown to be questionable.
This was shown to be caused as a result of enactment by clinical and non-clinical 
groups of their respective social contexts. These can be defined as knowledge- 
creating contexts which determine how data might be both produced and also how it 
might be validly used in decision-making, both within and outside the domain of 
clinical work. These enactments were shown to be mutually constitutive of action and 
structure, both within and between groups.
Clinical enactment both created the clinical view of reality clinically sought, and also 
colluded in that sought by non-clinicians. Creation of this latter view was shown to 
have a foundation both in clinical behaviour towards general society and, at the initial 
stages of data transfer, through the medical casenote. At this point construction through
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the data of an alternative model of the clinical reality experienced began. Non-clinical 
groups imposed their own model, based on their own very different frames of reference 
and assumptions about clinical work. These non-clinical models reflected those factors 
rather than any direct interaction with clinical reality itself.
Models created in this way were shown to give the appearance of control over their area 
of reality because they defined and, in that sense, created it. Belief in them generated 
behaviour which perpetuated those realities, and which, aimed as it is in this case at 
healthcare decision-making up to policy level, has widely-known and far-reaching 
effects.
This thesis has demonstrated, therefore, that, as noted by Bladder (1995):
\ . . .  knowledge is multifaceted and complex, being both situated and abstract, 
implicit and explicit, distributed and individual, physical and mental, developing 
and static, verbal and encoded.’ (Bladder, 1995, in Scarborough et al, 1999: 34)
It has also shown medical practice to be an area where formalisation of that knowledge 
is inherently problematic, due to a range of social factors. As noted by Clancey:
\ . . .  medical practice is inherently unformalizable and truth-constructing, and that 
doesn’t fit with the objectivist view of classic science.’(Clancey, 1995: 8)
Turning now to the last research question, the impacts of these findings on decision­
making in healthcare are significant. As things currently stand, this knowledge 
underpins key final outputs, which at present include hospital management data and 
government statistics about healthcare. They will increasingly also include data upon 
which clinical decisions are made. In that context this knowledge has been shown to 
perpetuate structures and actions which are misconceived. To argue that decisions 
made in this context are irrational would be inaccurate. As discussed by Dreyfus et al 
(1986) the term ‘rational’ may be defined as that which can be explained based on valid 
explanation, where the elements of a situation can be identified and combined by a 
decision rule in order to justify a particular decision. Thus, NHS managers might argue 
that it is rational to close one of two intensive care facilities because the data shows that
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levels of conditions treated by them only justify one. Such decisions have rationality in 
that they are the result of calculative thought. However, it is misguided rationality, as 
an unknown quantity of the data on which it is based is fabricated. The research found, 
therefore, that NHS healthcare policies displayed fundamentally flawed rationality.
In terms of whether this matters and whether it works, in one sense it does. The NHS 
continues from day to day and patients are treated. However, if this is done, and the 
evidence presented suggests it is, on the assumption that policies are based on 
knowledge of clinical reality as experienced by patients and clinicians, it must now be 
argued that this assumption is incorrect. The model which the DH use has been shown 
to be too far removed from that which they assume, and the primary DH relationship is 
not with that assumed reality but with that constructed by, and from, and with the data, 
and the methods and assumptions applied to it. These findings raise, therefore, serious 
questions about the validity of healthcare statistics, and the wide range of governmental 
strategic decision-making.
11.2 Implications and Recommendations for Healthcare Practice and 
Management
If this situation is to improve, the implications of these findings for the NHS are 
momentous and would affect all organisational groups explored in this research. An 
informed response would require a fundamental reappraisal of the vast range of 
decisions and systems which rely on the transference of clinical knowledge across 
functional boundaries, and of its use in different knowledge domains. Such decisions 
include policy development, determination of how much taxpayers’ money should be 
spent on healthcare, funding allocation, and systems investments.
Addressing these issues clearly has implications for the current structural arrangements 
in the NHS. As this thesis has demonstrated, ‘structure’ is a manifestation of personal 
and informational behaviour. If these arrangements persist, the problems identified in 
this thesis can be expected to also. Thus the situation where clinicians have no formal 
corporate responsibility and managers have no management responsibility which is
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inextricably linked to the core work of the business, must be reappraised. Part of this 
would involve establishing a currently missing link between the meaning of data and its 
purpose. In other words, a method of doing business must be found where it is not 
possible to disregard whether a bone marrow transplant is coded as a kidney transplant, 
and where a clinical conjecture about the source of pain cannot be coded as kidney 
stones. This would help overcome the current situation where each key stakeholder 
group can be ignorant of the realities and problems of the other. This is not 
unavoidable, and small examples of more successful approaches exist, which range 
from the supportive and positive to the punitive. An example of a supportive approach 
was found in a clinical department which adopted a more organic method of 
management. Here a manager was employed specifically as a boundary-spanning 
liaison between the department’s clinical needs and those of hospital management. 
This person was a manager, but employed by the clinical department. This had been 
highly successful, as trust was developed by both clinical and managerial groups that a 
fair and balanced process of mutual understanding and negotiation was taking place. 
A more punitive approach is the US hospital which withdrew admitting privileges to 
physicians who did not complete high quality clinical documentation about patients in a 
given timescale. Clearly, these are small-scale examples, and the US case exists within 
a very different context to that of the NHS. However, current principles of organising 
in the NHS have been shown to be one result of circumstances and not, therefore, the 
only ones possible.
Such a change in the value of information to the NHS would, in turn, support an 
equally necessary change in the attitudes of both professional and non-professional staff 
to each other. As long as existing attitudes persist substantial change will not occur in 
the existing situation. It would also have implications for the nature of all staff 
handling clinical coding and data, and the training and career infrastructures 
surrounding them. More informed behaviour in this area would require a different level 
of expertise among relevant staff, and concomitant rewards.
There are also implications for systems, which would also have effects on those 
involved in them. Systems here include coding schemes and automated coding
254
systems. The former are the backbone of NHS data flows and, as the electronic health 
and electronic patient record begins to become a reality, the latter will grow in 
importance. Given this situation, there would be a need to move away from the current 
situation where:
‘.... development of formal vocabularies moves about in its own world of 
formalism. Now that many groups have developed competing vocabularies, the 
problem has been transformed to formally relating formal descriptions. The 
original problem faced by a medical practitioner of producing good descriptions 
and interpreting past work are lost. To the vocabulary enthusiast we need only 
produce finer-grained vocabularies and all will be complete and rational.’ 
(Clancey, 1995: 8-9)
As this thesis has shown, there is no way to completely record subjective experiences 
and events. All coding requires abstraction from experience and interpretation of 
terminology. All coding means that the primary information and its context are 
necessarily left out. As noted by Shariq (1991) knowledge transfer is ultimately a 
human-to-human process. Even in this type of transfer, since this process is inherently 
interactive and dynamic, the knowledge, in essence, transforms while or during the very 
process of its transfer. Herein lies the dilemma. In an increasingly electronic 
environment, coded, computerised clinical data is essential. This is the case not only 
for management, if any notion of efficiency, effectiveness and equity, all of which are 
apparently aspired to, is to permeate the NHS as a whole. It is also essential for clinical 
purposes. Bowker and Starr (1994) following their analysis of the ICD for mortality 
purposes, suggest a way forward which recognises the inherent tension in this need, but 
also demonstrates the size of the task implied:
‘It is unrealistic and counter-productive to try to destroy all uncertainty and
ambiguity in these sorts of infrastructural tools  Rather than root out all
instances of ambiguity, analysts of standardised lists should instead seek clearly 
and consistently to define the degree of ambiguity that is appropriate to the object 
in question.’ (Bowker and Starr, 1994: 207)
They do not offer any practical suggestions about how this might be done, and indeed it 
could be argued that the degree of definition suggested assumes a constancy in clinical 
reality which was not observed during the research. The problem in this approach is 
echoed by Davenport and Prusak (1998) who assert that:
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‘The challenge is to codify knowledge and still leave its distinctive attributes 
intact, putting in place coding structures that can change as rapidly and as flexibly 
as the knowledge itself.’ (Davenport and Prusak, 1998: 87)
However, there is at least a recognition of the inadequacy of such tools, which is the 
foundation for change. A similar recognition was found in Law’s comments. His 
concern is more focused on the need for and effects of labelling:
‘Naming does work. It does analytical work. But it also does political work .....
Labelling .... strains to perform simplicity. It pushes towards singularity. It tends 
to make relative fixity. And it helps to perform the possibility of unsituated 
transportability.’ (Law, 1997: 9)
However, as he goes on to note, this should not deter consideration of:
‘.... how to talk about something, how to name it without reducing it to the 
homogeneity and fixity of singularity ....’ (Law, 1997: 10)
Clancey (1995 ) perhaps offers a practical way forward:
‘We must focus on the practice of how people use descriptions, perhaps 
augmenting them by informal representations (e.g. free text, photos, video, sound 
recordings) and ensuring that meaning can be reconstructed collaboratively.’ 
(Clancey, 1995: 8-9)
Thus what Clancey is suggesting is a move away from the assumption that any one type 
of system can capture the complexity that is clinical knowledge, towards an improved 
situation where multiple input and output types are employed. This has some 
precedence already, in prototype clinical systems, which at the time of this research 
were aimed purely at delivery of clinical work, and which combined such multi-media 
and format presentations. This demonstrates a positive move at the clinical level, the 
wider relevance of which will unfold in due course.
This would inevitably, however, have implications for the data which Government 
could extract from the NHS, and its belief in the notion that the NHS is being 
accurately controlled by current methods, or indeed that it can ever be controlled to that 
extent. It would require a shift from the image currently projected that fairly complete
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and concrete information about the use of public money is held, to a realistic account 
and realistic plans. This sea-change has no precedence in Government behaviour and 
the motivation to do it, while critical, is not assumed.
Given the implications discussed above, it is recommended, therefore, that further work 
is undertaken in this area, which involves clinicians and non-clinical stakeholders, to 
fundamentally realign traditional notions of which clinical knowledge can reliably be 
computer coded, and that findings from this work find expression in the clinical 
systems, statistical datasets and decisions of the future. It is recommended that the 
models developed in this thesis be employed in this work. This will further test those 
models and thesis findings. It is also recommended that findings from further work 
reshape and refocus the enormous efforts directed towards measuring and achieving 
quality in the area of coded clinical data, so that the NHS becomes a learning 
organisation, rather than one caught in its own history (Stinchcombe, 1965).
In making the above recommendations, account is taken of reflections made by 
Davenport and Prusak (1998). The process in which clinical and non-clinical groups 
would engage in undertaking such recommendations would be one of knowledge 
sharing and creation. In that circumstance a shared language is essential:
‘Research has shown time and time again that a shared language is essential to 
productive knowledge transfer. Without it individuals will neither understand nor 
trust one another. Brought together they will simply clash and not connect.’ 
(Davenport and Prusak, 1998: 98)
Thus it is also recommended that individuals with boundary spanning abilities would be 
a key group to the process suggested. These individuals would translate between 
cultures and value systems, and thereby make knowledge creation and sharing easier. 
Future work might usefully focus on a methodological approach such individuals might 
employ. It is suggested, therefore, that this thesis could usefully have practical 
implications, in that it could be used to develop guidance for a range of practitioners, 
including those in the fields of management, IS and OT, and other key stakeholder 
groups, which was based on recognition of the findings of this research and on
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addressing the range of issues thus entailed in managing and implementing change of 
this type.
Response to the significant challenge this would represent for the NHS would need to 
be driven from the highest levels. As discussed earlier, the factors leading to the 
current situation have multiple, sometimes deep-seated sociological foundations. They 
would involve all key stakeholder groups: clinicians, coders, managers, statisticians and 
Ministers. They would also directly affect the general public. Given that situation, the 
changes suggested would require significant power in order to see them through.
Structure has already been discussed in terms of organisational players. However, this 
is also an issue for the above-mentioned practitioners involved in facilitating any 
change. The systems needed would not be for the organisation or ‘structures’ of today.
The challenges are, therefore, substantial. However, the rewards for all involved could 
be equally so:
‘.... the ability to analyse the different types of knowledge deployed by the 
organisation (are they embedded in organisational routines, in technology, or in 
people, and what are the transfer processes between these modal types?) and to 
relate such knowledge to issues of organisational design, career patterns and 
employment security, would provide an interpretive resource of greater value than 
the simplistic, cognitive paradigm that emerges from much of the existing 
literature .... Understanding can in turn inform practice in that the awareness of 
different forms of knowledge and their contribution to the organisation can help to 
shift the debate from the level of epistemology to a much more grounded and firm- 
specific discussion centred on corporate strategy.’ (Scarborough et al, 1999: 51)
11.3 General Conclusions and Recommendations
The apparent leap in this thesis from a constructivist view of information: that it is part 
of social interaction and structures, etc, to a structuralist view, was shown not to be the 
product of the thesis or the approach taken to the research. Rather, it was a unique 
discovery of this research that this dichotomy exists in reality. The dynamic nature of 
the emergence of knowledge, and the way it is sometimes ossified, e.g. through ICD- 
10, generates a different reaction than would otherwise have been the case. Thus,
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ossified knowledge was shown to assume characteristics not associated with its 
dynamic origins, and to lead to behaviour that would otherwise not have occurred.
These findings have a number of major and more generalisable implications. At one 
level they promote caution, both in terms of untested assumptions about social domains 
and also, therefore, in terms of the use of data associated with those domains. At a 
more fundamental level, however, key amongst the implications is the issue that, in 
order for more informed consideration to be given to transfer of knowledge via any 
medium, and in any setting, particularly where unstructured, highly qualitative areas are 
addressed, it is first necessary to challenge socially accepted assumptions about the 
nature of the knowledge involved and its relevance and relationship to any subsequent 
modelling methods, techniques and decisions. It has been shown that, whatever the 
reasons which precipitate such action, it is simply inadequate to apply scientific, 
machine models to knowledge areas of this type. This thesis demonstrates that these 
models have application, but also that they singularly fail to recognise complex 
realities, not least because they fail both to take responsibility for the informational 
content of what they address, and to recognise information as a fundamentally human 
phenomena.
In final conclusion, and to return now, on the basis of the evidence presented, to a basic 
premise of this thesis, its findings call also for further work in a number of areas.
The implications of the findings reported in this thesis are significant. It is, therefore, 
recommended that they are also tested outside the sphere of healthcare. The ontological 
position assumed in this thesis rejects the notion of ‘truth’ that can be known 
independently of the values, interests and purposes of the enquirer. It engages in:
‘.... knowledge making as a human activity (which produces) sufficient 
compelling evidence in order to persuade one another of the value or goodness of a 
way of thinking.’ (Schwandt, 1993: 19-20)
Validation of the findings in this thesis rests, therefore on two factors. The first is 
contained within the thesis and involves the extent to which the underlying assumptions
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on which the arguments and stances are built have been exposed and bear scrutiny. 
This level of validation requires no new work to be undertaken. The second involves 
the extent to which this thesis has produced knowledge worth acting on. In order to 
determine this it is recommended that further work is undertaken which tests the 
strength of the relationship between the key theories, concepts and domain models 
which have been established and other, different, real world social contexts.
Also, this thesis asserts the value of a transdisciplinary exploration of knowledge, data 
and information. It also asserts the importance of exploring these phenomena in-situ. It 
is recommended that work is undertaken, which may include any of that discussed here, 
that tests these approaches.
Drawing now on specific findings from the thesis, two further recommendations for 
future work are made. Firstly, it is recommended that work is undertaken to 
fundamentally reassesses the types of knowledge being handled in systems generally 
and the way those types are handled. It is recommended that it should provide either 
conclusive evidence to support the notion that machines which can handle those levels 
and types of complexity can be found or, if not, for a methodological framework for 
more sensitive application of ‘scientific’ systems, which recognises the limitations of 
the paradigm.
Secondly, there is an increasing reliance on a knowledge-based economy and the need 
for learning organisations to underpin that. It is recommended, therefore, that the 
models and findings developed in this thesis are used to develop the above-mentioned 
notion of exploring the types of knowledge that can be reliably computer-coded into a 
more powerful theory of Knowledge Management. In other words, it is recommended 
that this thesis and the research on which it is based is used as a platform for achieving 
organisations and systems driven by knowledge rather than data. This has the potential 
to improve the quality of our actions in response to situations, reinstating the 
‘knowledge’ we appear to have lost in the phenomenon that is ‘information’ (Eliot, 
1963).
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Chapter 12, Contribution of the Research to the Literature
This chapter describes the contributions made by this research to a number of areas of 
literature. Contributions to specific areas are discussed first, and followed by 
contributions of a more general nature.
A range of contributions are discussed within this chapter, some of which may seem 
insignificant. However, in relatively young fields, for instance Medical Informatics 
and Knowledge Management, it seems appropriate at this stage to include them, as 
some may be seminal. Further research would determine this and, therefore, the 
relative importance of other contributions. Thus, while a summary table of key 
contributions can be helpful where such a range is discussed, for these reasons that 
presentational approach is not used here. The presentation of this chapter thus seeks to 
be coherent rather than to give any notion of significance.
Specific areas of contribution were considered to be The Sociology of Knowledge, and 
within that ANT (Callon, 1986, 1997; Law, 1987; Latour, 1996a, 1996b) the Sociology 
of Scientific Knowledge; Knowledge Management and within that AI; Information 
Systems, Organisational Theory and Medical Informatics; and Healthcare 
Management.
This thesis claims to have also contributed on a more general level by providing an 
innovative combination and application of cross-disciplinary bodies of work.
12.1 Contributions to the Sociology of Knowledge
A contribution has been made to the Sociology of Knowledge, particularly as it is 
explored through Structuration Theory (Giddens (1976, 1984). As discussed earlier, 
this is an abstract, heuristic, meta-level theory which explicitly excludes explanatory or 
descriptive application to real-world situations and stops at the level of meta-analysis. 
However, theory comes from iterative engagement with reality, and in order to claim 
validity must demonstrate its ability to offer explanatory insights to real life situations. 
Application of this theory to the research problem has, therefore, strengthened its claim
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to validity. By adding this practical dimension, it should also have made it more 
accessible to other researchers.
A specific example of this was development, by application to the real-life context of 
the research problem, of the model underpinning this theory so that it includes 
consideration of the processes in play between different frames of reference and the 
resulting actions. These were namely the reflective processes, which engage with 
consciously selected data, which is endowed with meaning. This meaning is drawn 
from existing structures, including individual frames of reference.
A second specific example addressed the argument that its meta-level, abstract focus 
means that this theory fails to address the material world of information systems in any 
substantial way all. This theory and its analytical framework represent a theoretical 
view which claims that systems embody interpretive schemes, norms and controlling 
facilities. As noted by Walsham (1993):
‘They are thus deeply implicated in the modalities that link social action and 
structure, and are drawn on in interaction, thus reinforcing or changing social 
structures of signification, domination and legitimation.’ (Walsham, 1993: 64)
However, this theoretical view was shown to be sufficiently well-developed to enable 
its successful application during the research to explore coding and computer systems. 
The implications for associated action and structure were also articulated. Thus it was 
both a conclusion of this thesis and a contribution to work in knowledge areas generally 
that knowledge which is ossified by systems assumes a host of characteristics not 
associated with its dynamic origins, and also has a defining influence on consequent 
behaviour.
Building on the social aspects of this contribution, the thesis also provides case study 
evidence of the effects of social location and characteristics on informational 
behaviour, and thereby again provides real life examples of the theoretical notion of 
structural contradiction and conflict (Giddens, 1976, 1984). It also, importantly 
describes not only effects, but also causes, thereby enabling recommendations for 
alternative action.
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This enabled demonstration in the thesis of the necessity to take analysis into more 
detailed exploration of systems and relationships, in order to fully appreciate what is 
happening and why in a problem domain. Thus the thesis provides an added richness 
to this theory by demonstrating that structure and action do not happen only in unitary 
environments. In the case of clinicians some actions were aimed at promoting the 
scientific structure of medicine, while others operated within clinically accepted 
structures.
This observation led to a contribution in a second area of work within the Sociology of 
Knowledge, ANT (Callon, 1986, 1997; Law et al, 1989; Latour 1989, 1991, 1997, 
1998). The contribution to which use of this work led involved the fact that ANT fits 
into social construction of technology (Bijker, Hughes and Pinch, 1987) and recognises 
that there are social consequences of technological choice, as well as reasons for it. The 
argument is that computers are increasingly undertaking tasks that were the domain of 
human intelligence, so the boundaries between the two are blurring. Latour (1996b) 
comments that:
Tt is no longer clear if a computer system is a limited form of organisation or if an 
organisation is an expanded form of computer system .... The two ... are now 
coextensive.’ (Latour, 1996b: 302)
He also argues that the two are inseparable. The heart of this approach is, therefore, 
complementary to that of Giddens discussed above, in that it encompasses recognition 
of technological systems as embodying social phenomena, in principal in same way as 
humans do. Where ANT makes a new contribution is in its approach to analysis of this 
phenomenon. Key dimensions of analysis include the notion of trying to trace and 
explain the processes whereby relatively stable networks of aligned interests are created 
and maintained through human and non-human agents. This analysis includes as 
central, therefore, people, organisations, software, computer and communications 
hardware and infrastructure standards. These elements were also central to the analysis 
of the problem explored in this thesis. People and systems were shown to be 
intrinsically linked, with systems being reflective of frames of reference, which 
included how the problems faced were framed and what measures were taken to 
address them. The thesis also shows how clinical and managerial behaviour could be 
interpreted as aimed towards sustaining networks of aligned interests, which each
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actively manipulated for their own ends. However, the thesis also contributes to this 
work in that it has also shown that the systems employed in this process are only a 
more visible manifestation of this issue. It asserts that all systems and choices about 
systems, whether computerised or manual, reflect human values and social 
characteristics. The thesis also shows that this is not as a result of a recent blurring of 
boundaries. Rather, this has long been the case, but these boundaries and the nature 
and effects of systems have been misunderstood. That ANT has arisen at this time is 
more likely to be reflective of the fact that technology is playing an increasingly large 
role in our lives. Effects have therefore become more acute, but the basic problem is of 
longer standing.
A further contribution has been made by demonstrating that understanding of broader 
social structures is an essential part of network analysis. These influence local 
structures and these include networks and collectivities of actors. In this sense, ANT 
seems to militate somewhat against the overall thrust of Giddens’ work, by overlooking 
the notion that the way things get done is part of a mutually constitutive process 
between action and structure. Supporters of ANT argue this is not the case:
\ . . .  The macro-structure of society is made of the same stuff as the micro­
structure. ’ (Latour, 1991:118)
They also argue that the methodological aspects of ANT can be used to move between 
the two. Firstly, some definition of what the ‘stuff referred to, and of macro and 
micro, is necessary to support this claim. Secondly, a contribution of this thesis is to 
demonstrate that it depends on the macro and micro-structures. The macro structures 
of the NHS and Government have been shown to have little effect, or at least little 
intended effect, on the micro-structure of its clinical workforce. ANT might, therefore, 
now be seen to overlook conflict of this type and at this level. A contribution of this 
thesis, therefore, is to demonstrate that use of the concepts in both this and 
Structuration Theory (Giddens, 1976, 1984) provide a more fine-grained analysis than 
would otherwise result.
A further contribution revolves around the notions of mutability and immutability, 
which this thesis has demonstrated could be better defined by ANT. ANT argues for 
the existence of immutable systems, which once established offer no possibility of
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returning to a position where alternatives might be considered. On the surface this 
militates somewhat against the notion of ‘social’ systems and mutability inherent in 
Giddens’ work (1976,1984). As discussed by Walsham and Han (1991):
‘The model of human agency in the theory views human beings as monitoring 
their conduct and its results in a reflexive way which together with an emphasis on 
the inevitability of unintended consequences o f intentional human conduct, 
implies that all action carries within it the seeds of change; thus all action can 
transform as well as reproduce existing structure.’ (Walsham and Han, 1991: 77)
However, there is also a temporal dimension which is not well articulated in ANT and 
was not the subject of this thesis, but which cannot be assumed. Structuration Theory 
allows for a temporal dimension, although it does not explore this in detail. It does 
assert that social practices are not fixed for all time, rather they are perceived to be 
mutable, and developing and changing in different ways in different times. The many 
consequences of social practices are, therefore, beyond being fully predictable or 
controllable in advance. As currently expressed, ANT does not explore this kind of 
dynamic. This is important because it demonstrates one aspect of humans and non­
humans which means they cannot be successfully analysed in the same way, as ANT 
would suggest. Knowledge and values were shown in this thesis to become ossified in 
the systems studied. Thus notions of mutual constitution were much less dynamic, 
although the effects of the systems on larger social structures and action was constant.
12.2 Contribution to the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge
A contribution by this thesis to this area of work was achieved by its exploration of 
numbers. It has demonstrated that, as noted by Handy:
‘Numbers .... are often the quantified expression of an opinion.’ Handy, 1985: 
341)
This thesis describes an innovative and practical demonstration of this process in the 
field of healthcare statistics. It also identifies and analyses both the causes and the 
effects associated with this.
A contribution in this area was also made by revealing medicine to be an art as well
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as a science. This suggests that the traditionally held view of medicine as purely 
scientific endeavour could usefully by adjusted. Also the link that this thesis has drawn 
between clinicians’ knowledge-creating processes and associated data indicates that 
widely held perceptions of that might also be adjusted. The thesis has shown that 
social construction is endemic in knowledge-creation, even in this apparently scientific 
field. It has also shown that the objective and factual status attaching to data produced 
in this way is equally a product of socially-defined activities. Even ‘objective’ 
measures have been shown to have a subjective element. For instance, taking a blood 
pressure depends upon myriad human attributes, so that only physically measurable 
objects are not subject to this. This suggests a contribution of interest in both this field 
and that of philosophy, which is that the homogeneous concepts of subjectivity and 
objectivity might usefully be stratified or further qualified in order to better reflect that 
to which they refer. It also suggests that the concept of ‘objectivity’ might justifiably 
be accorded no greater weight or deeper meaning than knowledge which follows from 
the available evidence, has been produced in accordance with current scientific 
practice, and accepted as such into a community. The notion of an ultimate ‘truth’ 
then becomes irrelevant and the inherent fallibility of knowledge creation is admitted.
12.3 Contributions to Knowledge Management
Contributions to this field are discussed here because they draw on concepts in the 
previous areas and also draw on and have relevance to those which follow.
Review of this area began promisingly, with Knapp’s (1998) observations about where 
the links between KM and industry were strongest. She asserts that foremost in these 
terms is the services sector, especially professional services firms, for which knowledge 
was the primary asset:
‘Knowledge Management (and the learning organisation) represent important new 
approaches to the problems of competitiveness and innovation confronting
organisations KM is .... focused on the ways in which firms facing highly
turbulent environments can mobilise their knowledge base (or knowledge assets) 
in order to ensure continuous innovation in projects.’ (Scarborough et al, 1999: 2)
Drew (1996) comments similarly:
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‘KM .... has an emphasis on relative competitive performance...’(Drew, 1996: 3)
KM focuses, therefore, on knowledge resources as ‘core competencies’ (Prahalad and 
Hamell, 1990) or ‘routines’ (Nelson and Winter, 1982) ‘capabilities’ (Collis, 1991) and 
‘core skills’ (Klein et al, 1991). Prahalad and Hamell(1990) discuss these resources 
as:
‘.... the well-spring of future product development .... the roots of 
competitiveness, and individual products and services are the fruit.’ (Prahalad and 
Hamell, 1990: 202)
Clearly then, the notion of managing knowledge has been driven by the search for 
increasingly effective ways of achieving and maintaining competitive commercial 
advantage. This was not necessarily problematic, as it was hoped that insights into the 
nature of knowledge would be such that findings were applicable in an organisation 
such as the NHS, which is non-profit-making, and where competition has been 
minimised to the point of non-existence for practical purposes. However, further 
exploration revealed a relatively narrow emphasis in this work and a number of other 
features of KM indicated the relative poverty of this field in relation to this research. 
KM was found to be dominated by:
‘.... a rather narrow IS perspective .... KM is primarily IS/IT driven.’ 
(Scarborough et al, 1999: 27)
Scarborough et al (1999) also noted that IT is seen as a key enabler to KM. Moreover, 
as noted by Gardner, its aim is to ‘mine’ the tacit knowledge, skills and expertise of 
people:
‘KM is equated to data mining, digging and drilling.’ (Gardner, 1998: 24)
‘ .... the idea behind KM is to stockpile workers’ knowledge and make it 
accessible to others via a searchable application.’ (Cole-Gromolski, 1997: 6)
A review of the KM literature indicated, therefore, that it is characterised by a scientific 
approach to knowledge and knowledge transfer, which is reminiscent of that discussed 
in literature on Al and Computer Science. As noted by Scarborough et al (1999):
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\ . . .  the systematic use of knowledge for economic objectives .... is clearly a 
feature of Taylorism and related methods.’ (Scarborough et al, 1999: 33)
KM emerged therefore, as:
‘.... a technocratic intervention, emphasising the use of IT and seeking to divorce 
the application of knowledge from its organisational context ....’ (Scarborough et 
al, 1999: 50)
A contribution made to this literature by this thesis is to demonstrate, not in any 
abstract way, but in a live case-study setting, that knowledge is socially-located and 
constructed, and that all coded information and computer systems are social systems. 
The thesis also demonstrates that failure to address these factors has significant, but not 
always immediately obvious negative effects. The current approach adopted by KM 
has, therefore, been shown to be simplistic, limited in scope and somewhat naive. It is 
suggested that KM must have a social dimension if it is to realise its potential and avoid 
becoming just another management fad.
A further contribution here, which again reflects the simplicity of current KM 
approaches, is the extent to which knowledge types have been described and discussed. 
Typically in the KM literature the dimensions of knowledge which are addressed are 
tacit and explicit, subjective and objective. For instance, Nonaka (1995, 1998) asserts 
that knowledge comes in two forms. The first is tacit/ explicit, the second is 
informal/uncodified, and formal/codified. This thesis adds the further, critical and thus 
far unexplored dimensions of uncertain/certain and incomplete/complete. Individuals 
have been shown still to make sense with vague, uncertain and incomplete knowledge. 
In addition this thesis has demonstrated how the process of knowledge generation and 
application changes from novice to expert. Experts operate on mature understanding 
that is so much a part of them they are almost unaware of it. Novices are more 
tentative and aware of their use of knowledge in decision-making processes. This 
thesis provides, therefore, further depth and texture to the types of knowledge KM 
addresses.
Moreover, as stated earlier, the aim of KM is to ‘mine’ the tacit knowledge, skills and 
expertise of people (Gardner, 1998). As asserted by Nonaka (1998):
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‘(KM) depends on tapping the tacit and often highly subjective insights, intuitions, 
and hunches of individual employees and making those insights available for 
testing and use by the company as a whole.’ (Nonaka, 1998: 24)
This is reminiscent of literature in the field of Al, and as this research has shown, the 
assumption that all knowledge is codifiable is wrong, and has consistently been proved 
so for some time by failures in Al. This thesis can, therefore, be said to have made a 
contribution to work in both of these fields. In addition, while hunches, etc. are 
discussed, scientism implicitly assumes an unproblematic and predictable relationship 
between knowledge, data, information and decision-making, which this thesis, in its 
exploration of clinical knowledge-creating and decision-making processes, has 
demonstrated cannot be assumed.
In summary, this thesis contributes to this area, and to Al, by demonstrating that 
rationalist assumptions about knowledge creation are inadequate and meaning cannot 
be transferred as easily as data, and also by providing detailed insights into the reasons 
for this. It has also shown that a broader approach to and definition of ‘knowledge 
management’ is not only possible but essential.
12.4 Contributions to IS, OT and Medical Informatics
It is also felt all of the above contributions are of importance to both the fields of IS 
and OT. As with KM, this thesis provides a useful resource in its description of the 
complexity of clinical knowledge contexts and processes, and the decision-making and 
behaviour associated with them. Also, as noted by Checkland and Holwell, (1998) the 
predominant model of organisation in both of these fields is either explicitly or 
implicitly philosophically positivistic and sociologically functionalist. This model 
overlooks a host of factors referred to above, including pluralism, any form of tribalism 
and fundamental differentiation. The systems which come from this view reflect this. 
This thesis demonstrates this was the situation in the NHS. What this thesis contributes 
is fuel for the argument that informed behaviour requires practitioners in both fields to 
take account of the wider organisational discourse within which the knowledge- 
creating of organisations is enacted. It has also demonstrated that this discourse takes
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place in a multi-disciplinary setting, and emphasises the need for practitioners with a 
far wider range of insights than the literature would suggest is often the case.
These comments are also relevant to the field of Medical Informatics. The specific 
contribution has been analysis of clinical decision-making and information use in the 
integrated context of both the local clinical and wider organisational settings. This 
expands the traditional focus in this area from clinical knowledge and data through to 
statistical datasets. This can particularly inform work in the area of clinical systems 
which, to date, as noted by De Dombal (1996) have reflected largely simplistic 
representations of knowledge and organisation. This thesis has shown reality is much 
more complex than this, and that it may be more realistic to accept that a variety of 
investigative and explanatory tools are required. It has also shown that Medical 
Informatics practitioners must develop in the same ways as are suggested for IS 
practitioners above.
12.5 Contributions to Healthcare Management
Finally, this thesis makes a significant contribution to literature on the theory and 
practice of healthcare management. Recognition of the research problem is 
demonstrated in that literature at only the most superficial levels, hence attempts to 
achieve better quality clinical data by training coders how to use classifications, and a 
relentless pursuit of coded electronic records which carry with them all of the historical 
issues discussed throughout the thesis. This thesis indicates the need for a move away 
from that position, which would require a fundamental reassessment of approaches to 
managing the NHS and to people and systems within it, and which would also require a 
very different sort of manager. It also, however, provides substantial material to enable 
those changes to be made.
12.6 General Contributions
At a general level this thesis makes a contribution to all areas of literature discussed, 
because it draws together very different areas of conceptual work, and in an innovative, 
transdisciplinary way extracts their mutually influential aspects and demonstrates their
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effects on socially significant classes of knowledge. As discussed, it also does this in a 
case study setting, which, for some areas of work in particular provides an essential 
application of theory to a real-life situation. This enables theory to be improved, or at 
least rendered more accessible to analysis and comment. It also provides substantiated 
insights to a real-world problem.
Lastly, this thesis also contributes to all literatures and theory focusing on knowledge, 
its creation, application, codification and computerisation.
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Chapter 13, Personal Reflections
The process of research described in this thesis led to a number of findings specific to 
the research problem. It also resulted in a number of key learning points relevant to the 
researcher and the research process, which are described in this chapter.
One such learning point involved the notion of social constructivism, which was shown 
to apply to actors in the problem domain. Thus, the research process was designed, as 
far as possible, to identify and take account of their potential biases and prejudices, in 
order that their social constructions could be better understood. However, social 
constructivism also applied to the researcher. Consequently, throughout the research 
there was also a need for both epistemic and situational reflexivity by the researcher, 
which achieved and demonstrated awareness of how epistemological commitments 
influenced her social construction of reality during the research. This was a learning 
process of achieving self and situational awareness. It required reflexive examination 
and monitoring of the grounds and reasons underpinning the researcher’s thoughts and 
actions relating to the problem and its context. It included consideration of the 
identification and scoping of the problem by the researcher, her choice of research 
methods, and the interactions and interpretations made. It also included awareness of 
the effect of the researcher and the field role upon the subjects and context of the 
research. This reflexivity was an essential element of the process of producing research 
findings that were defensible and significant in terms of the goals of the research. It 
was also felt to be even more valuable in this case, where the researcher had been a 
participant in the organisation and later became an observer. This history of 
participation brought with it significant insights, but these in turn carried the potential 
for increased levels of bias in the researcher’s view of the problem and its context.
Thus reflexivity in this context was not simply a different and more self-aware way of 
looking at events for the researcher. Rather it involved all participants in the problem 
domain and demonstrated the inherent inter-connectedness of the researcher and the 
problem domain. This enriched the researcher’s appreciation of reflexivity by enabling 
her to reposition it within the broader contexts of both Structuration Theory (Giddens, 
1976, 1984) and ANT (Callon, 1986; Law, 1987; Latour, 1996a, 1996b). This also
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further highlighted the situationally-dependent nature of reflexivity. It was approached 
as something which was never ‘achieved’, nor were methods of pursuing it ever 
considered to be definitive. Rather, as noted by Holland (1999) it was considered as 
part of an endless and dynamic process.
A further key learning point was that reflexivity clearly involved more than situational 
and epistemic awareness. This research required critical analysis of existing systems of 
knowledge which spanned the philosophical spectrum, at a level which could 
understand and articulate the sectional interests and power bases which sustained them, 
and which could evaluate the position of each through the lens of the other. As 
discussed by Holland (1999) this represents a ‘transdisciplinary form of reflexivity’ 
(Holland, 1999: 466) the value of which, it is argued, has been demonstrated in this 
thesis. This approach enabled dismantling of the boundaries of disciplines, paradigms 
and structures which, if left unaddressed, can preclude or severely limit critical 
analysis.
A second and related key learning point related to the completion of this thesis. 
Achieving sufficient transparency in the account of the research generally, and the 
reflexivity it involved, was a learning process. Specifically, it was one in which the 
perceptual and cognitive issues inherent in the faithful representation and transfer of 
knowledge, which were central to this thesis, were regularly encountered. In addition, 
the process of writing how and why particular understandings were arrived at was, in 
itself, part of the reflexive process. Writing was not confined, therefore, strictly to 
conveying understanding previously arrived at, or to consideration of presentational 
issues, important as they are to conveying meaning. It was also used as a method of 
further analysis of observations and findings. This lengthened the writing process, but 
was considered valuable in that the critical reflection it involved enabled findings to be 
further refined.
This leads to the final reflection, which it is hoped will be valuable to future 
researchers. This research was conducted on a part-time basis and production of this 
thesis was a lengthy process. Over such a protracted period of time it is always possible 
that all manner of personal and professional changes and events will occur, and in the 
event they did. It is suggested, therefore, that successful completion of such projects
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requires substantial and sustained determination and concentration, and an ability to 
maintain a level of consistency despite sometimes lengthy interruptions. It also 
depends heavily on support from interested parties. The reward however is also 
substantial, in terms of both personal and professional development.
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Appendix 1, Read 3 Contents
Occupations - Self- explanatory.
History and Observations- This chapter contains terms for clinical findings, which the 
literature says may be obtained from a clinical history, examination, assessment, special 
investigation or tests. The manner in which the information is collected is not included 
in the terms. This extra information is recorded in the patient record using what are 
known as ‘qualifiers’ (see below). Terms prefixed ‘C/O’ (complaining of) ‘H/O’ 
(history of ) ‘O/E’ (on examination) and ‘F/H’ (family history of ) are marked as 
optional and listed in the context-dependent chapter.
Disorders - This contains terms describing disease processes and abnormal function or 
form. The literature says they are arrived at by clinical interpretation.
Investigations - This lists laboratory tests and special clinical investigations. The 
terms describe the procedure rather than the results of the tests, which are listed in the 
History and Observations chapter.
Operations, Procedures and Interventions - This lists the physical procedures that 
are performed on the patient. These are usually therapeutic in nature, although it is 
recognised some may be done for diagnostic purposes, e.g. ‘laparotomy’ or ‘needle 
aspiration of the breast’
Regimes and Therapies - This contains terms for a range of non-surgical treatments 
and regimes, e.g. psychotherapy.
Prevention - This contains terms to do with contraception, obstetric care, control of 
infectious diseases and childhood examinations, e.g. ‘rhythm method contraception’, 
‘child 3 month examination’.
Causes of Injury and Poisoning - This mirrors a chapter in the ICD-10 classification 
for External Causes of Morbidity and Mortality. This is due to the need for statutory 
classified data to be produced by any hospitals using Read 3 as the primary coding 
system. In this area, of Causes of Injury and Poisoning, the axes of description between 
the two systems are very different. The classification has an interest in types of events
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which are of no apparent interest to working clinicians, e.g. ‘cardiovascular devices 
associated with adverse incidents’, ‘legal execution by beheading’. In order to serve 
the needs of statutory data collection without diminishing the clinical relevance of Read 
3, the only course open was to insert the classification chapter wholesale into Read 3 
so that Read 3 users could provide statutory data. The same applies to the ICD-10 
chapter for mental health disorders.
Tumour Morphology -This contains terms like ‘small cell carcinoma’.
Staging and Scales - This contains a list of tumour ‘staging’ systems. These are 
designed to measure the progression of tumours.
Administration - At the time of writing, this chapter was being restructured. It 
contains terms relating to GP administrative work, such as ‘patient temporarily left’, or 
‘offered child surveillance’.
Context Dependent Categories - This contains terms already embedded in ‘core 
terms’ as opposed to ‘qualifying terms’, and also offered separately here, e.g. 
‘complaining o f. A ‘Context of Care’ project had been undertaken, which delivered a 
number of terms describing the ‘context’ of a concept, e.g. ‘ordered’, and ‘done’.
Qualifiers - This contains terms which add extra detail to core terms (see below).
Attribute - This contains terms such as ‘causative agent’, ‘site’, ‘laterality’, and 
‘priority’. The attribute describes the relationship between the extra detail and the core 
term. The value is the detail itself.
Value -The following chapters contains terms that are used as values:
Drugs - This covers the range of drugs that can be prescribed under the NHS. 
Specialist sections include specialist foods, dialysis fluids, radio-pharmaceuticals and 
camouflage cosmetics, e.g. ‘Digoxin 125 milligram tablet’.
Appliances and Equipment - This contains all prescribable products in the Drug 
Tariff for England and Wales, e.g. ‘cotton crepe 5cm bandage BP’.
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Unit - This contains SI and other units used in the clinical record, e.g. ‘mm Hg’ 
(millimeters of Mercury).
Organisms - This includes a list of plants, animals, insects and all micro-organisms 
that are considered to be of significance to humans, e.g. ‘staphylococcus auras’.
Anatomical Site - This contains what are described as a comprehensive set of 
anatomical terms, sufficient to add detail to core terms in both disorders and procedures 
and regional and systematic anatomy, e.g. ‘Pouch of Douglas’, ‘superior mesenteric 
artery’.
Additional Values -  This contains structured lists of the remaining values, e.g. 
‘substances’, ‘objects’, ‘definite’, ‘mild’.
Read Thesaurus Concept Type - Each Read code concept is labelled as being of a 
certain ‘type’, as detailed in the headings in this list, e.g. ‘procedure type’, ‘prevention 
type’ etc.
It is assumed that users will not normally use the latter two chapters.
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Appendix 2, ICD-10 Contents
Certain infectious and parasitic diseases 
Neoplasms
Diseases of the Blood and blood-forming organs and certain disorders involving the 
immune mechanism
Endocrine, metabolic and nutritional diseases
Mental and behavioural disorders
Diseases of the nervous system
Diseases of the eye and adnexa
Diseases of the ear and mastoid process
Diseases of the circulatory system
Diseases of the respiratory system
Diseases of the digestive system
Diseases of the skin and subcutaneous tissue
Diseases of the musculo-skeletal system and connective tissue
Diseases of the genito-urinary system
Pregnancy, childbirth and the puerperium
Certain conditions originating in the perinatal period
Congenital malformations, deformations and chromosomal abnormalities
Symptoms, signs and abnormal clinical and laboratory findings not elsewhere classified
Injury, poisoning and certain other consequences of external causes
External causes of morbidity and mortality
Factors influencing health status and contact with health services
Morphology of neoplasms
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Appendix 3, Hospital Consultation Transcript
a. GP Referral Letter:
Dear Mr. X
Thankyou for seeing this young boy who has a right-sided hydrocele and a rather 
tight foreskin. He has had 2 episodes of balanitis but I think this will probably 
settle on its own.
I am concerned however that his hydrocele is persistent and would be grateful for 
your advice about further management.
Yours sincerely 
Dr W
Again the casenote was brought into the treatment room, where the patient was waiting 
with his mother and, after the usual greetings and putting the patient at ease, the GP 
referral letter was used as a basis for opening the discussion:
-So I see from this that there is some swelling to the testicle.
-Yes. Originally the foreskin was tight but antibiotics cleared that up, but his 
testicle is still swollen.
The Consultant then performed digital examination of the child, asking his mother who 
was also present:
-How long have you been aware of the swelling?
-About a month.
-The foreskin does look tight but I suggest we do nothing now. If there are 
repeated infections we would need to consider circumcision, but I really think this 
will settle down on its own and be perfectly normal.
He then examined the child further, explaining to the mother, who expressed concern 
that only one testicle seemed to be present, that both were there. He then explained that 
he thought the problem was a hydrocele (a swelling in the scrotum containing fluid). 
He further explained that a small operation would be necessary to sort it out. He also
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advised that a small trace of protein had been found in the urine sample the clinic had 
taken, and that that it would be analysed to check for infections.
b. Casenote sheet written by the Consultant:
A
| size 
Blood o
-swig L scrotum 
-tests—
Swig R scrotum 
tight foreskin 
R hydrocele
TCI - ligation R Hydrocele
He then dictated a letter to the child’s GP, using the above notes as the basis for it. He 
also completed the structured proforma for coding and a further proforma to put the 
child on the waiting list for treatment, detailing demographics, operations, laterality, 
whether it was a day case or not, number of days before admission, priority, referring 
GP, contract identifier, whether or not it was an extra contractual referral, whether it 
was a waiting list case, whether it was booked or planned, and who the patient was 
being referred from and to. The case note and pro forma were processed in the same 
way as for Patient A in the main body of the text (see chapter 7).
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